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This thesis aims to articulate and defend a version of a 'relational moral theory.' Many philosophers have argued that the non-instrumental value of certain relationships, such as friendship and parenthood, can explain at least some of our moral obligations. A relational moral theory extends this thought by arguing that all, or most, of our moral judgements can be explained by the non-instrumental value of one or more interpersonal relationships. The plausibility of such views depend on the possibility of identifying a relationship that all moral agents share a 'moral relationship'. While the idea of such a relationship has featured in ethical writings as early as the Stoics, few attempts have been made to develop a rigorous and precise understanding of this relationship. This thesis therefore aims to articulate and defend a plausible understanding of the moral relationship, and then to use it as a basis for outlining the structure of a genuinely relational moral theory. It will argue that the moral relationship is best understood as a broad and inclusive relationship shared by all who are vulnerable to a distinct kind of 'second-order evil.' It will then argue that the value of this relationship can provide the basis for a relational form of a contractualist moral theory based on the work of T.M. Scanlon. Understanding the nature of the moral relationship, and the role it plays in such theories, will then be seen as a means of unifying, clarifying, and responding to a number of influential objections against such theories, including objections concerning its capacity to accommodate intuitions concerning cases of aggregation and our obligations to future persons.

Time raises a host of difficult ethical questions. This doctoral project focuses on two: 1. How are "static" comparative principles (e.g. equality, desert) to be understood over time? (The Problem of Fairness & Time) 2. How might separation (in time) between agents, objects, and threats affect claims to the relevant resources? (The New Problem of Temporal Distance) My work begins with a simple observation: our prima facie intuitions about the value of simple distributions change depending on whether such cases are presented as static (occurring at one time) or dynamic (extended over time). Further examination of more complicated distributions leads to the proposal of a new theory, Weighted Progressive Egalitarianism. This theory has two features: only past-regarding complaints matter (a scope restriction), and a comparative complaint between persons located at a great temporal distance matters less than a complaint between contemporaries (a weighting restriction). This theory provides one plausible answer to the first question, the Problem of Fairness & Time. The evaluation of this theory relies on and reveals some non-standard answers to the second question, the New Problem of Temporal Distance. I conclude by arguing that the theory’s application to a few puzzles in population axiology merits further investigation.

Can contemporary liberalism justify antidiscrimination law? The question seems impertinent until we consider contemporary liberalism’s commitment to limited government. Once we do, we realize that contemporary liberals may not complacently assume that their theories justify antidiscrimination law simply because discrimination based on race or sex is so obviously wrongful. Rather, they must scrutinize antidiscrimination law just as they do other regulation of individual conduct. Providing such scrutiny, this thesis argues that three of the most prominent contemporary liberal doctrines of political legitimacy—John Rawls’s “political liberalism,” an antiperfectionist version of the “harm principle,” and Joseph Raz’s “liberal perfectionism”—all fail to justify core applications of antidiscrimination law, applications that we intuitively consider perfectly legitimate. In light of this failure, contemporary liberalism faces a dilemma: it must jettison either its commitment to comprehensive, uniform antidiscrimination regimes or its antiperfectionism and overriding commitment to personal autonomy. This thesis argues for the latter course by providing an account of the wrongfulness of discrimination based on race or sex that condemns all instances of the conduct. According to this account, discrimination is wrong because acting on discriminatory intentions is wrong. More specifically, by taking another person’s race or sex as a reason to treat her less favorably than one would treat people of other races or the other sex, one fails to respect her as a person, to regard her as a being of ultimate value. Unlike contemporary liberal accounts, this account is fully perfectionist, since it defines discrimination in terms of the intentions of discriminators, and the intentions of discriminators in terms of their attitudes, which partly constitute their moral characters. So long as we remain committed to antidiscrimination law in its current form, we must attend to discriminators’ characters. And to attend to discriminators’ characters, we must be willing to espouse perfectionism.

The development of predictive biomarkers in neuroscience is increasingly enabling bioprediction of adverse behavioural events, from psychosis to impulsive violent reaction. Because many brain-based disorders can be thought of as end-states of a long development, bioprediction carries immense therapeutic potential. In this thesis, I analyse issues raised by the development of bioprediction of brain-based disorder. I argue that ethical analysis of probabilities and risk information bioprediction provides is confounded by philosophical and social structures that have, until recently, functioned nominally well by assuming categorical (binary) concepts of disorder, especially regarding brain-disorder. Through an analysis of the philosophical concept of disorder, I argue that we can and ought to reorient disorder around probability of future harm and stratify disorder based on the magnitude of risk. Rejection of binary concepts in favour of this non-binary (probability-based) one enables synergy with bioprediction and circumnavigation of ethical concerns raised about proposed disorders of risk in psychiatry and neurology; I specifically consider psychosis and dementia risk. I then show how probabilistic thinking enables consideration of the implications of bioprediction for two areas salient in mental health: moral responsibility and justice. Using the example of epilepsy and driving as a model of obligations to protect others against risk of harm, I discuss how the development of bioprediction is poised to enhance moral responsibility. I then engage with legal cases and science surrounding a predictive biomarker of impulsive violent reaction to propose that bioprediction can sometimes rightly diminish responsibility. Finally, I show the relevance of bioprediction to theories of distributive justice that assign priority to the worse off. Because bioprediction enables the identification of those who are worse off in a way of which we have previously been ignorant, a commitment to assign priority to the worse off requires development of and equal access to biopredictive technologies.

This diploma thesis deals with the Aristotelian virtue ethics and its renaissance in the twentieth century. Ethics is first defined generally as a separate science which belongs to the practical sciences. Subsequently, the emphasis on virtue ethics as one of the directions of normative ethics. A key part of the thesis deals with the ethics of virtue in Aristotle and interpretation corresponding more or less to the interpretation of the work of Nicomachean Ethics. The emphasis is on concepts of virtue, bliss and goodness. The development of u virtue ethics from the time of Aristotle until the twentieth century is also mentioned. The last part deals with the form of virtue ethics in the twentieth century, including the process how the ethics of virtue acquired its present form. It is also compared to the interpretation of virtue ethics in Aristotle and in the works of modern moral philosophers, particularly the work of Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue is emphasized.