Zugl.: Mainz, Univ., Diss., 2005

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Donald MacKinnon (1913-1994) is arguably one of the most influential Anglican theologians in the British context in the second half of the 20th century. His writings reveal a restive and unsystematic thinker, yet there is a good case to be made that a series of reoccurring questions – ‘obsessions’ might better suit MacKinnon’s temperament –appear throughout. These relate to the demands of moral realism, the tensions between the philosophical positions of realism and idealism generally, and the perennially disruptive presence of Christ, whose redemptive significance cannot be fully appreciated apart from a tragic ascription. The first chapter proposes a new lens through which MacKinnon’s project may be viewed. It will characterise his work as a form of ‘therapeutic’ philosophy that combines a call for intense interiority and moral realism in a way that sees these notions as mutually involved and reinforcing. As the chapter progresses the extent to which Kant lies behind much of MacKinnon’s therapeutic language of ‘purgation’ and ‘illumination’ will become clear. So too the fact that moral realism becomes, for MacKinnon, both the end of a certain therapeutic discipline and a commitment that shapes his engagement with philosophy and theology at every level. It characterises a ‘form of life’. MacKinnon never sets out a systematic defence of moral realism nor for his insistence that the tension between idealism and realism is at once a) something crucial for theologians to confront explicitly, b) a tension that necessarily exists and remains perennially unsolved, and c) results in the continued need for a language of metaphysics. Yet, these ideas occur again and again throughout his corpus. They emerge as philosophical inevitabilities from within the task of continued description and redescription of human experience in all its historical particularity. An examination of the key influences on MacKinnon follows in Chapter 2, and it is here we can detect one of the sources of MacKinnon’s restiveness as he seeks to imbibe insights from a confident moral apologic theology of the previous generation, while at the same time respecting the ways in which the analytical turn had highlighted the impossibility of such projects. The rest of the thesis is spent looking at various domains in which MacKinnon’s therapeutic moral realism comes to the fore. These include his understanding of Christ (Chapter 3), his convictions as to the indispensability of good literature for moral philosophy (Chapter 4) and his response to Wittgenstein as he sought to articulate his own distinctive moral and theological convictions (Chapter 5). The thesis concludes with words of affirmation and critique, having shown MacKinnon to represent a compelling voice in support of catholic humanism that remains provocative into the 21st century.

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<p>Heightened awareness of the evolutionary, socio-cultural, and psychological origins of our moral judgments pushes many of us in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of doubting the objective truth of our moral judgments. But should awareness of the origins of our moral judgments shake our confidence in them? Are there good moral debunking challenges or debunking arguments from premises concerning the accessible origins of our moral judgments to skeptical conclusions regarding them? In vigorous pursuit of these questions, this dissertation sifts three promising moral debunking challenges to moral realism, namely Richard Joyce's (2001) evolutionary debunking argument from epistemic insensitivity, Sharon Street's (2006) "Darwinian Dilemma," and David Enoch's (2010) "Epistemological Challenge." It is argued that each challenge faces cogent objections that not only demonstrate the inadequacy of the best debunking challenges available but also instructively guide us to the development of new and more forceful debunking challenges to moral realism. This dissertation develops two new and forceful debunking challenges, both of which target the epistemic reliability and justification of our moral judgments on realist views of the moral facts. The first new debunking challenge starts from the premise that the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth and invokes a new species of epistemic insensitivity to secure the conclusion that our moral belief-forming processes are epistemically unreliable. The second new debunking challenge reasons that the best explanation of the fact that moral realists have no good explanation of the reliability of our moral belief-forming processes is that there is no such reliability.</p> / Dissertation

Selon la version courante du « dilemme d’Euthyphron », on considère que lorsque les théistes tentent de décrire la relation entre Dieu et la morale, ils doivent choisir entre volontarisme théologique et objectivisme robuste (le réalisme moral, en particulier). Selon la première option, les statuts moraux fondamentaux dépendent essentiellement des volontés contingentes, ou nécessaires, de Dieu. Selon la deuxième, Dieu agit en conformité avec un ordre moral objectif et nécessaire, en lui-même indépendant de sa volonté, comme il l’est de tout type de volonté ou de pro-attitude, au moins pour ce qui est des statuts moraux fondamentaux (et les propriétés morales sont conséquentielles aux propriétés non morales, sinon réductibles à elles). Ici nous argumentons en faveur de l’existence d’une troisième possibilité pour les théistes, refusant l’externalisme moral assumé par les deux premières options. Selon cette troisième option, on nie qu’objets, états de choses, actions ou personnes puissent posséder une valeur ou générer des obligations morales indépendamment de l’ensemble de nos pro-attitudes et des fins que nous sommes inclinés à poursuivre. Nous proposons, contre les objections réalistes en particulier, la défense d’une version universaliste (ou non relativiste) de cette position métaéthique, et tentons de montrer sa compatibilité avec le théisme classique : la théorie anti-objectiviste de la loi naturelle, selon laquelle les valeurs et les normes pertinentes pour nous dépendent de notre complexe motivationnel, en dépendant de nos inclinations universellement partagées et des fins (ou de la fin) en lesquelles (en laquelle) nous trouvons notre achèvement et notre bonheur. / According to the common version of the “Euthyphro dilemma”, it is generally considered that when theists try to describe the relation between God and morality, they must either opt for theological voluntarism or for hard objectivism (moral realism, in particular). According to the first option, fundamental moral statuses depend essentially on God’s contingent, or even necessary, will. According to the second, God acts in conformity to an objective (and necessary) moral order that is in itself independent of His will, as it is of any kind of pro-attitude, will or desire, at least for the most fundamental and prior moral statuses (and moral properties are consequential upon nonmoral ones, if not reducible to them). I argue here for the existence of a third possibility for theists, rejecting the metaethical externalism assumed by the first two options. According to this third option, it is not the case that objects, state of affairs, actions or persons can have value or generate obligations to us independently of all our pro-attitudes and of the ends we are inclined to pursue. I propose a defence, against realist objections in particular, of a universalist (or non relativist) version of that metaethical position and try to show its compatibility with classical theism : the anti-objectivist natural law theory, according to which values and norms relevant for us depend on our motivational set, depending on our – universally shared – natural inclinations or essential dispositions to love and pursue certain ends (or possibly one ultimate end) preferently to others, and to find our completion and happiness in them (in it).

This PhD thesis provides an extended evaluation of evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics. Such arguments attempt to show that evolutionary theory, together with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, lead to moral scepticism: the implausible view that we lack moral knowledge or that our moral beliefs are never justified (e.g. Joyce 2006, Street 2005, Kahane 2011). To establish that, these arguments rely on certain epistemic principles. But most of the epistemic principles appealed to in the literature on evolutionary debunking arguments are imprecise, confused or simply implausible. My PhD aims to rectify that. Informed by debates in cutting-edge contemporary epistemology, Chapter 1 distinguishes three general, independently motivated principles that, combined with evolution, seem to render knowledge of robustly objective moral facts problematic. These epistemic principles state that (i.) our getting facts often right in a given domain requires explanation - and if we cannot provide one, our beliefs about that domain are unjustified; (ii.) higher-order evidence of error undermines justification; and (iii.) for our beliefs to be justified, our having them must be best explained by the facts they are about. Chapters 2-4 develop and critically assess evolutionary debunking arguments based on those principles, showing that only the one inspired by (iii.) succeeds. Chapter 2 investigates the argument that evolution makes explaining why we get moral facts often right impossible. I argue that Justin Clarke-Doane's recent response (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017) works, yet neglects an issue about epistemic luck that spells trouble for robust moral objectivity. Chapter 3 discusses the argument that evolution provides higher-order evidence of error regarding belief in robustly objective moral facts. I show that such an argument falls prey to Katia Vavova's (2014) self-defeat objection, even if evolutionary debunkers tweak their background view on the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. Chapter 4 develops the argument that evolution, rather than robustly objective moral facts, best explains why we hold our moral beliefs. I offer a systematic, comprehensive defence of that argument against Andreas Mogensen's (2015) charge of explanatory levels confusion, Terrence Cuneo's (2007) companion in guilt strategy, and David Enoch's (2012, 2016) appeal to deliberative indispensability. Chapter 5 brings everything together. It investigates whether robust moral objectivity survives the worry about epistemic luck raised in Chapter 2 and the explanatory challenge developed in Chapter 4. Making progress, however, requires a better idea of how we form true, justified beliefs about and acquire knowledge of robustly objective moral facts. Since it offers the most popular and best-developed epistemology of robustly objective morality, my inquiry in Chapter 5 focuses on contemporary moral intuitionism: the view that moral intuitions can be the source of basic moral knowledge. I argue that its success is mixed. While moral intuitionism has the conceptual tools to tackle the problem of epistemic luck from Chapter 2, it cannot insulate knowledge of robustly objective moral facts against the sceptical worry raised by the evolutionary debunking argument developed in Chapter 4. Thus, evolutionary theory, together with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, does lead to a form of unacceptable moral scepticism.

Question-asking has long been an integral part of human learning. In scholarly investigations over the past several decades, questions have been studied in terms of the answers they generate, their grammatical structure, their cognitive functions, their logical content, and their social dynamics. Studies of student classroom questioning have focused on science education and reading instruction particularly; they detail the reasons why students don't ask questions and explore a plethora of recommendations about teaching students how to question. This qualitative study addressed question-asking from a hermeneutic moral realist perspective, studying question-asking as it unfolded in the everyday practice of learning in a graduate seminar on design thinking. Findings of the study included seven themes that fit within three broader metathemes about the complexities and virtues of classroom questioning, the sociality of question-asking, and the temporality of questions in practice. Specific themes of the study concerned the complexity of overlapping practices within the classroom, ways in which students evaluated the quality and virtue of their questioning interactions, the moral reference points that guided student participation in various kinds of questioning (i.e., convergent questions, divergent questions, challenges to others), and the temporality of question-asking that reflected the way questions mattered to the students and how different aspects of the subject matter were disclosed and concealed in the process of learning. Findings from this study suggest that a moral realist-oriented inquiry can provide a wide-ranging and nuanced set of insights regarding question-asking as a part of student learning.

This thesis is an exploration of the role of a new course design method in the teaching practice of faculty at Brigham Young University (BYU). This method, used by teaching and learning consultants at BYU, is termed authentic purposeful design. It encourages faculty to succinctly define what their course will help students become, use principles of backward design to align all course elements to that purpose, and teach the course with its core purpose in mind. The course design and teaching methods of 3 faculty members who used authentic purposeful design were studied using a qualitative research approach. Themes emerged regarding various values and forces involved as teachers strive for excellence, as well as the roles and dynamics that authentic purposeful design can have in relation to those efforts. The study also revealed ways that the formulation and use of authentic purposeful design could be altered for greater utility by consultants at BYU and other institutions of higher education.

My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical naturalists must either (a) build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures (or varying moral belief systems) into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or (b) insist, in the face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for their moral beliefs was never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. This will bring me to suggest that moral properties might only weakly supervene upon natural phenomena. But, according to the other horn of the dilemma, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge.