This thesis aims to articulate and defend a version of a 'relational moral theory.' Many philosophers have argued that the non-instrumental value of certain relationships, such as friendship and parenthood, can explain at least some of our moral obligations. A relational moral theory extends this thought by arguing that all, or most, of our moral judgements can be explained by the non-instrumental value of one or more interpersonal relationships. The plausibility of such views depend on the possibility of identifying a relationship that all moral agents share a 'moral relationship'. While the idea of such a relationship has featured in ethical writings as early as the Stoics, few attempts have been made to develop a rigorous and precise understanding of this relationship. This thesis therefore aims to articulate and defend a plausible understanding of the moral relationship, and then to use it as a basis for outlining the structure of a genuinely relational moral theory. It will argue that the moral relationship is best understood as a broad and inclusive relationship shared by all who are vulnerable to a distinct kind of 'second-order evil.' It will then argue that the value of this relationship can provide the basis for a relational form of a contractualist moral theory based on the work of T.M. Scanlon. Understanding the nature of the moral relationship, and the role it plays in such theories, will then be seen as a means of unifying, clarifying, and responding to a number of influential objections against such theories, including objections concerning its capacity to accommodate intuitions concerning cases of aggregation and our obligations to future persons.

Human existence (or be-ing) is profoundly relational. Yet educational environments often assume that learning happens individually. Though many educators are trying to rectify this problem by introducing community into the learning process, these efforts are too often simply overlaid onto a system that works through competition and rewards individual achievement. Therefore, an alternative perspective for who we are as humans and how we should be together is needed. In this dissertation, I examine what it means to be fundamentally related and show how such an understanding might impact learning. We often think of “community” as a place, but I also use it to embody an alternative understanding of human be-ing: how we are and should be related and the process by which we can learn to embrace our ethical responsibilities. This second way of understanding community addresses a mode of be-ing that describes how we should come together: with (or “com”) unity. I use religious narratives to explore what a non-modern understanding of relational be-ing might mean for education. Looking at community in a religious context is helpful because it offers a different framework for understanding human be-ing. Using three stories found in Genesis—(a) the Creation of the world including the introduction of Adam and Eve, (b) their Fall, and (c) their Expulsion from Eden—I argue that they reveal the importance of three aspects of community: (a) diversity, a deep appreciation for our and others' enduring individuality, (b) unity, a willingness to be responsible both to and for others in a particular, ethical way, and (c) work, the catalyst for coming together and making relationships purposeful. Understanding how the aspects of diversity, unity, and work strengthen supportive relationships is an important way to understand community, including learning communities. It suggests that the purpose of education should be to help learners realize their moral responsibilities to others and teach them how to respond to that obligation. Moral learning communities can generate experiences that speak more authentically to human be-ing. They enhance education so that learning becomes not only more meaningful but truly life-changing.