This thesis aims to use general assertions of moral uncertainty as a perspective by which to explore and illuminate contemporary strands of liberal theory. It examines the work of the earlier contemporary liberal theorists, including John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman, as well as the more recent accounts of liberalism that express ideas of pluralism (Michael Walzer, Joseph Raz, John Gray, William Galston, George Crowder), political liberalism (John Rawls, Charles Larmore), public reason (Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Gerald Gaus), multiculturalism (Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Brian Barry, James Tully, and Bikhu Parekh), and postmodernism (Richard Rorty). The development from the earlier to more recent liberal theories represents a fundamental shift in justificatory strategy: where earlier liberal conceptions aim at universality, and at overcoming or transcending uncertainty, later approaches make this uncertainty, usually in the form of pluralism or difference, central to the liberal project. In order to achieve this, these latter theories tended to presuppose the circumstances of western society, or western democratic values. Generally speaking, these approaches fail to respond adequately to moral uncertainty, and to meet their own justificatory aims. This manifests, in the earlier theories, as plausible but contestable central conceptions, and, in the more recent theories, as the inability to justify particular liberal conceptions in the face of persistence difference. This is an important result, and suggests the need for further developments in liberal justificatory strategies. I suggest that one viable approach would be for liberal theory to accept moral uncertainty, and work from a model of society and self towards a more successful liberal conception.

This paper concerns the issue of ignorance about values, and how to best deal with it.I try to find out what we ought to do when we are ignorant of what it is valuable topromote. The proposed solution is an indirect system of “provisional values”, builtaround three goals that are likely to increase our chances of achieving real value,should such a thing be possible.These three provisional goals the system gives us are as follows: knowledge,optionality, and diversity.Knowledge is the traditional way of trying to relieve our ignorance and has beenthe focus of most philosophizing about value.Optionality means having options, or the power to act differently. This is likelyto become important should we ever discover what it is actually valuable to do.Finally, diversity is simply the idea that, not knowing what truly is valuable, weshould do as much as possible of everything in the hope that some of it may bevaluable. / Denna uppsats handlar om problemet med vår brist på kunskap om värde och hur manbäst hanterar det. Jag försöker ta reda på vad vi borde göra i situationer där vi ärokunniga om vilka mål som är värdefulla att uppnå. Den lösning som föreslås är ettindirekt system av ”provisoriskt värde”. Detta system är uppbyggt kring tre mål somsannolikt kommer att öka våra chanser att uppnå direkta eller verkliga värden, om ensådan sak skulle vara möjlig. Dessa tre provisoriska mål som systemet ger oss ärföljande: kunskap, optionalitet och mångfald.Kunskap är det traditionella sättet att försöka lindra vår okunnighet, och harvarit fokus för det mesta filosoferandet om värde.Optionalitet innebär att ha alternativ eller makten att agera annorlunda. Dettakommer sannolikt att bli viktigt om vi någonsin upptäcker vad det är värdefullt attgöra.Slutligen är mångfald helt enkelt tanken att om vi inte vet vad som verkligen ärvärdefullt så bör vi göra så mycket som möjligt av allt i hopp om att något av det kanvisa sig värdefullt.