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This thesis aims to use general assertions of moral uncertainty as a perspective by which to explore and illuminate contemporary strands of liberal theory. It examines the work of the earlier contemporary liberal theorists, including John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman, as well as the more recent accounts of liberalism that express ideas of pluralism (Michael Walzer, Joseph Raz, John Gray, William Galston, George Crowder), political liberalism (John Rawls, Charles Larmore), public reason (Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Gerald Gaus), multiculturalism (Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Brian Barry, James Tully, and Bikhu Parekh), and postmodernism (Richard Rorty). The development from the earlier to more recent liberal theories represents a fundamental shift in justificatory strategy: where earlier liberal conceptions aim at universality, and at overcoming or transcending uncertainty, later approaches make this uncertainty, usually in the form of pluralism or difference, central to the liberal project. In order to achieve this, these latter theories tended to presuppose the circumstances of western society, or western democratic values. Generally speaking, these approaches fail to respond adequately to moral uncertainty, and to meet their own justificatory aims. This manifests, in the earlier theories, as plausible but contestable central conceptions, and, in the more recent theories, as the inability to justify particular liberal conceptions in the face of persistence difference. This is an important result, and suggests the need for further developments in liberal justificatory strategies. I suggest that one viable approach would be for liberal theory to accept moral uncertainty, and work from a model of society and self towards a more successful liberal conception.

Doctor Legum - LLD / The success of any human rights system at the domestic, regional or international level requires an adequate development of the normative, institutional and jurisprudential frameworks. With regard to the African Commission, its approach on the normative and jurisprudential framework on evidence obtained through human rights violations is critiqued. The study is guided by three research questions on the African Commission’s normative and jurisprudential framework, and interrogates the need for improvement. While other human rights bodies like the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee have developed jurisprudence, their experiences can only be useful to Africa where they are subjected to a framework that speaks to an accused, in Africa in light of his or her peculiar situation. An evaluation of the African Commission’s mode of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations, followed by an evaluation of the mode engaged by other human rights bodies offers a platform to selectively, and with necessary adoption recommend a framework that the Africa Commission can use to improve its jurisprudence. In this regard, the study draws on the experiences of other human rights bodies to aid, the development of a framework to improve the jurisprudence of the African Commission. The study situates theoretical underpinnings that inform the decisions of the African Commission, the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee. This is followed by an evaluation of the normative and jurisprudential frameworks of the three human rights bodies. The study proposes a framework based on a victim-centred approach to improve the jurisprudence of the African Commission on evidence obtained through human rights violations.

The Kantian Triangle of democratic institutions, IGOs, and economic interdependence has received a great deal of attention by international relations scholars. This project expands on liberal theory by arguing the pacific effects of the Kantian Triangle extend beyond dyadic context, and shapes state decision making on defense spending decisions. This project asserts that as states (1) build democratic institutions, (2) increase the number of memberships in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and (3) exposes domestic markets to the global economy and subsequent interdependence on foreign markets for both imports and exports, they are less likely to allocate resources toward the military. To test this argument I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods. I first utilize a pooled time series data set of all states from 1960-2000. I then examine the case of Brazil and its relationship with the Kantian Triangle and subsequent military planning decisions. I conclude that there is mixed evidence to support the notion that the Kantian Triangle reduces military spending. I establish that while democracies reduce military spending, consolidated democracies enjoy no additional benefit in military spending. However, the longer states are democracies the more likely they are to reduce spending, and if they have electoral systems based on consensus designs. I find that IGO memberships reduce military spending, however, the bulk of influence IGOs have on military spending decisions are retained by security focused organizations. Lastly, I find that international trade and overall economic globalization increases military spending, while regional trade decreases it. In all the Kantian Triangle has a substantial influence on military spending, yet it is clear from this project that this influence is not universal among all elements of the Kantian Triangle, and that the liberal influences are not completely pacific.

A major weakness of the literature on the regulation of freedom of expression within the field of political science is the assumption of peaceful, liberal democratic conditions. My project seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the legitimate regulation of speech by analyzing disciplinary approaches to freedom of expression through the lens of countries recovering from intractable conflict. I ask: How appropriate are current understandings of freedom of expression to the regulation of speech in post-conflict environments? Relying on insights from the field of social psychology and the case of post-genocide Rwanda, I argue that greater restrictions on freedom of expression could be legitimate in countries recovering from intractable conflict. However, rights derogations must take place within limits so as not to become a tool of authoritarian rule.

A major weakness of the literature on the regulation of freedom of expression within the field of political science is the assumption of peaceful, liberal democratic conditions. My project seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the legitimate regulation of speech by analyzing disciplinary approaches to freedom of expression through the lens of countries recovering from intractable conflict. I ask: How appropriate are current understandings of freedom of expression to the regulation of speech in post-conflict environments? Relying on insights from the field of social psychology and the case of post-genocide Rwanda, I argue that greater restrictions on freedom of expression could be legitimate in countries recovering from intractable conflict. However, rights derogations must take place within limits so as not to become a tool of authoritarian rule.

A major weakness of the literature on the regulation of freedom of expression within the field of political science is the assumption of peaceful, liberal democratic conditions. My project seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the legitimate regulation of speech by analyzing disciplinary approaches to freedom of expression through the lens of countries recovering from intractable conflict. I ask: How appropriate are current understandings of freedom of expression to the regulation of speech in post-conflict environments? Relying on insights from the field of social psychology and the case of post-genocide Rwanda, I argue that greater restrictions on freedom of expression could be legitimate in countries recovering from intractable conflict. However, rights derogations must take place within limits so as not to become a tool of authoritarian rule.

Peace has finally come to Aceh. The Indonesian province has suffered for over 30 years through conflict with the Indonesian army. Instrumental in having achieved this peaceful outcome has been the role of the European Union (EU). Its crucial monitoring role and long term commitment had a profound impact on the province, helping to end the hostilities and to rebuild Aceh. The EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is the central feature of this thesis. Like Aceh, Europe has experienced wars. However, since the beginnings of Western European institution building, peace and cooperation in the region transpired. This phenomenon has spread across the continent. The progressive structure enabled the EU to flourish as a cooperative institution, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War east-west division. This period also gave the EU an opportunity to expand its peaceful legacy by exporting its values abroad. The development of the EU's external capability to deliver such aspirations is a central part of this thesis. The thesis seeks to draw a connection with the EU's quest to bring peace to Aceh with international relations (IR) theory. As such, it assesses the EU's motives and interests in the Aceh peace process to discover what they were based on. After assessing both realist and liberalist IR viewpoints, the thesis’ central findings confirm the liberal motives of the EU. The EU has predominantly acted in the interests of Aceh. It helped bring many liberal based values to the province and experienced constructive relations with Indonesia and other powers in the region. Whilst realist orientated EU power motives are outlined, the EU's liberal agenda based on mediation, peace and security, multilateralism, democracy and human rights - as core liberal elements - are more convincing explanations as this thesis argues.

This dissertation evaluates the recent academic consensus on liberal multiculturalism. I argue that this apparent consensus, by subsuming religious experience under the general category of culture, has rested upon undefended and contestable conceptions of modern religious life. In the liberal multicultural literature, cultures are primarily identified as sharing certain ethnic, linguistic, or geographic attributes, which is to say morally arbitrary particulars that can be defended without raising the possibility of conflict over metaphysical beliefs. In such theories, the possibility of conflict due to diverse religious principles or claims to the transcendent is either steadfastly ignored or, more typically, explained away as the expression of perverted religious faith. I argue that this conception of the relation between culture and religion fails to provide an account of liberal multiculturalism that is persuasive to religious believers on their own terms. To illustrate this failing, I begin with an examination of the Canadian policy of official multiculturalism and the constitutional design of Pierre Trudeau. I argue that the resistance of Québécois nationalists to liberal multiculturalism, as well as the conflict between the Québécois and minority religious groups within Quebec, has been animated by religious and quasi-religious claims to the transcendent. I maintain that to truly confront this basic problem of religious difference, one must articulate and defend the substantive visions of religious life that are implicit in liberal multicultural theory. To this end, I contrast the portrait of religious life and secularization that is implicit in Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights with the recent account of modern religious life presented by Charles Taylor. I conclude by suggesting that Kymlicka’s and Taylor’s contrasting conceptions of religious difference—which are fundamentally at odds regarding the relation of the right to the good, and the diversity and nature of genuine religious belief—underline the extent to which liberal multicultural theory has reached an academic consensus only by ignoring the reality of religious diversity. / text

Objectifs : Le mémoire examine la privatisation en Bulgarie à partir d'une certaine distance historique de 25 ans, pour démontrer les conséquences sociales présentement visibles, entre autres les inégalités sociales par rapport au développement économique; l’impact démographique aussi que les nouvelles structures et valeurs sociales. Méthode: Nous utilisons une approche à deux volets. Pour le développement socio-économique, nous étudions six variables constantes pour la période, telles que le nombre de personnes en dessous du seuil de pauvreté, le PIB, l'indice Gini, les dynamiques démographiques, le taux de chômage et l'indice de développement humain; Pour les changements sociaux, les nouvelles structures et les valeurs, nous utiliserons une approche qualitative, basée sur des entrevues, des questionnaires, des études de terrain, etc. Résultats: Nous constatons que les résultats obtenus par les deux méthodes, ceci comprenant leurs limitations, correspondent plutôt à notre hypothèse : la privatisation en Bulgarie était économiquement nécessaire, mais socialement destructive et a entraîné des conséquences sociales dévastatrices à long terme, principalement en raison des politiques et des pratiques de privatisation défectueuses. La privatisation a émergé de la théorie néo-libérale économique prédominant à l'époque. Les pratiques spécifiques utilisées dans la privatisation Bulgare ont favorisé principalement à court terme certains petits groupes sociaux, mais pas la société dans son ensemble. Conclusion: Nous constatons que la façon dont la privatisation bulgare a été menée a été socialement et économiquement nuisible avec des conséquences continues. À long terme, l'économie s'est rétablie, mais les divergences sociales ont toujours une tendance à croître. / Objectives : We look at the privatization in Bulgaria as defined above from a certain historical distance of 25 years, trying follow the visible now social consequences of the privatization, such as social inequality vs economic development; demographic impact and new social structures and values. Method: We use a two-prong approach. For the socio-economic development we study six constant variables for the defined period such as number of people below poverty line, GDP, Gini Index, demographic dynamcs, employment rate, and Human development index; for the social changes, new structures and values we use a qualitative approach, based on based on interviews, questionnaires, field studies, etc. Results: We find that results by both methods, with all the limittaions they have, rather align with our hypothesis that privatization in Bulgaria was economically necessary, but socially destructive and led to devastating social consequences, mainly as a result of flawed privatization policies and practices. It did emerge from the predominant at that time neo-liberal economic view and the specific practices used in the Bulgarian privatization favoured mainly in short term for some small social groups but for the society as a whole. Conclusion: We find that the way Bulgarian privatization was conducted was socially and economically damaging with long lasting consequences. In the long run the economy has recoverd, however the social divergences tend to grow.