South Africa is a developing country. It has been an active participant in the multilateral trading system since the creation of the new democratic government in May 1994. However, the country's role in the history of the multilateral trading system before this was very different. South Africa was a founding member of the GATT in 1947. The apartheid regime positioned itself within the organisation as a developed country and behaved as such. This study examines over 800 GATT documents on the country's participation in the GATT from 1947 to 1994. These documents have not been examined or studied before in any comprehensive manner. Although there is a vast literature on the history of the GATT, much of this is written from an orthodox standpoint, especially on the role of developing countries (Bhagwati, 2002; Srinivasan, 1998; Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995; Martin and Messerlin, 2007). More recently, there has been some revisionist academic literature on the GATT (Wilkinson, 2006, 2014; Wilkinson and Scott, 2008). This empirical study contributes to the work of the revisionists. An examination of the GATT documentation raises three main questions that this study sets out to examine. First, why did Apartheid South Africa project itself as a developed country in the GATT from its formation in 1947? Second, how was South Africa able to implement its domestic protectionist and discriminatory policies and still adhere to the ideas and principles of the GATT? And third, why did the major players in the GATT reflect a tendency to deviate from the main ideas and principles of the GATT in their trade practices vis-a-vis South Africa?John Ruggie's work on ideas and multilateralism and his concept of 'embedded liberalism' to describe the post-war multilateral economic institutions, including the GATT, is utilised to analyse the above questions. This study argues that while Ruggie's work is helpful in setting out the main ideas that drove the creation of the GATT and that became the core principles of the organisation, this analytical work on the multilateral trading system is incomplete and will need to be extended by other theoretical work. The GATT documentation reveals that there was a gap between the ideals of the multilateral trading system and the practice of both South Africa and the developed countries within the organisation. While they both professed their commitment to the GATT ideas of liberalisation, non-discrimination and reciprocity, their practices often tended towards protectionism, discrimination and the exclusion of developing countries. To explain this contradictory behaviour this study has drawn on the revisionist history of the GATT. This extended analytical framework is utilised to analyse the GATT documentation on South Africa.

The World Trade Organization’s agreements contain a national security exception, that allows WTO members to circumvent their international trade obligations under the organization if they find it necessary to protect their essential security interests. The exception embodies the complex and difficultly navigated line between national security and free trade. National sovereignty is a matter that is widely considered to go beyond the interests of trade, a notion from which the need of a security exception spawns, while circumvention of the WTO obligations for any other reason than honest and real intent to uphold security clearly undermines the system.  To date, two WTO panels have interpreted a subparagraph of the national security exception, namely the case where a member may adopt measures they find necessary for the protection of their essential security interests in times of war or other emergency in international relations. To satisfy the requirements under this provision, a member must adhere to the principle of good faith by articulating its essential security interest, and elucidate the link between these interests and the trade restrictive measures adopted. However, the panels failed to properly scrutinize the existence of good faith. Instead, fulfillment of these requirements was determined by how close the emergency in international relation lied to the hard core of armed conflict. In this essay, it is argued that the failure to properly review good faith leaves a legal loophole that enables abuse of the exception for purely economic reasons. Previously, the atmosphere of the trading system allowed security and economic matters to more easily be kept apart. However, recent developments of national trade policies and the rise of new economic powers have changed the balance of the geoeconomic order.  Because uncodified powers no longer efficiently suppress security disputes from entering the WTO, this essay concludes that the security exception might have to be clarified to prevent abuse. Considering the changes to the trading regime’s state of play, the main discussion held is on whether an evolutionary interpretation of the term “emergency in international relations” could help remedy the loophole in the national security exception. As the multilateral trading system is facing challenges much different from the post-war environment in which the exception was drafted, the security exception must be interpreted in a dynamic manner to ensure compliance with the intention of its drafting parties.

L'OMC existe et l'Algérie a présenté sa candidature. Cette procédure d'accession dure depuis plus de 23 ans et n'a toujours pas abouti. L'objet de cette thèse est d'expliquer les raisons apparentes et profondes de la lenteur de cette candidature en s'appuyant sur la situation de l'Algérie et sur les modalités de fonctionnement du système commercial multilatéral. / The WTO exists and Algeria has applied to be a member. This application process has been going on for over 23 years and has not reached a conclusioon yet. The aim of this thesis is to explain the reasons both obvious and hidden for the slowness of the process based on the situation of Algeria and on the working rules of the multilateral trade system.

<p>How does the recent wave of preferential trading arrangements affect, the incentives for further trade liberalization of member states, and the possibility of obtaining global free trade? And are there any differences in this aspect between custom unions and other forms of preferential trading arrangements? These questions are well debated and have divided international trade researchers into two camps, one in favour for preferential trading arrangements and the other side against them. I have used well acknowledged researchers in the area of international trade theory to make a literature study of the above mentioned key elements in the debate. When comparing the two sides I have focused mainly on their differences, assumptions and results. I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing to be alarmed by of the wave of regionalism that’s occurring in the world today, but caution should be applied and more research in this area is necessary before any certain conclusions can be drawn. Free trade association seems to be welfare enhancing in general, with a few exceptions. I have found that the crucial points of what affect Free Trade Agreements will have on trade liberalization seems to be whether they are open or closed, how asymmetric the world is and the size of the trading blocs. The matter concerning custom unions are more alarming and seems to harm further trade liberalization in many aspects but this area also needs more research to give more reliable answers.</p>

How does the recent wave of preferential trading arrangements affect, the incentives for further trade liberalization of member states, and the possibility of obtaining global free trade? And are there any differences in this aspect between custom unions and other forms of preferential trading arrangements? These questions are well debated and have divided international trade researchers into two camps, one in favour for preferential trading arrangements and the other side against them. I have used well acknowledged researchers in the area of international trade theory to make a literature study of the above mentioned key elements in the debate. When comparing the two sides I have focused mainly on their differences, assumptions and results. I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing to be alarmed by of the wave of regionalism that’s occurring in the world today, but caution should be applied and more research in this area is necessary before any certain conclusions can be drawn. Free trade association seems to be welfare enhancing in general, with a few exceptions. I have found that the crucial points of what affect Free Trade Agreements will have on trade liberalization seems to be whether they are open or closed, how asymmetric the world is and the size of the trading blocs. The matter concerning custom unions are more alarming and seems to harm further trade liberalization in many aspects but this area also needs more research to give more reliable answers.

The diploma thesis is focused on the participation of developing countries in multilateral trade system. It analyzes the developing countries' view of world trade system, how this system reflected their special needs and interests and how their positions changed in multilateral trade negotiations under GATT/WTO.

George Marshall's speech to an audience at Harvard University in June of 1947 announced a plan that eventually made its way through the United States congress and took the form of the European Recovery Plan (ERP). The ERP distributed roughly thirteen billion dollars in aid to sixteen European countries. The ECA grew out of this program as the managerial arm of the ERP. The ECA's propaganda campaign included pamphlets, posters, radio broadcasts, traveling puppet shows, and finally 250 films created between 1949-1953. Marshall Plan Films discussed productivity, multilateral trade, and labor unions. For Marshall Planners these issues were the key to both revitalizing the European economy, and creating a self sustaining Europe. In film, Europeans could see not only the modernizing techniques, building projects, and examples of Marshall Plan, but they were treated to visions of the American lifestyle as well. This study is an attempt to explicate the meanings and messages in the Marshall Plan Filmography. The Marshall Plan launched a massive propaganda campaign in an attempt to reformat the ideals of Europeans. The Plan was ostensibly an attempt to combat Communism as well as to re-vamp the economy of Europe. However, the films presented American ideals as something to aspire to: not only in business, but also in living everyday life. By stressing consumption over conservation and massive production over craftsmanship, the films told Europeans what America thought was best for them, and what would be beneficial for their future. Marshall Planners effectively sought to make Europe into a new, more American, place to live. / Master of Arts

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009