This thesis consists of three essays on optimal monetary policy. In the first essay I study time-consistent monetary policy in an small open economy model with incomplete financial markets. I demonstrate the existence of two discretionary equilibria. The model is capable of explaining periods of different exchange rate volatilities as well as the transition between those regimes. Following a shock the economy can be stabilised either `quickly' or `slow', where both dynamic paths satisfy the conditions of optimality and time-consistency. I also show that a policy of partially targeting the exchange rate results in far worse welfare outcomes relative to a strict inflation targeting policy. In the second essay, I analyse how a policy maker can avoid expectation traps and coordination failures. Using a framework developed by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) in which a policy maker may or may not default on past promises I show that already mild degrees of precommitment are sufficient to generate uniqueness of the Pareto-preferred equilibrium. In the last chapter, I examine optimal monetary policy from an empirical perspective. I estimate a simple small open economy model separately for a policy maker acting under commitment and discretion and find that the data favours the commitment approach. Furthermore, the data suggest that the Bank of Canada did not target the nominal exchange rate in the inspected time period.

Comments and Discussion : Toshiki Tamai

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 133-141). / The focus of this dissertation is on colonisation and decolonisation as cornerstones in the development of sub-Saharan Africa's current institutions and how these historical institutions affect current economic growth outcomes. The dissertation consists of three main chapters besides the introductory and concluding chapters. The rst main chapter considers conditions of optimality in a co-optive strategy of colonial rule. It proposes a simple model of elite formation emanating from a coloniser's quest to maximise extracted rents from its colonies... In the second main chapter, I argue that the pattern of decolonisation in West Africa was a function of the nature of human capital transfers from the colonisers to the indigenous elites of the former colonies. Underpinning the nature of these human capital transfers is the colonial educational ideology... The third main chapter investigates the channels through which colonial origin affects economic outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It focuses on four key channels of transmission namely, human capital, trade openness, market distortion and selection bias.

Thesis advisor: Arthur Lewbel / The thesis includes two essays. The first essay, Inequality Moments in Estimation of Discrete Games with Incomplete Information and Multiple Equilibria, develops a method for estimation of static discrete games with incomplete information, which delivers consistent estimates of parameters even when games have multiple equilibria. Every Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a discrete game of incomplete information is associated with a set of choice probabilities. I use maximum and minimum equilibrium choice probabilities as upper and lower bounds on empirical choice probabilities to construct moment inequalities. In general, estimation with moment inequalities results in partial identification. I show that point identification is achievable if the payoffs are functions of a sufficient number of explanatory variables with a real line domain and outcome-specific coefficients associated with them. The second essay, Tenancy Rent Control and Credible Commitment in Maintenance, co-authored with Richard Arnott, investigates the effect of tenancy rent control on maintenance and welfare. Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. The essay analyzes the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality, maintenance, and rehabilitation. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to show it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The essay formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

x, 132 p. : ill. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / This dissertation examines the role that institutions play in the existence of multiple equilibria in models of economic development. In addition, it examines the dynamics of transition between such equilibria. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I build a dynamic model of institutional choice, wherein the government invests in the legal infrastructure in response to the need for the protection of output from appropriation. A unique equilibrium exists only under commitment, not under discretion. This would suggest that a measure of institutional quality must not only consider the extent to which current policies protect property rights but also include the ability of the government to commit to reform in the long run. The second chapter of this dissertation examines the effect of adaptive learning on stability and transitional dynamics between multiple equilibria in a growth model with human capital externalities. I find that there are two equilibria, one a poverty trap with no education. Only the poverty trap is locally stable under learning. However, productivity shocks are not sufficient to generate transitions between the equilibria. Indeed, productivity shocks must lie below a threshold in order for the economy to escape the poverty trap. These escape paths do not allow the economy to transition to the upper steady state. I propose instead the use of shocks to expectations to permit such a transition. The third chapter of this dissertation presents an empirical test for the role that human capital and institutions may play in transitions between equilibria by estimating a Markov-switching regression. This methodology allows me to characterize both distinct growth regimes and transitions between them. I explore the effects of time-varying institutional measures and human capital on transition probabilities. I find that political and economic institutions are similar in their effects on transitions arid that the time variation in the institutional measure increases the probability of identifying both miracle growth and stagnation regimes. Furthermore, human capital has a significant effect on switches between miracle growth, stable growth and stagnation. / Committee in charge: George Evans, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Shankha Chakraborty, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Jeremy Piger, Member, Economics; Yue Fang, Outside Member, Decision Sciences

Based on Ian Steedman's seminal contribution "Consumption Takes Time", we propose a formal activity-based model for consumer behaviour. The model simultaneously incorporates choices over consumption time, as well as quantities and qualities of products consumed. We identify and examine preconditions for satiation with products and draw implications for economic policy. Satiation with products explains the limited effects of price or income changes on demand and questions the pertinence of economic growth for development. It further highlights the relevance of working time reductions for well-being. (authors' abstract)

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京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(農学) / 甲第23241号 / 農博第2448号 / 新制||農||1084(附属図書館) / 学位論文||R3||N5331(農学部図書室) / 京都大学大学院農学研究科生物資源経済学専攻 / (主査)准教授 三谷 羊平, 教授 伊藤 順一, 教授 梅津 千恵子 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Agricultural Science / Kyoto University / DGAM

In their famous paper on the "Big Push", Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show how the combination of increasing returns to scale at the firm level and pecuniary externalities can give rise to a poverty trap, thereby formalising an old idea due to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). We develop in this paper an oligopoly model of the Big Push that is very close in spirit to the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny (MSV) model, but in contrast to the MSV model it is easily extended to the case of an economy that is open to international trade. Having a workable open-economy framework allows us to address the question whether globalisation makes it easier or harder for a country to escape from a poverty trap. Our model gives a definite answer to this question: Globalisation makes it harder to escape from a poverty trap since the adoption of the modern technology at the firm level is impeded by tougher competition in the open economy.

In their famous paper on the "Big Push", Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show how the combination of increasing returns to scale at the firm level and pecuniary externalities can give rise to a poverty trap, thereby formalising an old idea due to Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). We develop in this paper an oligopoly model of the Big Push that is very close in spirit to the Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny (MSV) model, but in contrast to the MSV model it is easily extended to the case of an economy that is open to international trade. Having a workable open-economy framework allows us to address the question whether globalisation makes it easier or harder for a country to escape from a poverty trap. Our model gives a definite answer to this question: Globalisation makes it harder to escape from a poverty trap since the adoption of the modern technology at the firm level is impeded by tougher competition in the open economy.