Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1962. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 183-184).

Thesis (A.M.L.S.)--University of Michigan, 1956. / "Library Science 391, first semester 1955/56."

No description available.

Thesis advisor: John R. Sachs / Catholic theology asserts that the human person is the unity of the physical body and the spiritual soul. Several important doctrinal documents of the Church, a number of liturgical texts, and Catholic practice—particularly in relation to the deceased—express this theological anthropology. Developments in biblical studies over the last century and advances in modern science, particularly in the field of neuroscience, have led theologians to raise several questions regarding the makeup of personhood, especially the role of the human soul. These inquires have posed challenges to longstanding Catholic anthropological understandings of the person. / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

In this paper I argue that Liam Murphy’s collective consequentialism—emphasizing fairness instead of maximization of value—is not an adequate response to the demandingness objections levied at consequentialism. Especially since Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” many have objected that consequentialism is far too demanding, particularly concerning our obligations of assistance to those in extreme poverty. Murphy thinks that the problem is not that consequentialism is necessarily too demanding; it is that, in our nonideal world of partial compliance, consequentialism is too demanding on those who comply with its dictates. I hope to show that Murphy’s theory is unsatisfying. I will not defend any particular version of consequentialism over alternative consequentialist theories, nor will I defend consequentialism over alternative non-consequentialist moral theories. My aim is far narrower: To show that those who accept a broadly consequentialist account of morality have little reason to accept Murphy’s collective consequentialism.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University, 1966. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-42). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

This thesis presents a two part criticism to Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s book, The Myth of Ownership, in which they attempt to argue that it is logically impossible that one can have any entitlement to their pretax income. The first criticism addresses their claim that based on a politically charged understanding of human nature you cannot have property without government. Through the fields of psychology, biology and anthropology, an overlap is found that presents human nature in such a way that presents a serious hurdle to the Murphy and Nagel position. The second criticism addresses their failure to define the scope of government in their book. In light of cultures that have a strong conception of property, Murphy and Nagel are charged with equivocating on the definition of government in order to make their argument hold. The conclusion reached is that based on current research pertaining to human nature and a brief anthropological study, the existence of government is not needed in order to have property within a community.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-96).

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 2000. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-122).

Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, 2000. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-151).