In 2006, Hizbullah operatives captured two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border attack, prompting a 34-day war in which neither Israel nor Hizbullah emerged victorious. Yet despite Hizbullah’s instigation of the war, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hizbullah, largely retained both his popular appeal and his legitimacy during and after the conflict. Noting this paradox, I examine how Nasrallah maintained his legitimacy, defined as having an accepted claim to authority, throughout and after the war. To do so, I perform content analysis on the seven major speeches that Nasrallah delivered during the war in order to answer the following question: How did Nasrallah utilize rhetoric to maintain his legitimacy as Hizbullah’s leader throughout the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah? I then draw upon these observations to discuss my subsidiary research question: How does having a better understanding of political rhetoric, particularly in terms of Hizbullah, affect U.S. policies towards the Middle East, and specifically in Lebanon? I argue that Nasrallah framed his message in these speeches using three particular themes: the “us versus them” narrative; the fulfillment of a divinely inspired mission, also known as the NasR ilaahi, or the divine triumph theme; and Hizbullah’s role as the protector of the Lebanese and the Palestinians. In tandem with Hizbullah’s self-identification as a resistance movement, I show that Nasrallah continuously qualified Hizbullah’s mission as defensive. I also demonstrate that Nasrallah chose his words to foster a sense of community and common purpose. Additionally, I note that he often appealed to values widely held through the Arab world, including the sense of karaama, or dignity, and taDaamun, or solidarity, in his remarks. To answer the second question, I review current U.S. policies towards Lebanon and note the ways in which these policies may not resonate with the Lebanese population. I argue that current U.S. policies, which focus on supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Internal Security Forces, developing stronger civil society, and promoting democratization, do not counter Hizbullah’s power partly because U.S. public diplomacy initiatives do not take Nasrallah’s rhetoric and legitimacy into account. / text

Notre récit commence dans l’Egypte nationaliste des années 1950. Le coup d’Etat mené par Gamal Abdel Nasser et le “Mouvement des Officiers Libres” ouvre la voie à une révolution politique, économique, et socioculturelle, au Caire et dans l’ensemble du monde arabe. Il met alors en place un puissant dispositif médiatique : il fonde la radio la Voix des Arabes, publie La Philosophie de la révolution, et fera très rapidement du journal Al-Ahram la langue de sa révolution. De la guerre de Suez en 1956, à l’union avec la Syrie en 1958, l’Egypte soutiendra alors tous les mouvements de libération nationale jusqu’à la “catastrophe” de 1967, qui signe l’arrêt de mort du nationalisme nassérien. Lorsque le nationalisme laïc n’a pas réussi à restituer la Palestine et la dignité arabe perdues, certains ont cru que c’est la religion qui le fera. Deux modèles antagonistes secouent alors le consensus des années 1960 : au “pétro-islam” saoudien s’oppose désormais un islam chiite inspiré par la Révolution islamique en Iran et prôné par le Hezbollah et son Secrétaire général Hassan Nasrallah. Les années 1980-1990 correspondent aussi à l’introduction des chaînes satellites dans le monde arabe ; au pouvoir mobilisateur de la radio des années 1950, se substitue la force de l’image de chaînes comme Al-Jazeera et Al-Manar. Ainsi, trois décennies après la dernière guerre israélo-arabe, la question de l’identité est exportée sur le front libanais : Nasrallah dit mener, en 2006, “la guerre de la nation contre l’ennemi sioniste”. Comment, à travers leur couverture de la révolution, de la guerre, de la défaite et de la victoire, les médias arabes ont-ils dit l’identité tout au long des soixante dernières années d’histoire ? Comment la radio, la presse écrite, la télévision satellitaire, mais aussi la chanson, les clips et les jeux vidéo ont-ils dit l’arabité? Qu’est-ce que “être arabe” dans le discours médiatique d’aujourd’hui et de quelles manières l’islam politique prôné par les médias contemporains reprend-t-il les anciennes thématiques du nationalisme nassérien ? / Our story starts in the nationalist Egypt of the 1950s. The military coup undertaken by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the “Free Officers Movement” paved the way for a political, economic and socio-cultural revolution in Egypt and the entire Arab world. Soon after, Nasser established a powerful multifaceted media apparatus: he founded The Voices of the Arabs radio station, published The Philosophy of the Revolution, while Al-Ahram was slowly becoming the “tongue” of his revolution. From the Suez crisis in 1956, until the union with Syria in 1958, Nasser’s Egypt supported all anti-colonial liberation movements in the Arab world, until the 1967 defeat that signed the death sentence of pan-Arab nationalism. When secular nationalism couldn’t resuscitate Palestine and the tarnished Arab dignity, some thought that religion could. Two antagonistic models shook the fragile consensus of the 1960s: a Saudi “petro-Islam”, and the more recently emerging Shiite Islam, inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and mainly promoted by Hezbollah and its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. The 1980s also correspond to the introduction of the first satellite channels in the Arab world: the power of images on channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar began to substitute radio’s mobilizing discourse of the 1950s. Three decades after the last Arab-Israeli war, the question of Arab identity is exported to the Lebanese front: Hassan Nasrallah says he is leading, in 2006, “the nation’s war against the Zionist enemy”. How did Arab media, through their coverage of revolutions, wars, defeats and victories, take part in the mechanisms of construction of post-colonial identities? How did the radio, the print and the satellite media, the songs, the music clips and the video games all define what is being “an Arab” today? And in which ways, does today’s political Islam, promoted by contemporary media narratives, reclaim the old pan-Arab and nationalist themes?

The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of how sectarian tensions can be harnessed, nourished and spread in Lebanon. It does so through a case study on the speech delivered by Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, on 18 October 2021, where he accused the Christian party, and former militia, the Lebanese Forces for killing seven Shia Muslims in a protest four days earlier. More specifically, this thesis is a Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis with the aim to examine how we can understand the discourse on Christians and how that discourse is shaped through Nasrallah’s framing of himself, Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces. With conspiracist elements, Nasrallah creates a dichotomy of us and them where them is the threat that also helps to define what is us. It is a highly polarizing speech, where he frames the Lebanese Forces as a political enemy and a threatful organization without morals that wants to sow division and create a civil war in Lebanon. In contrast, Nasrallah depicts Christians as part of a larger us that wants peace and stability. However, within the us, Christians are depicted as exposed, vulnerable and in need of protection which stands in contrast to Hezbollah that is immensely strong and can protect Christians. Meanwhile, he encourages and mobilizes Christians to act against the Lebanese Forces. Thus, despite a rhetoric about unity among Christians and Muslims, the main finding of this thesis is that Nasrallah seeks support from Christians by spurring sectarian tensions and sowing division within the Christian camp, with the goal to gain power.