Inaug.-Diss.--Heidelberg. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1960. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 156-163).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1965. / Digitized and made available by the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections Center as part of Minds@UW. Description based on print version record. WU Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-79).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1965. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-79).

Thesis (B.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1963. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 47-48).

No description available.

Following Tunisia, Egypt was the second Arab nation to engage in the Arab Spring, as massive civil uprisings in protest of its former repressive dictator Hosni Mubarak succeeded in toppling his regime after thirty years of rule. After seventeen months of military rule in the period following Mubarak’s fall, Mohamed Morsi, a member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, was elected the fifth president of Egypt. Morsi is Egypt’s first civilian president. Ever since the Free Officers Revolution of 1952, Egypt has been ruled by a succession of military leaders, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. Consequently, political and economic authority has since rested in the hands of the military. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the strategic approaches undertaken by Egypt’s former leaders in an overall attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to this central question: what are President Morsi’s strategies for controlling the military in post-revolutionary Egypt? I will argue that, while Morsi has demonstrated his desire to control the armed forces through various institutional changes, his efforts have fallen short of attacking the heart of the problem, which is the deeply-rooted militaristic culture that has come to be valued and accepted by Egyptian society throughout the course of the last sixty years.

In 1952 Gamal Abdel Nasser and his clique of disaffected young officers launched ‘the Free Officer’s Coup,’ deposing the monarchy, overturning the parliamentary system, and launching a durable regime that defined the face of Egypt in the second half of the twentieth century. This thesis examines the relationship between Nasser and Egypt’s intellectuals, and takes preeminent writers Naguib Mahfouz and Yusuf Idris to reveal the social environment in which this relationship took place. The literary and historical evidence reveals a lively relationship of contestation, critique, accommodation, dependence, and acclamation. Promulgating reformist domestic policies and defiantly nationalist foreign policies, Nasser earned legitimization from intellectuals. His regime endeavored to establish hegemony over Egyptian civil society, an effort resisted and repulsed by intellectuals. Inspired by the most relevant theoretical literature on intellectuals, namely the work of Julien Benda, Antonio Gramsci, and Edward Said, this thesis reveals responsibilities and challenges faced by intellectuals everywhere.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Hohenheim, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-199).

Thesis (M.A.)--Miami University, Dept. of Political Science, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF document. Document formatted into pages; contains [1], ii, 71 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-71).