This study will cover the period between 1861 and 1865. It will cover within that period of time, the technical and historical advance of the navy through the Civil War. The technical approach will cover the advancements in design, engineering, and armament from the beginning of hostilities to its end, and contrast those advancements with those of the period immediately preceding them and immediately after it, while the historical approach will cover the main engagements of the war and the results of the technical advances. The study will also cover the advancement and growth of the Confederate States Navy, and the effect which the marine designs of that navy had on the designs of the rival United States Navy.

This thesis explores the activities of the U.S. Marine defense battalions from October 1939 to December 1942. More specifically, it explains why Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) decided to continue the defense battalions as separate entities when, by mid-1943, it needed additional men to replace its combat losses and to create new divisions. In this process HQMC disbanded other special units, such as the raider battalions, parachute battalions, barrage balloon squadrons, and the glider squadrons. It retained, however, the defense battalions because of their versatility and utility as demonstrated during the various operations they conducted in Iceland and the Central and South Pacific. In these locations defense battalions performed as: (a) island garrisons, (b) antiaircraft artillery units, and (c) landing forces. Their success in carrying out these missions led to their retention as separate entities throughout World War II.

This thesis is a survey of the available material on the submarine issue during 1914-1917 as a factor in German-American relations which contributed to the American declaration of war in April 1917. No other scholarly work is devoted solely to the submarine issue during this period. The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the submarine as an international legal issue. German-American relations were strained during 1914-1917, because of the different interpretations of international law regarding the submarine. And this thesis was written in order to test the existing historical interpretations of the submarine issue as a focal point of German-American relations.

On 10 February 1964 during naval night exercises off the south coast of Australia, the destroyer HMAS Voyager was lost after colliding with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. 82 men were killed. Following the collision, there were two Royal Commissions that sustained a political controversy that lasted for over four years. This thesis examines the loss of Voyager as a watershed in the operational and administrative history of the RAN and as a major event in Australian national history. This study has four broad objectives: to describe the loss of Voyager and the long running controversy that accompanied the disaster; to offer a convincing explanation of the causes of the collision and why two royal commissions concluded that the causes for the disaster were inexplicable; to assess the effect on the RAN, in terms of specific reforms and its influence on Service culture and professional ethos, of the disaster and the inquiries that followed; and finally, to analyse the loss of Voyager as a media and political cause celebre in Australian history. As so little has been written about Voyager using primary sources, this thesis was committed to detailed description of events as well as analysis of themes. This thesis draws upon an extensive body of primary source material in the form of official naval and Royal Commission records to which complete access was given; several large collections of private papers; over one hundred interviews with principal participants; and comprehensive files of press cuttings. The discussion seeks to demonstrate that a series of naval accidents preceding the loss of Voyager contributed in a substantial way to shaping the public reaction to, and political handling of, the disaster; that the method of inquiry played a major role in generating public and political disquiet; that the collision was both a catalyst and stimulus to change in naval operations and reform in naval administration; that the inability of two Royal Commissions to ascertain the causes of the collision and then to public suspicion of a cover-up; and, that the collision was most probably caused by the incorrect relaying of a tactical signal on the bridge of Voyager. The loss of HMAS Voyager appears to be a key event in the development of the RAN, not as a direct result of the collision or its causes, but as a consequence of its long and controversial aftermath.

Includes bibliographical references

This study examines Churchill's struggle during the summer of 1940 to preserve Britain's naval superiority worldwide, through the neutralization of the French fleet and by securing the active participation of the United States. Sources consulted included autobiographies of the participants, especially those by Churchill, Reynaud, Baudouin, and Weygand, document collections, and British and American official histories. This study is organized to give a chronological analysis of Churchill's efforts from 10 May to 2 September 1940, ending with the United States' acceptance of the destroyers-for-bases agreement. This act committed them to shared strategical responsibilities with Great Britain. The thesis concludes that Churchill's efforts in this period laid the foundation for later Allied victory.

Of the large amount of writings concerning the Civil War only a small percentage pertains to the Federal Navy's role. This is understandable since this was primarily a land war. A few of the Navy's exploits such as the capture of New Orleans, the sinking of the Alabama, the capture of the Florida in Brazilian waters, and the Trent affair received great amounts of publicity, but the majority of the naval activities were of a routine nature, each individually warranting little notice but collectively contributing immensely to the final Federal victory. The purpose of this paper is to show in detail the role of only a portion of the Navy, the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, during this struggle.

In 1793, Great Britain embarked on a war against Revolutionary France to reestablish a balance of power in Europe. Traditional assessments among historians consider British war planning at the ministerial level during the First Coalition to be incompetent and haphazard. This work reassesses decision making of the leading strategists in the British Cabinet in the development of a theater in the Mediterranean by examining political, diplomatic, and military influences. William Pitt the Younger and his controlling ministers pursued a conservative strategy in the Mediterranean, reliant on Allies in the region to contain French armies and ideas inside the Alps and the Pyrenees. Dependent on British naval power, the Cabinet sought to weaken the French war effort by targeting trade in the region. Throughout the first half of 1793, the British government remained fixed on this conservative, traditional approach to France. However, with the fall of Toulon in August of 1793, decisions made by Admiral Samuel Hood in command of forces in the Mediterranean radicalized British policy towards the Revolution while undermining the construct of the Coalition. The inconsistencies in strategic thought political decisions created stagnation, wasting the opportunities gained by the Counter-revolutionary movements in southern France. As a result, reinvigorated French forces defeated Allied forces in detail in the fall of 1793.

The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the importance of the military principle of unity of command by examining the military history of a Union army unit during the Civil War. The Mississippi Marine Brigade and its predecessor, the Ellet Ram Fleet, being a creation of the War Department, and yet conducting tactical operations within the scope of the Navy Department, vividly illustrates the problems inherent in joint army-navy operations. The brigade's primary mission was to counter guerrilla warfare in the Mississippi River valley. The text describes the organization, administration, and major operations of the brigade as a mobile, independent, private military force.