During the debate over the ratification of the United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the Bush Administration argued that implementation of a free trade agreement would help strengthen the nascent democracies in Central America. As a bilateral agreement, CAFTA would not only foment greater trade liberalization by expanding market access and eliminating trade barriers, but also help transform the entire commercial frameworks in Central America and promote economic development. These implications are not just economic – in particular, its provisions on intellectual property and investment rights, government procurement and labor standards affect the political institutions underpinning democracy and rule of law. This thesis assesses the role in which CAFTA has affected democratic institutions in Central America. It employs a methodology known as the Democratic Audit to evaluate consequences to four dimensions of democracy - the electoral processes, open and accountable institutions, civil and political liberties, and civil society. It demonstrates the value of using the Democratic Audit to assess a trade agreement’s political effects with an application to Mexico after NAFTA. Then this work considers the case studies of El Salvador and Costa Rica, the most salient examples of democratic institutional change after CAFTA, by drawing on original research especially into the electoral politics and civil society development in these countries. Ultimately, the thesis argues that the most significant institutional effects of CAFTA have been its role as a political issue, rather than its content, in galvanizing popular opinion and reinvigorating electoral politics and civil society - ironically, not the consequences that the Administration originally had in mind. The research demonstrates that, even if some conclusions cannot be drawn due to the recency of CAFTA, the framework it has employed will be an invaluable tool for assessing future trade agreements.

Post-civil war democratization is a critical element of building sustainable peace in the post-civil war states. At the same time, studies of democratic transition and survival suggest that the post-civil war environment is not hospitable to either the transition to or survival of democracy. The post-civil war environment is contentious. Former protagonists are fearful about their security and at the same time they want to protect their political and economic interests. The central argument of this study is that former rivals can agree to a transition toward democracy to the extent that a stable balance of power exists between the government and rebel groups, a balance that eliminates the sort of security dilemma that would encourage one or both to resume armed conflict. And the balance should ensure access to political power and economic resources. This study identifies factors that contribute to the establishment of such a balance of power between former protagonists and factors that affects its stability. These factors should affect the decision of former protagonists on whether or not they can achieve their political and economic interests if they agree to a transition toward democracy once civil war ends. Factors that are conducive to a transition toward democracy are different from factors that sustain that transition in post-civil war states. Post-civil war democracies are fragile. The side that won the democratic election can dismantle institutions of democracy and repress oppositions. The fear of being repressed could create stronger incentives for the opposition groups to return to conflict. To address this puzzle, I develop a conceptual framework that explains how costs of the previous civil war, the establishment of inclusive institutions and the higher level of economic development create incentives for the former rivals to sustain democracy. Hypotheses derived from the theoretical implications are tested by using survival analysis.

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