The argument advanced is this thesis is that the entities that make up the environment are those that do not owe their origin to any willful creative activity but have evolved through accidental natural processes. This fact of not being willfully created makes the environment ontologically independent and confers on it intrinsic value as opposed to instrumental value. This intrinsic value is one that all the entities that make up the environment share. It is further argued that this intrinsic value is aesthetic rather than moral. Only beings that are specially endowed with certain capacities, like reflection and understanding, could be said, in the context of this work, to have intrinsic moral value in the sense of being moral agents. But as moral agents, we need to give moral considerability to all the natural entities in the environment since they share the same natural right with us, based on our common origin. So, even though the nonhuman, natural entities in the environment do not have moral rights, they have natural rights. It is further argued that this natural right could be best safeguarded in a legal framework.

Scholarship has tended to depict John Owen as a “Reformed catholic” attempting a synthesis of Reformed principles with a largely Thomist doctrine of God. In this thesis, I argue that this depiction risks losing sight of those aspects of Owen's doctrine of God that are intended to support a distinctly Protestant account of the economy of grace. By an examination of the principles of divine government, I argue that Owen employs the theme of God's “dominion” in order to establish the freedom and gratuity of God's grace, and to resist theologies that might otherwise use the doctrine of creation to structure and norm God's government of creatures. In chapter one, I argue against prevailing readings of Owen's thought that his theology of the divine will is, in fact, “voluntarist” in nature, prioritizing God's will over his intellect in the determination of the divine decree. I show that Owen regards God's absolute dominion as an entailment of his ontological priority over creatures. Chapters two and three examine the character of God's dominion over creatures in virtue of their “two-fold dependence” upon him as both Creator and Lawgiver. Chapter four takes up Owen's theology of God's remunerative justice in the context of his covenant theology. I show here that his doctrine of divine dominion underwrites his critique of merit-theology and attempts to establish the gratuity of that supernatural end to which humans are destined. Finally, in chapter five, I examine the principles of God's mercy, expressed in the work of redemption, where I demonstrate how Owen's conception of divine dominion underwrites the freedom of God in election and his account of particular redemption.

My primary argument in this thesis is that creation theologies significantly influenced early developments in the doctrine of the Trinity, especially in Augustine of Hippo’s theology. Thus this is a work of historical theology, but I conclude with proposals for how Augustine’s theologies of creation and the Trinity can be read fruitfully with modern theology. I critically analyse developments in trinitarian theologies in light of ideas that were held about creation. These include the doctrine of creation ‘out of nothing’ and ideas about other creative acts (e.g., forming or fashioning things). Irenaeus and other early theologians posited roles for God (the Father), the Word / Son, the Spirit, or Wisdom in creative acts without working out formal views on economic trinitarian acts. During the fourth century trinitarian controversies, creation ‘out of nothing’ and ideas about ‘modes of origin’ influenced thinking on consubstantiality and relations within the Trinity. Basil of Caesarea and others also presented ideas about trinitarian acts of creation and the Trinity in hexaemeral works. I will argue that in Augustine’s views of trinitarian acts of creation, he attributes roles to God (the Father), the Word / Son, and the Spirit. In his mature theology, he attributes the giving of formless existence, differentiated existence, and perfected existence to the three Persons respectively, while depicting shared roles. He also attributes to the Spirit the giving of the capability of ‘dynamic abiding’ to creatures, which gives them agency in continuing their existence. Augustine’s theologies of creation and the Trinity were significantly influenced by his exegesis of Gen. 1, John 1. 1-3, Wisdom, and other scriptures, and his ideas resonate with the hexaemeral works of Basil and Philo of Alexandria. I argue that scholars should examine these sources and Augustine’s own hexaemeral commentaries to gain a deeper understanding of his trinitarian theology.

Scholars and storytellers alike have deemed George MacDonald a great mythopoeic writer, an exemplar of the art. Examination of this accolade by those who first applied it to him proves it profoundly theological: for them a mythopoeic tale was a relational medium through which transformation might occur, transcending boundaries of time and space. The implications challenge much contemporary critical study of MacDonald, for they demand that his literary life and his theological life cannot be divorced if either is to be adequately assessed. Yet they prove consistent with the critical methodology MacDonald himself models and promotes. Utilizing MacDonald’s relational methodology evinces his intentional facilitating of Mythopoesis. It also reveals how oversights have impeded critical readings both of MacDonald’s writing and of his character. It evokes a redressing of MacDonald’s relationship with his Scottish cultural, theological, and familial environment – of how his writing is a response that rises out of these, rather than, as has so often been asserted, a mere reaction against them. Consequently it becomes evident that key relationships, both literary and personal, have been neglected in MacDonald scholarship – relationships that confirm MacDonald’s convictions and inform his writing, and the examination of which restores his identity as a literature scholar. Of particular relational import in this reassessment is A.J. Scott, a Scottish visionary intentionally chosen by MacDonald to mentor him in a holistic Weltanschauung. Little has been written on Scott, yet not only was he MacDonald’s prime influence in adulthood, but he forged the literary vocation that became MacDonald’s own. Previously unexamined personal and textual engagement with John Ruskin enables entirely new readings of standard MacDonald texts, as does the textual engagement with Matthew Arnold and F.D. Maurice. These close readings, informed by the established context, demonstrate MacDonald’s emergence, practice, and intent as a mythopoeic writer.