Abstract The study aims to develop the Teacher Belief Scale. The subjects were 533 junior high school teachers in Kaohsiung, receiving the Teacher Belief Scale from March to June in 2009. There were four subscales in the scale, including the Teacher Role Identification Subscale, the Creative Teaching Behavior Subscale, the Student-centered Education Subscale, and the Multiple Learning Subscale. The results showed (1) Cronbach¡¦s £\ for the subscales ranged from .629 to .790, with an overall Cronbach¡¦s £\ of .810; (2) the male teachers got higher scores than the females in the Creative Teaching Behavior Subscale; (3) teachers who graduated from general universities got higher scores than those from normal universities in the Creative Teaching Behavior Subscale; (4) teachers with administrative position got higher scores than homeroom teachers and teachers with other service in overall Teacher Belief Scale; (5) teachers with administrative position got higher scores than homeroom teachers and teachers with other service in the Teacher Role Identification Subscale; (6) in the Creative Teaching Behavior subscale, teachers with administrative position got higher scores than homeroom teachers and full-time teachers; (7) in teaching experience, analyzed through Scheffe post-hoc comparison, only scores of teachers with 1-4 year experience were significantly higher than those of teachers with 5-9 year experience in the Student-centered Education Subscale; (8) there were no significant difference in teachers¡¦ teaching subjects analyzed through Scheffe post-hoc comparison.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cornell University, 1910. / "Reprinted from the American journal of psychology October, 1910, vol. XXI."

Thesis--PlanB (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Stout, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 281-294).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-146). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (PH. D.)- Columbia university, 1924. / Vita. "Reprinted from Archives of psychology... no. 67." Bibliography: p. 46-47.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a non-Fregean account of the functioning of belief attributions (BA's), specifically those of the form 'B believes that Fa' where 'a' is a proper name, which provides a satisfactory account of the phenomena associated with the substitution of co-referential names and with the use of vacuous names. After an intitial study of non-Fregean theories of reference, specifically those of Kripke, Kaplan and Donnellan in which Kaplan's introduction of content, of the singular proposition, is found to be necessary, an examination of certain proposed solutions for BA's, compatable with direct reference, is carried out. These proposals, namely those of Quine, Perry and Nathan Salmon, are all found wanting, the latter two due to their being, ultimately, Fregean. A non-Fregean approach is initiated beginning with an examination of our actual practices in using BA's. It is found that very different information can be conveyed by the use of the same sentence in the same context. While this differing information cannot be captured by means of the proposition expressed, it can be captured by treating the BA as an answer to a question. Belnap's logic of questions and answers is then developed to encompass vacuous terms and, with this in place, two distinct uses of BA's emerge. In one, the BA is used to provide a direct answer to the question; in the other it is used in order to modify the claim to truth of the embedded proposition, to provide a tentative answer. Problematic cases of BA's are then examined. It is found that substitution in all cases is permissible. Supposed difficulties with this position in the area of belief itself and with the explanation of action are discussed and resolved, the latter partly by means of the development and application of an account of 'why' questions and answers. The use of vacuous names is then investigated and a difference noted between cases in which the BA is used to provide a tentative answer and those in which it constitutes a direct answer. In the former case, the use of a vacuous name results in no answer being given. However, given the nature of tentative answers, no problems specific to belief attributions are generated in such cases. In order to deal with cases where the vacuous name occurs in a BA asserted as a direct answer, Evans' account of pretend games is invoked, though modified to permit a possible world account of counterfactuals. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

In this thesis I argue that our philosophical account of the nature and norms of belief should both inform and be informed by our scientific understanding of monothematic delusions. In Chapter 1, I examine and criticise standard attempts to answer the question “What is delusion?” In particular, I claim that such attempts are misguided because they misunderstand the kind of term that “delusion” is. In Chapter 2, I look at the nature of explanation in psychology and apply it to delusions. In particular I look at the constraints on a successful explanation of a person’s psychological state in terms of brain damage or dysfunction. I then propose, in Chapter 3, a way of understanding how delusions of misidentification arise. In particular, I criticise the standard view that they are formed via inference (in the relevant sense of “inference”) on the basis of anomalous experience. I draw on empirical work on object and individual tracking, on dreams, and on the Frégoli delusion, and argue that inference is not only un-necessary, but is actually often bypassed in humans, for judgments of identification. The result is a non-inferential file-retrieval view. On certain views of belief, this would mean that the Capgras delusion lacks the right functional role to count as a genuine belief. In Chapter 4, I criticise such views of belief, and put forward a “downstream only” view. Roughly, something is a case of believing if and only if it disposes people to act in certain ways. I defend such a view against two serious and influential objections. In Chapter 5, I ask whether this means that the Capgras delusion can therefore safely be called a belief. I argue that there is a risk – even if one accepts the downstream only view of belief – that it still won’t count as a belief, as a result of the subject’s “incoherence” or “agentive inertia.” However, I then distinguish egocentric from encyclopaedic doxastic states. This opens the possibility that one can truly say that the subject has the egocentric belief, “This man is not my father”, but may fail to have the encyclopaedic belief, “My father has been replaced by an impostor”. It also demonstrates that the question “Are delusions beliefs?” has been approached in an unhelpful way by the main participants in the debate. This thesis is important because it shows the extent to which real-world phenomena can inform and be informed by central philosophical notions like belief. More precisely, it shows that the most plausible way of accounting for monothematic delusions involves abandoning both a strong normativism, and a discrete representationalism, about belief.

Thesis (M.S.)--Ohio University, June, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 82-88)