Spelling suggestions: "subject:"nonbelief"" "subject:"unbelief""
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Rough BeliefHunt, Emily R 01 January 2013 (has links) (PDF)
This is a collection of poems.
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The Relation between Basic Memory Processes and Awareness of Lexical Ignorance in Young ChildrenLipowski, Stacy L. 07 July 2008 (has links)
No description available.
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PEDIATRIC CYSTIC FIBROSIS ADHERENCE: A LOOK AT HEALTH BELIEFSWightman, Nicole R. 11 July 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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Factors Influencing Influenza Vaccination of ChildrenMiller, Julie A. 12 September 2013 (has links)
No description available.
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BELIEFS ABOUT PROCESSING FLUENCY CAN IMPACT JUDGMENTS OF LEARNING WITHOUT DIFFERENTIAL PROCESSING FLUENCYMueller, Michael 06 July 2016 (has links)
No description available.
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What Makes a Belief Warranted? A Pragmatist’s AnswerHerrine, Luke 22 October 2010 (has links)
No description available.
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When it Pays to Persevere: Belief Perseverance and Self-EnhancementGuenther, Corey L. 05 September 2006 (has links)
No description available.
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Assessing Knowledge and Behavior Regarding Influenza VaccinesBrown, Melissa 25 October 2010 (has links)
No description available.
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The relationship of selected personality characteristics and personal belief systems to mitral valve prolapse syndrome /Gebhart, James Edward January 1982 (has links)
No description available.
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The Effects of Manipulating the Degree of Belief in a Diagnostic Hypothesis on Feature Detection / Belief in a Diagnostic Hypothesis and Feature DetectionLeblanc, Vicki 08 1900 (has links)
In Experiment 1, the degree of belief in a focal hypothesis was manipulated
using priming as well as the principle of unpacking of Tversky and Koehler (1994).
The effects of these manipulations on feature detection was measured. It was found that
regardless of the degree of belief in the focal hypothesis, novice diagnosticians who
have it in mind will call more of its features than those who do not have it in mind. It is
believed that this is due to the fact that having a diagnosis in mind seems to focus the
attention of diagnosticians to the relevant features. Also, our manipulation of
suggesting alternatives to the diagnosticians did not have the effect of decreasing the
diagnosticians' belief in the focal hypothesis, contrary to what is predicted by Tversky
and Koehler's unpacking principle (1994). The results from Experiment 1 suggest, and
those from Experiment 2 confirm the hypothesis that in order to decrease the degree of
belief in the focal hypothesis when it is presented with alternatives, the alternatives
must be plausible. If the focal hypothesis is extremely dominant over the alternatives, a
reversal of the unpacking principle will occur. / Thesis / Master of Science (MS)
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