Online communities thrive on their members participation and contributions. Continuous encouragement of participation of these members is vital for an online community. Social visualizations are one of the methods to make members explicitly aware of their connections and relationships. There are numerous ways to visually represent information, current-status, power, and acceptance of members in an online community. In this thesis I present a design of a visualization representing the evolving reciprocity of relationships among users based on the comments they give to each others posts. The purpose of the visualization is to emphasize and hopefully trigger a common bond in the community and thereby increase their participation. We developed and deployed the visualization in an online community called WISETales where women in science and engineering share personal stories. We also deployed modified and improved versions of the visualization in two other communities, I-Help class discussion forums and the Vegatopia discussion forum for vegetarians. In this thesis we present the results of the evaluation in these three communities. The results unfortunately, were negative. Even though separate explanations for the lack of motivational effect can be found in each of the experiments, it seems that the chosen motivational approach was too gentle to encourage participation. It seems for reciprocation to take place, the users need to be committed to the community and already have some other underlying motivation to participate actively. The visualization also should provide some new information that they werent aware of previously. This was not the case with the users in the three chosen communities. WISETales was too new and can barely be called a community. I-Help was not a community, but a place for student to post questions for the teacher to answer. Vegatopia, in contrast, is well established, active community, where people know each other, and engage in conversations with each other. The visualization did not provide any new information for them that they didnt know and only served as a brief attraction for a day (novelty effect). We are still optimistic, however, that the visualization may be useful for active and too dynamic communities where people are unaware of their social relationships because they are too many, for example, social network sites like Twitter.

This dissertation addresses gaps in anthropological knowledge about how reciprocity--and a specifically Andean form of reciprocity--works in disaster and resettlement settings. This study looks at the practices of reciprocity in a disaster-affected community (Manzano) and a disaster-induced resettlement (Pusuca) in the Andean highlands of Ecuador. Specifically, it examines two aspects of reciprocal exchange practices in these sites. It first looks at some of the factors that affect the continuity of reciprocal exchange practices, which other studies have found to play a vital role in recovery from disasters and resettlement. It then looks to the roles of unequal power relations in the practices of reciprocity and a particularly Andean form of reciprocity and cooperative labor, the minga. The study identifies power-laden dynamics in the practice of reciprocity that tend to be overlooked in studies of social support and mutual aid in disasters and resettlements. I argue that these dynamics are critical to an examination of reciprocity in these contexts because they have important implications for the distribution of relief and development resources. This study employed an iterative, mixed-method, 3-phase research strategy in the recursive discovery and corroboration of analytical domains and the evaluation of study hypotheses. In the first phase, exploratory observation, key informant interviews, and archival searches identified specific terms, practices, and events in order to design effective structured interview questions. In the second phase, I administered structured interviews to obtain quantitative indicators of reciprocal exchanges between group members, distribution of development benefits and collective resources, and occupational and socioeconomic data. In the third phase, I conducted focused observation and documentation of participation in decision-making, plus patterns of influence in public negotiations of development strategies and aid allocation. The expectation of hypothesis 1 was that wage employment and residential distance would be negatively associated with minga participation. The results were mixed between the two sites. In Manzano, wage employment was not significantly associated with records of minga participation, but there was a significant negative correlation with residential distance and minga participation. In Pusuca, there were significant negative correlations with wage employment and residential distance with records of minga participation. The expectation of hypothesis 2 was that household exchange participation would be positively associated with minga participation. Multiple tests of the association between household minga attendance and total household exchange participation found positive associations between these two variables in Manzano, but not in Pusuca. For hypothesis 3a, the expectation was that total household exchange participation would be positively associated with brokerage and decision-making power and statistical tests found a significant positive correlation between these variables in both sites. The implication is that one way that politically powerful individuals exercise and maintain their power is through forming reciprocal exchange ties. Those with more ties are more likely to act as brokers between their neighbors and scarce aid and development resources and more likely to have their views and agendas supported in local decision-making processes. Hypothesis 3b tests the assumption that households connected through reciprocal exchange relations to highly connected households access a greater share of relief and development resources than others. Statistical tests indicated a significant positive association between being connected to highly connected households and project benefit inclusion in both sites. This suggests that it is not only the powerful that access scarce extra-local resources, but also their less connected allies, which can be taken as evidence of privileged inclusion as a form of power in both sites. This study contributes to anthropological knowledge about the political economy of reciprocity in disaster-induced resettlements in two ways. First, it looks more broadly at the range of factors that could influence the continuity or disruption of practices of cooperation and reciprocal exchange in resettlement than other studies, which focuses on the narrow influence of policy practice. In this study, I draw on the economic anthropology of reciprocity and posit a possible role of wider political economic processes--growing integration into the capitalist wage labor economy--as an added explanatory factor for the dissolution of reciprocal exchange relations in post-disaster and resettlement contexts. The second way in which I seek to build upon these studies is by foregrounding the ways in which power relations are bound up in reciprocal exchange relations.

This paper investigates the influence of two representative other-regarding preferences on specified issues. The first chapter studies the preferred tax rate and labor supplies of voters in the presence of income inequality aversion in a two-stage redistribution game. The two-stage redistribution game consists of a first stage in which voters vote for a flat tax rate on income with the revenues redistributed evenly and a second stage in which workers, who are also voters, provide the labor supplies with the tax rate given. I specify inequality aversion preferences into two ways: The payoff inequality aversion represents people's preference to divide their material payoff evenly, and the income inequality aversion represents people's preference to divide their income evenly without considering their efforts to earn that income. In conclusion, payoff inequality-averse workers provide the same labor supplied as a worker who does not have any inequality aversions (a standard worker) but prefers a higher tax rate to a standard worker. The income inequality-averse workers, first, provide their labor supply considering their positions in a skill distribution and, therefore, adjust their labor supply such that the income curve becomes flatter. High-skilled workers tend to earn less income, while low-skilled workers tend to earn more income. Second, the income share of the richest decreases with the degree of inequality aversion up to a point. Third, inequality-averse workers do not necessarily prefer a higher tax rate to a standard worker, mainly because some level of income inequality is already self-adjusted in the second stage. The second chapter looks at how reciprocal preferences influence coalition size in international environmental agreements. Reciprocal preferences represent how a decision maker gains an additional positive utility when it responds to a kind action with a kind action or to an unkind action with an unkind action. I incorporate reciprocal preferences in a two-stage game that predicts the decision of each government to participate in an agreement that decreases pollutant emissions. The main result shows that bigger coalition forms than the standard preference does not include reciprocal preferences. Reciprocal governments that participate in the treaty (signatories) suffer from unkindness based on pollution by non-signatories so that the threat to retaliate by polluting becomes credible. Then, free-rider governments (non-signatories) on the margin surrender to the implicit threat and participate in the treaty. Furthermore, including reciprocity reverses the usual result that there is an inverse relationship between the marginal benefit and coalition size. In other words, the size of coalition increases with the marginal benefit of abatement in an equilibrium when the reciprocal sensitivity is sufficiently high. Signatories are more likely to retaliate against non-signatories because the benefit to non-signatories of refraining from decreasing emissions aggravates the unkindness to signatories.

This dissertation is a theoretical exploration of commonly used policy tools meant to improve market performance. The first chapter examines the use of prizes and grants as instruments for encouraging research and development. The second chapter investigates the welfare impact of price caps in oligopoly markets with endogenous entry. The third chapter studies the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk taking, when a banker is motivated by reciprocity. The first chapter explores the use of grants and prizes as tools for encouraging research activity and innovation. Grants and prizes are commonly used by public and private research funders, and encourage R&D activity in different ways. Grants encourage innovation by subsidizing research inputs, while prizes reward research output. A common rationale for prizes is moral hazard; if a funder cannot observe all relevant research inputs then prizes create a strong incentive for R&D activity. In this chapter, it is shown that grants are a more efficient means of funding when a researcher's ability is unknown to the funder (adverse selection). When both adverse selection and moral hazard problems exist, a grant may emerge as an optimal funding mechanism, provided the moral hazard problem is relatively weak. In settings where the moral hazard problem is sufficiently strong, a grant emerges as part of an optimal funding mechanism, in conjunction with a prize. These results are useful for understanding different funding mechanisms used by both public and private entities. The second chapter, which is based on joint work with Stan Reynolds, examines the impact of price caps in oligopoly markets with endogenous entry. In the case of deterministic demand, reducing a price cap yields increased total output, consumer welfare, and total welfare. This result falls in line with classic results on price caps in monopoly markets, and with results for oligopoly markets with a fixed number of firms. These comparative static results for price caps need not hold when demand is stochastic and the number of firms is fixed, but recent results in the literature show that a welfare improving price cap does exist. We show that a welfare-improving cap need not exist in the case where demand is stochastic and entry is endogenous. In addition, we provide restrictions on the demand function such that a welfare-improving price cap exists under endogenous entry and stochastic demand. The third chapter, which is based on a joint project with Martin Dufwenberg, investigates the relationship between deposit insurance, risk taking, and insolvency. Empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of deposit insurance increases risk taking by banks and results in a greater chance of insolvency. The common rationale for this connection is that deposit insurance decreases the incentive for customers to monitor their banks, and invites excessive risk taking. In this chapter, it is argued that this classic explanation is somewhat puzzling. If customers can monitor their bank's behavior, certainly the insurance provider (FDIC) has this same ability. If this is the case, appropriate mechanisms could limit the moral hazard problem. We put forth an alternative explanation, and demonstrate that deposit insurance invites excessive risk taking when a banker is motivated by reciprocity.

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This thesis contrasts a “real” sharing economy with the commonly held understanding of this new mode of exchange. By examining the lived experiences within a successful example of sharing, we can see its true value and acknowledge where other businesses fall short. Based on in-depth interviews with users of freecycle.org, this thesis illustrates the importance of motivation within a real sharing economy, highlighting the existence of generalized reciprocity, the value of community, and altruism between members of this gifting platform.

Conditions that underlie contracts and cooperative agreements in business take different forms in different parts of the world. This research investigates the nature, structure and content of those informal relations that lie outside the formal contractual relations in the business community in contemporary China. Specifically, it addresses the role of gift giving in business relations, including the practical and cultural implications. This is a worldwide phenomenon, but my focus is on the relationships known in China as guanxi. Building and managing guanxi includes the exchange of gifts, therefore, discerning whether these exchanges are artefacts of the past or are rational and logical today is crucial. I argue that offering a gift symbolizes the desire to have cooperation within a close trusting relationship. Using an historical anthropological approach I present a systematic examination of pre collected data. The analysis looks for patterns to answer the following questions: What role, if any, does gift exchange play in creating guanxi relationships of trust that include reciprocal obligations? What role does guanxi play in China’s growing economy? I hypothesize that in the context of uncertainty in business it is important to be able to trust the person with whom one has business relationships. The research shows that gift exchanges create an atmosphere of trust that is time-and cost-efficient. Therefore, gift exchange has a rational motivation and facilitates advantageous business transactions within a guanxi relationship. Guanxi management is an important part of business strategy. This research will lead to a deeper understanding of the differences and similarities in contemporary business as it is practiced, both globally and locally, by people with different cultural backgrounds. / Graduate

Thesis (doctoral)--Cornell University. / "August 1974." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 372-381).

This research introduces a framework for explaining why managing family members create a shared understanding of caring and being cared for with their nonfamily employees, called ‘Social Reciprocity'. Applying an embedded case study design, using grounded theory method, this research adds to the understanding of the social mechanisms of internal stakeholder management in family firms, which have been largely ignored. The emergent framework proposes that the ability of family members to build trusting relationships with employees, based on cognitive and affective trusts contributes to the creation of social reciprocity. Affective trust, in particular, has a direct and moderating role in the creation of social reciprocity on emotional and instrumental level. The moderating role of affective trust is considered a valuable finding; since it emphasizes the role of trust as a meta theoretical concept. The developed framework suggests that affective trust initiates a social learning process that leads to a positive attribution bias, i.e. an automatic positive attribution of managing family members' actions as being based in benevolence and genuine care. Furthermore, social learning in the form of trust network reproduction emerges as contributory to the diffusion of social reciprocity to lower hierarchical levels. Analysis of data demonstrates that employees with little direct interactions with managing family members develop trusted weak ties to managing family members, with similar levels of cognitive and affective trust. This finding is particularly valuable as it challenges traditional network theory, which argues for frequent personal interaction to be necessary in creating trust ties. This thesis contributes to theoretical and methodological knowledge in several ways. First, it advances understanding of the social dynamics and mechanisms of internal stakeholder engagement in and SME family firm context. Second, the developed framework demonstrates the importance that concepts form multiple disciplines such as psychology, social psychology and sociology have on the development of theories in management research. Third, trust network reproduction and upper network stability emerged as causal mechanisms of potentially meta theoretical value that may have applicability on a wider range of topics in management research. Lastly, this thesis demonstrates the value of grounded theory in developing theory in management research.

This thesis sets out an interpretation of the value of community that I call communal reciprocity. It charts the history of that ideal, analyses its use in the work of an important academic proponent, G.A. Cohen, and develops a more comprehensive account of its main features. It also discusses the implications of communal reciprocity, including whether or not it conflicts with certain freedom-based concerns and its application, including in the assessment of market economies.