Thesis (Ph. D.)--Princeton University, 1950. / Author, John F. Nash, Jr. Includes bibliographical references (leaf [27]). Also issued electronically via World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-109).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-83).

Both of the two major components of Game Theory, e.g., the non-cooperative game theory and the cooperative game theory, are becoming more and more closely related to the field of optimization, as the needs to study the analytical properties of games start to rise. The results presented in this thesis illustrate several connections between Optimization and Game Theory, and attempts are made to build a bridge between the cooperative game theory and the non-cooperative game theory, to characterize the co-existence of competition and cooperation in practice. We start by applying the properties of Polymatroid Optimization to the cooperative game theory, and show that both of the joint replenish game and the one warehouse multi retailer game are submodular games. In the next part, we show that the strategies promoting learning from history are convergent under certain conditions. This result can also be viewed as an efficient algorithm to compute the Nash Equilibrium of the game. Because the competitive routing game satisfies the condition, we know that if every user adapts with good enough memory, then asymptotically the system converges to Nash Equilibrium. Therefore, if the decision of cooperation is difficult to reverse, then it can be justified for the farsighted players to use the cost structure in the Nash Equilibrium point to decide if they should cooperate or not, instead of reacting to the immediate consequences as a basis to make decisions. With the optimization tools applied, we are able to show that in parallel network, the social cost and the cost of other players tend to decrease if two players cooperate. Also, the price of anarchy is higher when the flow demand of players are more evenly distributed. Using that structural result, we derive the exact upper bound of the price of anarchy for a given parallel network with fixed number of players. The exact upper bound of the price of anarchy for arbitrary parallel network with given number of players, which is independent to the network structure and parameters, can be derived consequently. / Simai He. / Adviser: Shuzhong Zhang. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-11, Section: B, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-103). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 152-166).

Any decentralized retail or wholesale system of competing entities requires a benefit sharing arrangement when competing entities collaborate after their demands are realized. For instance, consider a distribution system similar to the observed behavior of independent car dealerships. If a dealership does not have in stock the car requested by a customer, it might consider acquiring it from a competing dealer. Such behavior raises questions about competitive procurement strategies that achieve system optimal outcomes. This dissertation consists of three main bodies of work contained respectively in chapters 2, 3, and 4. In the first work -- chapter 2, we examine a decentralized system that adopts an ex-post agreed transfer payment approach proposed by Anupindi et al. (Manuf. Serv. Oper.Manag. 4(3):349-368, 2001). In particular, we state a set of conditions on cost parameters and distributions that guarantee uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In the second work -- chapter 3, we introduce a multilevel graph framework that links decentralized inventory distribution models as a network of stochastic programming with recourse problems. This framework depicts independent retailers who maximize their individual expected profits, with each retailer independently procuring inventory in the ex-ante stage in response to forecasted demand and anticipated cooperative recourse action of all retailers in the system. The graph framework clarifies the modeling connection between problems in a taxonomy of decentralized inventory distribution models. This unifying perspective links the past work and shades light on future research directions. In the last work -- chapter 4, we examine and recast the biform games modeling framework as two-stage stochastic programming with recourse. Biform games modeling framework addresses two-stage games with competitive first stage and cooperative second stage without ex-ante agreement on profit sharing scheme. The two-stage stochastic programming view of biform games is demonstrated on examples from all the known examples regarding operational decision problems of competing firms from the literature. It allows an “old” mathematical methodology to showcase its versatility in modeling combined competitive and cooperative game options. In short, this dissertation provides important insights, clarifications, and strategic limitations regarding collaborations in decentralized distribution system.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 135-140).

This thesis consists of five papers. Paper [1] analyzes one possible way of replacing dynamic Pigouvian taxes by a static approximation of such taxes from the point of view of social accounting. The idea is to approximate a Pigouvian emission tax by using the instantaneous marginal willingness to pay to reduce the stock of pollution. If this approximation is close enough to the correct Pigouvian tax it will be useful for at least two reasons: (i) it brings the economy close to the socially optimal solution; and (ii) it provides information relevant for social accounting by closely approximating the value of additions to the stock of pollution. Paper [2] analyzes the welfare effects of an agreement between countries to slightly increase their emission taxes. The results indicate that such an agreement need not necessarily increase the global welfare level, even if each individual country has set its prereform emission tax to be lower than the marginal social cost of pollution. Paper [3] provides an economic framework for analyzing the global warming problem, emphasizing the use of forests as a means of carbon sequestration. We explore the difference between the decentralized economy and the socially optimal resource allocation, and discuss the appropriate tax system required to implement the first best optimum. Paper [4] incorporates the uncertainty involved in the production of nuclear energy into a dynamic general equilibrium growth model. We compare the resource allocation in the decentralized economy with the socially optimal resource allocation and design the dynamic Pigouvian taxes that make the decentralized economy reproduce the socially optimal resource allocation. Paper [5] treats externalities from nuclear power in a dynamic differential game framework involving two countries, which differ with regard to their nuclear technology. The model is solved numerically, where one country is considered relatively safe and the other relatively less safe. / <p>Härtill 5 delarbeten.</p> / digitalisering@umu

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 121-128).

Unknown wireless devices that use receiver architectures with a mixer may be detected and located using stimulated emissions. Transmitting a known stimulation signal and correlating leaked mixer products allows measurement of the TOF and thus range. The FRFT improves the detection of the stimulated emissions by compressing the energy of the stimulated emissions to a single axis value. The stimulation signal has many parameters that may be optimized for maximum detection distance or minimum range error or somewhere in between. The primary limiting factor for the parameters is the processing time, as the algorithm to compute the discrete FRFT is computationally intensive at the time of this report. The tests performed in this investigation achieved 45+meters detection distance with &lt; 3 meters of range error, with potential for farther detection distance.