This paper explores the nonidentity problem, an influential puzzle in modern ethics which addresses the nature of our moral responsibilities towards future generations. I begin by laying out the two conflicting intuitions comprising the problem and providing several examples to illustrate how we conceive of the moral status of future people. I then examine two versions of consequentialism, averagism and totalism, which circumvent the nonidentity problem. However, these two solutions each pose their own respective problems; thus, I argue that a modification of totalism – the critical level view – is the most viable consequentialist answer to the nonidentity problem.

In Experiment 1, four subjects were trained to match two visual samples (A) and their respective nonidentical visual comparisons (B); i.e., A-B matching. During nonreinforced test trials, all subjects demonstrated stimulus equivalences within the context of sample-comparison reversibility (B-A matching): When B stimuli were used as samples, appropriate responding to A comparisons occurred. A-B and B-A matching persisted given novel stimuli as alternate comparisons. However, the novel comparisons were consistently selected in the presence of nonmatching stimuli: i.e., during trials comprised of a novel comparison, an A or B sample from one stimulus class, and an "incorrect" comparison from the other, B or A stimuli respectively. In Experiment 2, three groups of subjects were trained under three different mediated transfer paradigms (e.g., A-B, C-B matching). Tests for reversibility (e.g., B0A, B0C matching) and mediated transfer (e.g., A-C, C-A matching)evinced stimulus equivalences for 11 of 12 subjects. The 11 subjects also matched the mediated equivalences given novel comparisons; whereas, they selected the novel comparisons when combined with nonmatching stimuli. Overall, the demonstrated stimulus equivalences favor a concept learning interpretation of non-identity matching-to-sample. Additionally, the trained and mediated matching relations were comprised of complementary sets of S+ and S- rules: Any stimulus of a given class used as a sample designated both the "correct" and "incorrect" comparisons.

The nonidentity problem is the issue of how to justify the belief that it is wrong to bring a person into existence if they would have a flawed life, though still worth living, instead of bringing another, nonidentical person into existence who would have a better life. To have an impaired life that is worth living seems to be a good existence, at least for the person in question. The nonidentity problem was made known mostly by Derek Parfit. The problem draws attention to three intuitions that seemingly cannot all be correct. How we respond to this predicament and which intuitions a solution depends on have severe implications primarily in population ethics but it will also affect other areas, to mention a few; genetic engineering, if and how to correct historical wrongdoing, and just resource management. In this essay, I will discuss David Boonin’s objections to previously proposed approaches to handle the nonidentity problem and his proposal on a solution. The conclusion I will draw is that although Boonin presents an answer based on a strategy of biting the bullet he fails to show how this is a plausible response to the nonidentity problem. Instead, I argue for my preferred strategy to tackle the problem by referring to a consequentialist moral theory such as utilitarianism. I intend to show that such a theory provides the most plausible solution and make the case that Boonin’s critique of such an approach is unjustified.