Scholars that study civil resistance mainly focus on factors that explain success or democratisation yet overlook what shapes an important link between the two: negotiations. This study asks why some civil resistance movements enter extensive negotiations with the regime while others do not and argues that the decision to negotiate in nonviolent campaigns is a function of a movement’s organisational capacity. Civil resistance movements with highorganisational capacity present fewer transaction costs for the regime and face fewer in-group constraints for entering negotiations. Thus, civil resistance movements with high organisational capacity are more likely to enter and conduct extensive negotiations with the regime. I test thehypothesised relationship through a structured, focused comparison of the Hirak in Algeria in 2019/2020 and the Sudanese Revolution in 2018/2019, relying on data collected through news wire reports. I find support for the hypothesis that organisational capacity matters for the scope of negotiations. However, the empirical evidence points towards the importance of the ability to shift tactics besides transaction costs and in-group constraints. Overall, this study presents a new theoretical framework, insights into the Algerian and Sudanese nonviolent campaigns and their negotiation processes and practical recommendations for civil resistance movements.