L’obiter dictum est une figure peu reconnue de la jurisprudence civile de la Cour de cassation. Pourtant, sa présence au sein des arrêts est régulièrement relevée, voire interrogée en doctrine. Mieux connu des juridictions supranationales ou des institutions et juridictions supérieures de droit public, son existence demeure néanmoins troublante. Il était donc nécessaire de mieux comprendre les réticences à son égard, puis d’observer ce qui fait la spécificité des obiter dicta de la Cour de cassation et de chercher à identifier ce phénomène. Une fois la conscience de l’existence et de la particularité du procédé acquise, la notion a pu être étudiée. Instrument incontournable de la common law, l’obiter dictum de la Cour de cassation doit être distingué de son équivalent étranger. Si la dénomination est identique, la réalité qu’elle recouvre diffère. Après avoir également discerné l’obiter dictum d’autres éléments du discours de la Cour de cassation, une définition a pu être proposée à partir d’un double critère : l’insertion de l’énoncé au sein de la décision et son extériorité à l’égard du champ décisionnel. L’étude du statut de l’obiter dictum a, quant à elle, permis de révéler sa nature d’outil au service du juge de cassation. La pratique de cet instrument par le juge de cassation devait donc être précisée, tout en prenant en compte les réflexions actuelles autour de la réforme de la Cour de cassation afin d’envisager le devenir de l’obiter dictum. L’observation des fonctions remplies par ce dernier a mis en lumière son rôle d’outil d’anticipation. Si l’obiter dictum apparaît comme un instrument performant au service des missions jurisprudentielles du juge de cassation, ses vertus ne sont cependant pas sans limites. Il ne peut ainsi être considéré comme un remède systématique aux effets néfastes des revirements de jurisprudence. Outil précieux entre les mains du juge de cassation, l’obiter dictum se révèle, à l’image des interrogations sur l’opportunité et les modalités d’une réforme de la Cour de cassation, être un instrument en quête d’équilibre. / The obiter dictum is a little known figure of the civil case-law of the Court of cassation. Yet, its presence amongst cases is regularly acknowledged, and even questioned by legal scholars. Better known by supranational courts or the institutions of superior courts of Public Law, its existence remains unsettling. It was, thus, necessary to better understand the reservations towards this object, and then observe what makes the specificity of the obiter dicta of the Court of cassation as well as to try to identify this phenomena. Once the consciousness of the existence and the specificities of this process had been acquired, its notion could be studied. The obiter dictum of the Court of cassation had to be distinguished from its counterpart that remains inherent and indispensable to the Common Law. Although the designation is identical, the reality they encompass varies. After having, also, separated the obiter dictum from other elements of the discourse of the Court of cassation, a definition was proposed by combinning two criteria : the insertion of an utterance within the decision and its extrinsic nature regarding the decisional field. The study of the status of the obiter dictum revealed its true nature of a tool. The practice of this instrument by the cassation judge needed to be detailed, whilst equally taking into account the contemporary reflections surrounding the reform of the Court of cassation in order to consider what would become of the obiter dictum. The observation of its functions allowed us to shine a light on its anticipatory role. If the obiter dictum seems to be a useful instrument serving the jurisdictional missions of the cassation judge, its virtues are not without limits. It cannot be thought of as a systematic remedy to the negative effects of courts overruling. A precious tool in the hands of the cassation judge, the obiter dictum appears, within the context of the questions regarding the opportunity and modalities of a reform of the Court of cassation, as an instrument searching for/in search of equilibrium.

In 1971 the right of re-trial in the Supreme Court was reformed and led to the court becoming a distinct forum for setting precedents. As a consequence of this the possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court was greatly reduced as the court’s primary task would be only to try cases and other issues of importance for the guidance of the application of the law. Before the reform in question, the focus of reviewing cases in the Supreme Court had been to ensure materially correct rulings. However, the legislator’s ambition was, through the reform, to allow the later function to disappear and instead concentrate the judicial activity to the legal system’s need for guidance, to reduce the flow of appealed cases and thereby the court’s workload. As a court of precedent, the Supreme Court’s rulings have a great authoritative effect, not only for the practice in the lower courts, but also for others who operate in the practical legal life such as government agencies, industry- and interest organizations, lawyers and, in the long run, general citizens. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s way of writing its judgments has changed over time, especially since the 1971 reform. Today the reasons in the decisions, both in criminal and civil cases, show a considerable scope of legal argumentation from several angles in a completely different way compared to the quite laconic rulings from older times. Because of this, a common element in the Supreme Court’s verdicts nowdays is the use of obiter dicta (in singularis: obiter dictum). Ratio decidendi means the reasons that determined the outcome of the case. In other words, the parts of the court’s reasoning that is necessary for the verdict. Obiter dictum is the opposite, i.e. something that is stated in the reasons but not necessary for the court to be able to decide on the disputed matter. For instance, obiter dicta can be made through general statements containing detailed descriptions of the legal situation, solid investigations regarding related issues but not relevant for the case or drawn conclusions linked to things or circumstances not invoked by the parties and therefore outside the frame of the trial. In this context severel interesting questions arise connected to obiter dicum as a legal phenomenon and whether it is appropriate. Some prominent doctrinal authors and former judges of the Supreme Court believe that the same court lacks the mandate to present answers to unclear legal issues and precedential matters outside the framework of the trial and through obiter dicta - statements. A few have even argued that it is unconstitutional. The aim of this master thesis is to examine whether the use of obiter dicta corresponds with the Supreme Court’s main function based on the rules of procedure and other relevant legislation for the court in its precedent setting activity.