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Part (I) of this thesis is on the Cournot model. Our aDn has been to collect together the known results on the Cournot model, present them in a systematic manner and derive the results from a single set of postulates. In the process we have corrected some errors, generalised some results and discovered some new ones. Part (II) is a brief review of the two main approaches to oligopoly theory: (1) the Reaction Function approach (also known as the conjectural variations approach, the classical approach or the traditional approach); (2) the game-theoretic approach, particularly the Super-Game approach of James Friedman. We show that the Reaction Function approach leads either to inconsistency, or to implausible econom1C results. We show that the Super-Game approach of James Friedman suffers from several defects, notably lack of credibility. In Part (III) we develop a new approach to oligopoly theory that avoids the difficulties of the two standard approaches. We propose a concept of credibility that promises to reduce the number of a priori possible oligopoly solutions, thus strengthening the predictive power of the theory. (

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I både den Europeiska unionen och i Sverige som enskilt land finns nu för tiden en utvecklad konkurrensrätt, som har till syfte att främja den fria konkurrensen, som i sin tur anses främja marknadsekonomin. En företeelse som hotar den fria konkurrensen är när företag som tillhör samma marknad går ihop i avtal om prissättningar eller uppdelning av marknaden. Denna företeelse förekommer även i mindre formella former, i så kallade samordnade förfaranden, där det inte finns några egentliga avtal som grund för samordningen, utan företagen agerar i samförstånd utan att ett avtal kan visas som styrker orsakssambandet mellan agerandet och samförståndet. Samordnade förfaranden förekommer på alla olika typer av marknader och svårigheten att skilja på ett förfarande i samförstånd och ett naturligt parallellt uppträdande mellan företag är stor. Ett parallellt uppträdande är när företag agerar självständigt men ändock följer varandra i prissättningen av liknande produkter, som en följd av en naturlig konkurrens, och är en del av en välfungerande marknad. Gränsen mellan parallellt uppträdande och ett samordnat förfarande kan vara svår att urskilja. Svårigheten blir större på så kallade oligopolmarknader, där det är få aktörer som styr över en stor andel av marknaden, varför ett parallellt uppträdande ter sig mer naturligt och förekommer i en annan utsträckning än på andra marknader. I denna uppsats kommer problematiken med bevisningen av samordnade förfaranden att framställas och även svårigheten att bedöma gränsen mellan samordnat förfarande och parallellt uppträdande som uppkommer när en marknad är ett oligopol.

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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the competition structure in the market for crossing Øresund and which price setting techniques are used. The results show that the market for crossing Øresund Bridge is monopolistically competitive market. While Øresund Bridge can in some cases be seen as a monopoly. Furthermore the results show how the firms that are operating in the market offer their consumers various pricing schedules to self-select from. The results based upon the information collected found that Øresund Bridge uses price discriminatory pricing schedules such as two-part tariff, quantity discount and peak-load pricing. According to the theory of price discrimination the firm needs to have market power in order to price discriminate and it is found that Øresund Bridge have a market share of 76%. The negative consequences of price discrimination in the particular market can mostly be seen in the ferry market where the two largest firms have to start collaborating in order to sustain as a part of the market. The positive consequences is found to be that a wider range of consumer groups are able to travel over Øresund due to the extensive range of different prices offered by the market operators.

Chapter 1: Downstream Competition and the Effects of Buyer Power The first chapter examines the interaction between buyer power and competition intensity in the downstream market in affecting consumer and total welfare. We study a model where oligopolistic retailers compete in quantity in the downstream market and one of them is a large retailer that has its own exclusive supplier. Negotiation between this retailer and its supplier is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game. We demonstrate that an increase in the buyer power of the large retailer against its supplier leads to a fall in retail price and consequently an improvement in consumer surplus and this is true even in the extreme case where the downstream market is served by a monopoly. More interestingly, we find that the effects of buyer power are large when the intensity of downstream competition is low, with the effects being the largest in the case of downstream monopoly. This suggests that buyer power and downstream competition are substitutes. Chapter 2: Subsidy, Product Diversity and Buyer Power The objective of the second chapter is to analyze the effectiveness of government subsidies in promoting product diversity when the downstream firm (a retailer) has buyer power. We extend the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition and compare the effects of subsidies on equilibrium number of product varieties and social welfare in the case where products are sold directly to consumers and the case where they are sold through a monopoly retailer with buyer power. Two types of subsidies are considered, a subsidy on marginal cost and a subsidy on fixed cost. We find that while the two types of subsides have different effects on the quantity and retail price of each variety, they both raise the number of product varieties and the social welfare. Moreover, a combination of the two types of subsidies is able to achieve the social optimum. These results are true even when products are distributed through a downstream monopoly retailer who has all the bargaining power, but the mechanism through which a subsidy increases product varieties is different. In comparison with the case where products are distributed directly to consumers, retailer buyer power reduces product variety and social welfare. Furthermore subsidies become less effective in the presence of buyer power. To be more specific, retailer buyer power has both a level effect and a marginal effect on product diversity. At any given subsidy rate, the equilibrium number of varieties is smaller and a marginal increase in subsidy leads to a smaller increase in the number of varieties. Chapter 3: Subsidy on Complementary Products in a Model of Monopolistic Competition The third chapter seeks to re-examine the market provision of product diversity under monopolistic competition and the effects of an infinitesimal subsidy on product variety and social welfare in the case of complementary products. This examination builds on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition but assumes an alternative demand linkage. The results show that, different from the case of substitutable products, demand complementarity leads to multiple equilibriums and the number of product varieties could be higher or lower than the constrained optimum depending on the level of the fixed cost of production. When the fixed costs are small, the market yields too many products and an infinitesimal subsidy exacerbates the problem leading to an over-supply of product varieties. On the other hand, when the fixed costs are large, there are too few products and in some cases the complementary goods industry becomes non-existent. A subsidy that induces a switch of equilibriums enhances product variety and improves social welfare.

Chapter 1: Downstream Competition and the Effects of Buyer Power The first chapter examines the interaction between buyer power and competition intensity in the downstream market in affecting consumer and total welfare. We study a model where oligopolistic retailers compete in quantity in the downstream market and one of them is a large retailer that has its own exclusive supplier. Negotiation between this retailer and its supplier is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game. We demonstrate that an increase in the buyer power of the large retailer against its supplier leads to a fall in retail price and consequently an improvement in consumer surplus and this is true even in the extreme case where the downstream market is served by a monopoly. More interestingly, we find that the effects of buyer power are large when the intensity of downstream competition is low, with the effects being the largest in the case of downstream monopoly. This suggests that buyer power and downstream competition are substitutes. Chapter 2: Subsidy, Product Diversity and Buyer Power The objective of the second chapter is to analyze the effectiveness of government subsidies in promoting product diversity when the downstream firm (a retailer) has buyer power. We extend the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition and compare the effects of subsidies on equilibrium number of product varieties and social welfare in the case where products are sold directly to consumers and the case where they are sold through a monopoly retailer with buyer power. Two types of subsidies are considered, a subsidy on marginal cost and a subsidy on fixed cost. We find that while the two types of subsides have different effects on the quantity and retail price of each variety, they both raise the number of product varieties and the social welfare. Moreover, a combination of the two types of subsidies is able to achieve the social optimum. These results are true even when products are distributed through a downstream monopoly retailer who has all the bargaining power, but the mechanism through which a subsidy increases product varieties is different. In comparison with the case where products are distributed directly to consumers, retailer buyer power reduces product variety and social welfare. Furthermore subsidies become less effective in the presence of buyer power. To be more specific, retailer buyer power has both a level effect and a marginal effect on product diversity. At any given subsidy rate, the equilibrium number of varieties is smaller and a marginal increase in subsidy leads to a smaller increase in the number of varieties. Chapter 3: Subsidy on Complementary Products in a Model of Monopolistic Competition The third chapter seeks to re-examine the market provision of product diversity under monopolistic competition and the effects of an infinitesimal subsidy on product variety and social welfare in the case of complementary products. This examination builds on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition but assumes an alternative demand linkage. The results show that, different from the case of substitutable products, demand complementarity leads to multiple equilibriums and the number of product varieties could be higher or lower than the constrained optimum depending on the level of the fixed cost of production. When the fixed costs are small, the market yields too many products and an infinitesimal subsidy exacerbates the problem leading to an over-supply of product varieties. On the other hand, when the fixed costs are large, there are too few products and in some cases the complementary goods industry becomes non-existent. A subsidy that induces a switch of equilibriums enhances product variety and improves social welfare.

The objective of this thesis is to investigate and describe components of pricing system which influence the dynamic performance of a price leader manufacturing firm in an oligopoly capital intensive industry producing an identical intermediate product (s). The synthetic fibre industry is chosen as an illustrative case upon which the discussion is built. However, this work could generally be applied to a wide variety of organizations and situations. After discussing the suitability of system dynamics to the formulation of long-run pricing strategy, a model of the pricing system is constructed by using this technique. The behaviour of this system is examined in terms of feedback loops. That is to illustrate how the characteristics of these loops and the interaction among them affect the dynamic behaviour of the system, and how this behaviour can be improved via changing the components of these loops and/or their structures. The improved system is simulated under different external disturbances, certain parameter changes, and different pricing control policies. The simulation shows that the design of a set of robust pricing policies makes the system insensitive to external disturbance and error in parameters. It also shows that the ability of the firm to attain its growth and profitability objectives is affected by the chosen control pricing policies. Some potential applications of the model, particularly, as planning and training tools are highlighted. It is concluded that System Dynamics is an appropriate approach to the formulation of the long-run pricing strategies.

This work deals with legal aspects of collective dominant position under Article 82 of the Treaty establishing European Community (hereinafter- EC). The purpose is to reveal a legal definition and main features of collective dominant position. The author examines features and criteria which are established in the jurisprudence of EC institutions. The author examines features and criteria which are established in the jurisprudence of EC institutions. The author also indicates that the criteria for establishing collective dominance are not fully scrutinized under EC competition law. Moreover, the practice of EC institutions is analyzed not only under Article 82, which prohibits abuse of a dominant position, but also under Merger regulation to that extent which is necessary to reveal the main topic. Further the work presents problems which are found under these two institutions of EC competition law.