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I både den Europeiska unionen och i Sverige som enskilt land finns nu för tiden en utvecklad konkurrensrätt, som har till syfte att främja den fria konkurrensen, som i sin tur anses främja marknadsekonomin. En företeelse som hotar den fria konkurrensen är när företag som tillhör samma marknad går ihop i avtal om prissättningar eller uppdelning av marknaden. Denna företeelse förekommer även i mindre formella former, i så kallade samordnade förfaranden, där det inte finns några egentliga avtal som grund för samordningen, utan företagen agerar i samförstånd utan att ett avtal kan visas som styrker orsakssambandet mellan agerandet och samförståndet. Samordnade förfaranden förekommer på alla olika typer av marknader och svårigheten att skilja på ett förfarande i samförstånd och ett naturligt parallellt uppträdande mellan företag är stor. Ett parallellt uppträdande är när företag agerar självständigt men ändock följer varandra i prissättningen av liknande produkter, som en följd av en naturlig konkurrens, och är en del av en välfungerande marknad. Gränsen mellan parallellt uppträdande och ett samordnat förfarande kan vara svår att urskilja. Svårigheten blir större på så kallade oligopolmarknader, där det är få aktörer som styr över en stor andel av marknaden, varför ett parallellt uppträdande ter sig mer naturligt och förekommer i en annan utsträckning än på andra marknader. I denna uppsats kommer problematiken med bevisningen av samordnade förfaranden att framställas och även svårigheten att bedöma gränsen mellan samordnat förfarande och parallellt uppträdande som uppkommer när en marknad är ett oligopol.

The objective of this thesis is to investigate and describe components of pricing system which influence the dynamic performance of a price leader manufacturing firm in an oligopoly capital intensive industry producing an identical intermediate product (s). The synthetic fibre industry is chosen as an illustrative case upon which the discussion is built. However, this work could generally be applied to a wide variety of organizations and situations. After discussing the suitability of system dynamics to the formulation of long-run pricing strategy, a model of the pricing system is constructed by using this technique. The behaviour of this system is examined in terms of feedback loops. That is to illustrate how the characteristics of these loops and the interaction among them affect the dynamic behaviour of the system, and how this behaviour can be improved via changing the components of these loops and/or their structures. The improved system is simulated under different external disturbances, certain parameter changes, and different pricing control policies. The simulation shows that the design of a set of robust pricing policies makes the system insensitive to external disturbance and error in parameters. It also shows that the ability of the firm to attain its growth and profitability objectives is affected by the chosen control pricing policies. Some potential applications of the model, particularly, as planning and training tools are highlighted. It is concluded that System Dynamics is an appropriate approach to the formulation of the long-run pricing strategies.

The objective of this thesis is to investigate and describe components of pricing system which influence the dynamic performance of a price leader manufacturing firm in an oligopoly capital intensive industry producing an identical intermediate product (s). The synthetic fibre industry is chosen as an illustrative case upon which the discussion is built. However, this work could generally be applied to a wide variety of organizations and situations. After discussing the suitability of system dynamics to the formulation of long-run pricing strategy, a model of the pricing system is constructed by using this technique. The behaviour of this system is examined in terms of feedback loops. That is to illustrate how the characteristics of these loops and the interaction among them affect the dynamic behaviour of the system, and how this behaviour can be improved via changing the components of these loops and/or their structures. The improved system is simulated under different external disturbances, certain parameter changes, and different pricing control policies. The simulation shows that the design of a set of robust pricing policies makes the system insensitive to external disturbance and error in parameters. It also shows that the ability of the firm to attain its growth and profitability objectives is affected by the chosen control pricing policies. Some potential applications of the model, particularly, as planning and training tools are highlighted. It is concluded that System Dynamics is an appropriate approach to the formulation of the long-run pricing strategies.

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal. / This thesis defines collusion broadly as play in a repeated game which differs from play in a one shot game. The analysis of collusion is an important part of many branches of economics. In industrial organization, for example, if collusion were not present then we could restrict investigation to the study of oligopolistic and competitive markets. Another important part of modern economic theory is the analysis of situations where there exists some ldnd of privileged information. Game theorists would say that in such a scenario there exists incomplete information. The predominant theme of the three essays composing this thesis is the study of repeated games under incomplete information. Typically, repeated game analyses have assumed the presence of complete information. However, many examples of repeated interaction must be treated in an incomplete information scenario. Auctions, the subject of the first essay, are the most natural example of this. The goal of this study is to understand how bidders collude in auctions. The main innovation is an explicit treatment of the repeated nature of the game to endogenize the threats necessary to support non competitive behavior. This analysis yields several testable implications about the behavior of colluding agents in auctions which are not apparent from the few models which have studied collusion in auctions from a static point of view. Nearly every model constructed to study collusion makes predictions which are at odds with accepted stylized facts. The most prominent of these paradoxes is the stability which theoretical models predict yet empirical and allegorical evidence rejects. This is the subject of the second essay. Incomplete information takes the form of how players evaluate future payoffs. This is an important detail because future payoffs are the only tool a cartel can use to enforce the play of collusive equilibria. The developed model imposes that patience is private information and heterogeneous and develops predictions which contrast strongly with accepted models of collusion. The predictions of the model are supported with discussion of some empirical evidence on cartels. The third essay develops a model which can have sociological as well as economic applications, in that it studies how rational agents form surplus creating partnerships in a repeated, incomplete information environment. Previous work has assumed an exogenous production technology which partners use to create this surplus. Furthermore an agents type, which affects surplus creation, has always been assumed to be observable. This essay studies matching with an endogenous production technology, in the sense that the surplus is a function of the level of collusion which can be supported. Collusion can be supported to varying degree based upon the type (patience, or discount factor) of each agent in the partnership. A special attention is turned to contrasting the implications of the model in the presence of complete as opposed to incomplete information.