Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 223-234).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 448-460).

This thesis consists of one literature review and three self-contained essays that discuss management transfers, work incentives and age structures in family firms. In the literature review, I summarize and structure recent studies on management transfer in family firms. The first essay focuses on the incentive effects of age structure in a single firm, and argues that compressed age structures are negatively related to firm performance, which provides a mechanism that causes the underperformance of dynastic management. In the second essay, I extend the single-firm analysis to a multi-firm scenario and find children prefer to work for their own family if the age gap between levels is large. Otherwise, they leave and work for other families. As a result, increased life expectancy leads to the separation between ownership and management, and family-managed firms have more compressed age structures than their professionally managed counterparts. In the third and final essay, I study the issue of self-enforcement in promotion tournaments and find organizations using rank-order contracts may still act opportunistically even when there exists no agency problem between owners and managers. Furthermore, both the wage-seniority profile and governance structure determine the credibility of rank-order contracts, which provides an alternative rationale for returns to seniority and underperformance of dynastic management.

State-owned banks in China have been among the last institutions to undergo reform. Over the last ten years, new institutions and regulations have been created and the banks have undergone a process of divesting themselves of bad policy loans in preparation for public listing. Three of the “Big Four” are now exchanged on Chinese stock markets, though majority ownership remains with the state. The recent reforms of China’s financial system have been tested by a financial crisis that has toppled banks around the world; yet China’s banks remain profitable. They have been able to weather the storm because of the unique institutional relationships they have with various state vehicles. In particular, state ownership as manifested through asset-management companies have given the Chinese banks an edge over the international competition. However, this relationship is not without its risks. There still remains a great deal of dependence within China’s financial system on the state and its favorable policies, subjecting the banks to continued interference. / text

US – Definitive Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China is the initial WTO dispute in which China claims that US-countervailing duties on certain products from China are inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the SCM Agreement. The meaning of “public bodies” within Article 1.1 (a) (1) of the SCM Agreement and the question of whether China’s “SOCB” constitute “public bodies” are the heart of the matter. The thesis argues that the theory of the governmental function is more persuasive than that of governmental control in terms of defining “public bodies”. Although the majority ownership of China’s SOCBs has remained in the Chinese government, their policy-oriented nature has been largely marginalized. The conclusion is that the WTO system needs to give developing countries more policy flexibility, and developing countries should also make the best use of their latent comparative advantage and the effects of globalization.

US – Definitive Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China is the initial WTO dispute in which China claims that US-countervailing duties on certain products from China are inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the SCM Agreement. The meaning of “public bodies” within Article 1.1 (a) (1) of the SCM Agreement and the question of whether China’s “SOCB” constitute “public bodies” are the heart of the matter. The thesis argues that the theory of the governmental function is more persuasive than that of governmental control in terms of defining “public bodies”. Although the majority ownership of China’s SOCBs has remained in the Chinese government, their policy-oriented nature has been largely marginalized. The conclusion is that the WTO system needs to give developing countries more policy flexibility, and developing countries should also make the best use of their latent comparative advantage and the effects of globalization.

No description available.

Thesis (PhDBusinessandManagement)--University of South Australia, 2002.

Thesis (PhD)--University of South Australia, 1999

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of New South Wales, 1999. / Also available online.