Introducing private capital and employing mixed-ownership structure are effective means and inevitable choices to enhance the vitality, control and influence of state-owned economy. An effective corporate governance structure that matches the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is the key to the success of the reform. This study suggests that the mixed-ownership reform and corporate governance practices under the Singapore Temasek mode provide China with important experience in separating government functions from enterprise management, the system of board of directors, highly independent market-oriented operation, open and diversified international employment and value-based motivation and assessment. The empirical study shows that a company's shareholding ratio of the top five shareholders, total compensation of board members, total compensation of senior officers, shareholding ratio of the board of directors, shareholding ratio of senior officers are positively related to corporate performance, while the degree of check-and-balance ownership structure, the separation of rights of chairman and general manager, and the proportion of independent directors are negatively related to corporate performance. In addition, there is a big difference in the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance under different types of controllers.The mixed-ownership reform practice of Northern International Trust Co., Ltd. in Tianjin was analyzed as a case study. This paper presents reform suggestions on such aspects as improving the relationship between the Tianjin Municipal Government and the state-owned capital investment platform by the mixed-ownership reform, the design of the corporate governance mechanism of the state-owned capital investment platform, and the design of corporate governance of participating and holding enterprises of state-owned capital investment platform based on the case study and the experience and theoretical results of the Singapore Temasek mode. / Business Administration/Strategic Management

Since 1989, there has been a period of rapid change of the economies of the former Eastern bloc. Within a few years, the majority of the formerly centrally administered economies had begun restructuring their economic systems, including the privatisation. of formerly state-owned enterprises. This process developed differently in different countries, depending among other things on their historical traditions and the momentum of their social, political and economic transformations. This doctoral dissertation examines the privatisation of large-scale industrial enterprises in Slovakia prior to 1997. In particular the thesis analyses the changing political and institutional framework governing the process and method of privatisation; and how the governance of firms was affected by the new markets and ownership- and control-structures that were established. Special attention is paid to the role played by investment funds andinvestment-companies established as a consequence of voucher privatisation. The research problem is approached both from an aggregate national level and from the enterprise level. The thesis includes a number of case studies of enterprises in Slovakia that underwent privatisation, and of investment funds that emerged to take part in the process. In addition, two panel-data sets were constructed for the sake of statistical analysis. The study points to the drastic changes in privatisation policy and its enactment, under different governments. It leads to the conclusion that privatisation is a highly political process, whose economic effects cannot be separated from its distributional effects. This politicised nature of ownership reform is shown to have some negative side-effects with regard to the development of well-functioning governance structures. It is, for example, pointed to that the capital market, as it developed during the period of study, was highly non-transparent,characterised by high transaction costs and insider-trading. The study also documents an increasingly concentrated ownership structure of the Slovak industry and relates it to the changes in privatisation policy. In the final analysis attention is drawn to a recurring theme in the study, namely the issues related to the relative stability and durability of the institutional set-up. In many cases an insecurity about "the rules of the game" led to short-term incentives and opportunism on behalf of the economic and political agents.