System trespassing, which refers to the unauthorized access of computer systems, has rapidly become a worldwide phenomenon. Despite growing concern, criminological literature has paid system trespassing little attention. The current study utilizes data gathered from a Chinese computer network to examine system trespasser behavior after exposure to one of three warning messages: an altruistic message used for moral persuasion (warning 1), a legal sanction threat (warning 2), and an ambiguous threat (warning 3). More specifically, the current study examines the temporal order of various keystroke commands to determine if some keystroke commands are used as a tactical skill to avoid detection. The results of a series of bivariate cross-tabulations show that encountering a standard legal threat or ambiguous threat increase the early use of reconnaissance commands; however, these findings were not pronounced enough to gain statistical significance. Since the current study is the first known test of particularistic restrictive deterrence in cyberspace it informs those working in cyber security, whilst expanding the scope of the theory.

Political success in semi-democratic countries has two aspects: shifting the balance of power in one’s favor and maintaining it. This thesis seeks to examine how the AKP has succeeded in shifting the balance of power in its favor while its predecessor the Welfare Party did not. Focusing on electoral success, existing research primarily lists center-periphery conflict, moderation, class struggle, party organization, and failures of others as the main determinants. Yet the significance of reining in the power of the Kemalist state structure has been mostly disregarded. Therefore, with a comparison of the AKP (2002-2007) and the Welfare Party (1996-1997) governments, this study tests one assertion using most-similar systems research design that in semi-democratic political settings with strong authoritarian actors, political parties that build broad coalitions via group specific policy promises will be more likely to shift the balance of power in favor of themselves than actors that lack such connections.

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