This thesis explores the influence of the Australian Labor Party's (ALP's) national factions on Party policy. The specific emphasis is on policy development during Labor's 1996-2004 period in opposition. Through a total of 88 interviews, predominantly with members of Caucus including Kim Beazley, Simon Crean and Mark Latham, this thesis has been able to examine not only the formal policy development processes but, significantly, also the informal processes within the Party. The thesis begins with an overview of the national factions' organisation and operations in relation to policy development in both the organisational and parliamentary wings. It concentrates on exploring how the informal processes of the faction system dominate the formal Party structures, and demonstrates how the factional elite control these decision-making forums. The thesis then concentrates on analysing in-depth the factional influences on policies developed within the Immigration, Trade and Family and Community Services portfolios. These case studies were selected because they provoked debate, to varying degrees, in the Party. An understanding of how consensus was reached among the diverse perspectives, particularly between the factions, within the Party is critical to exploring the relationship between the national factions and policy development. The case studies cover a range of policy development modes, and therefore provide ample opportunity to explore factional dynamics in relation to policy formulation under different circumstances throughout the 1996-2004 period. This thesis utilises Arend Lijphart's theory of the Politics of Accommodation, which was originally developed to explain inter-party negotiations within the Dutch coalition government during the twentieth century. This theory is relevant to the study of the ALP's modern factions because, similar to the Dutch political system, the faction system operates on the power-sharing principle of proportional representation (PR). By applying Lijphart's theoretical framework, this thesis provides a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the ALP's factional dynamics in relation to policy. It gives an in-depth analysis of the elite control of the faction system in the domain of policy development. It demonstrates that faction leaders resolve contentious policy issues by negotiating in a 'spirit of accommodation' and when the factions adopt a policy position, the unwritten rules of the 'factional game' are applied to ensure the national factions reach a consensus on Party policy. Given that the national factions compete for power and sometimes pursue a different set of policy objectives, this 'spirit of accommodation' appears to be paradoxical; this palliative application of factional power is arguably in contrast to the general perception of faction politics. Through the presentation and analysis of original primary data this thesis makes a valuable contribution to the study of the ALP and factions in general, significantly advancing existing knowledge.

A literatura é pródiga em apontar o facciosismo como a norma do sistema partidário vigente à democracia de 46. Em função das constantes cisões verificadas no interior das legendas, a coalizão de apoio ao Executivo no parlamento seria predominantemente concebida ad hoc. O objetivo deste trabalho foi investigar a procedência da referida tese, avaliando o comportamento dos legisladores nas votações realizadas na Câmara dos Deputados entre 1946 e 1964. As informações reunidas no estudo permitem contestar a interpretação usual, comprovando ser incomum a base governista precisar de auxílio externo para assegurar a passagem da própria agenda de trabalho. Somente nas gestões de Getúlio Vargas e Juscelino Kubistchek as contribuições de membros de oposição se fizeram capitais para a aprovação dos programas do governo. Ainda assim, seriam as metas varguistas as mais dependentes deste tipo de subsídio. No quadro geral, o êxito administrativo das presidências decorreria do uso estratégico da verificação de quorum, um procedimento regimental que permitia tanto à situação quanto as demais legendas visualizarem a divisão de forças no plenário, minimizando o efeito-informação de Riker (1962). Desta forma, o governo pôde calcular a melhor estratégia política capaz de lhe certificar a vitória em plenário, independentemente da ajuda dos opositores / The literature tells us that factionalism was the norm in the party system of the Brazils Second Republic (1946-1964). As a result of constant factions within parties, presidential coalitions in the legislature were primarily constructed ad hoc. The objective of this study was to investigate the origin of this argument by analyzing the behavior of legislators on roll call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1946 and 1964. The data used in this investigation challenge the conventional wisdom by showing that it was unusual for governing coalitions to need outside help to ensure the adoption of their agendas. Only in the administrations of Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954) and Juscelino Kubistchek (1956-1960) was the support of members of the opposition essential to the approval of government programs, with Vargas agenda being most dependent on this type of support. In general, presidents success arose from the strategic use of verification of quorum, a procedural rule that allowed both the government and the opposition to visualize the division of the forces in the legislature, minimizing Rikers (1962) information effect. Thus, the government could calculate the best political strategy able to ensure victory, independent of opposition support.

A literatura é pródiga em apontar o facciosismo como a norma do sistema partidário vigente à democracia de 46. Em função das constantes cisões verificadas no interior das legendas, a coalizão de apoio ao Executivo no parlamento seria predominantemente concebida ad hoc. O objetivo deste trabalho foi investigar a procedência da referida tese, avaliando o comportamento dos legisladores nas votações realizadas na Câmara dos Deputados entre 1946 e 1964. As informações reunidas no estudo permitem contestar a interpretação usual, comprovando ser incomum a base governista precisar de auxílio externo para assegurar a passagem da própria agenda de trabalho. Somente nas gestões de Getúlio Vargas e Juscelino Kubistchek as contribuições de membros de oposição se fizeram capitais para a aprovação dos programas do governo. Ainda assim, seriam as metas varguistas as mais dependentes deste tipo de subsídio. No quadro geral, o êxito administrativo das presidências decorreria do uso estratégico da verificação de quorum, um procedimento regimental que permitia tanto à situação quanto as demais legendas visualizarem a divisão de forças no plenário, minimizando o efeito-informação de Riker (1962). Desta forma, o governo pôde calcular a melhor estratégia política capaz de lhe certificar a vitória em plenário, independentemente da ajuda dos opositores / The literature tells us that factionalism was the norm in the party system of the Brazils Second Republic (1946-1964). As a result of constant factions within parties, presidential coalitions in the legislature were primarily constructed ad hoc. The objective of this study was to investigate the origin of this argument by analyzing the behavior of legislators on roll call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1946 and 1964. The data used in this investigation challenge the conventional wisdom by showing that it was unusual for governing coalitions to need outside help to ensure the adoption of their agendas. Only in the administrations of Getúlio Vargas (1951-1954) and Juscelino Kubistchek (1956-1960) was the support of members of the opposition essential to the approval of government programs, with Vargas agenda being most dependent on this type of support. In general, presidents success arose from the strategic use of verification of quorum, a procedural rule that allowed both the government and the opposition to visualize the division of the forces in the legislature, minimizing Rikers (1962) information effect. Thus, the government could calculate the best political strategy able to ensure victory, independent of opposition support.