published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

This study examined the effects of a smoking cessation program using vouchers as reinforcers with individuals with traumatic brain injury and a history of substance abuse. The intervention was conducted at a residential facility that houses individuals with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Vouchers were delivered contingent on reductions of carbon monoxide (CO) samples of 5 ppm or less across a shaping phase, and an abstinence induction phase. A standard pay phase was added at the end of the study to examine the effects of a standardized reinforcement scale with the abstinence criterion set at 8 ppm or less. Reductions in CO were not robust in the shaping and abstinence induction phase. The standard pay schedule showed some improvements in CO levels with less variability for two of the three participants.

Quality-based payment in healthcare—also known as pay-for-performance—is a popular policy intervention aimed at improving healthcare quality. However, there has been little theoretical work characterizing the underlying quality problem or the interaction between pay-for-performance and existing payment mechanisms. Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence that pay-for-performance has a substantial effect on healthcare quality.

This dissertation presents three essays. The first essay finds that the household risky ratio, the ratio of high risk assets over low risk assets directly owned by households, is a strong negative predictor of the equity premium on the US stock market. The predictability is robust to definition of the asset classes, first versus second half of sample, and the finite-sample bias of Stambaugh (1999). The predictability is stronger than, and not subsumed by popular predictors like price-earnings ratios, yield spread, equity share of issues, or consumption-wealth ratios. The main predictive power is decomposed into three similar parts: 1) the household tilt of risky assets, which is novel and generally orthogonal to known predictors; 2) a valuation ratio component; and 3) an issuance component of high risk versus low risk assets. / Economics

In this dissertation a new method is proposed to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP). The method works as an additional interview scene appended to conjoint analysis and it is named throughout this dissertation as the Price Estimation scene (PE scene). In the preceding conjoint analysis price is not included as an attribute. Instead the exchange rate between conjoint utilities and willingness-to-pay is estimated in the PE scene. This is achieved by the use of product stimuli in addition to price scales that are adapted for each respondent in the interview reflecting his or her previously estimated part-worth utilities. In the PE scene the respondents are presented with a sequence of product choices with assigned prices and indicate whether they would actually purchase each of the presented product profiles. The PE scene is a method to estimate willingness-to-pay at an individual level based only on each respondent's provided information. Shortcomings of existing approaches that use conjoint analysis, such as a missing choice rule as well as problems that arise when price is included as an attribute are overcome. The PE scene was tested in an empirical investigation in which the WTPs of the customers of the Nokia online shop in Germany for different product bundles were estimated. (author's abstract)

No description available.

Teacher compensation reforms have been on the rise in recent years, yet research has yet to fully demonstrate how teachers interpret these policies and how they may influence their instructional practices and professional decisions. This qualitative study of a performance pay program in an urban district in Texas drew on cognitive approaches to policy implementation and theories of sensemaking to examine and explicate these issues. Teachers’ experiences in two schools were examined through interviews, focus groups, and document analysis. The experiences of school principals and district policymakers acting as sensegivers to teachers about the program’s goals, purposes, and theory of action were also examined. District policymakers’ understandings of the program varied, and were informed by their positions in the system and their own interests in the program. These differences resulted in a complex program with an array of objectives for teachers to implement in schools and classrooms, as well as varying expectations for teachers’ work, which were not always understood by teachers. With few clear and consistent messages from policymakers, teachers and principals interpreted the program according to their own ideas about important outcomes, and then shaped it to fit their situations. Although accepting of the program, teachers and principals were not always able to focus on it in ways expected by policymakers given other demands on them, particularly those emanating from the accountability system. Some evidence of goal distortion in terms of teachers’ attention to student assignments and mobility was also found. These findings hold implications for cognitive theories of policy implementation, suggesting that teachers’ responses to policies are influenced by the amount of attention they are able to give them, as well as direct sensegiving about policy goals and expectations on the part of policymakers. The findings also suggest that performance pay programs can be expected to be adapted, co-opted, and selectively attended to in order to fit within the contexts in which they are implemented. Thus, policymakers should consider other demands in the policy environment that may compete with performance incentives, as well as the organizational contexts of schools in which they will be implemented. / text

Not available / text

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration