The issue of pay television has generated a plethora of reports and submissions from politicians, bureaucrats and industrialists for a decade. That the issue is not yet resolved is the result of many factors, all of which serve to highlight the structural complexities of the Australian electronic media system. At the political level, social policy is in a state of transition and broadcasting policy has reflected this. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) have been forced to reappraise their roles as public broadcasters. The commercial networks have seen their reserves and their profitability deteriorate drastically in an environment of poor management, fluctuating government policy and a depressed national economy. The Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (ABT), the federal regulator of commercial broadcasting, is struggling to adapt to these new circumstances, and is confronted by new challenges to its powers and responsibilities. Ideally, a discussion on the introduction of pay television would be conducted within the context of a comprehensive and established federal broadcasting policy. Basic to this thesis is the perception that no such policy exists. It is left to the analyst to speculate as to the intentions evident in Government initiatives, suggest the potential impact of pay television in that light, and offer constructive criticism accordingly. This thesis recognises that pay television seems inevitable as both major political parties are committed, in principle at least, to its introduction. This thesis sets itself the following objectives: to identify the salient components that serve to define pay television; to develop and employ a methodology to extract lessons from the experiences of others with pay television, whilst remaining sensitive to historical and structural context; to apply those lessons to the Australia condition; and to make recommendations on the introduction of pay television, based on both the definitional and comparative work of this thesis, within the context of contemporary Government deliberations, as evident in the Report from the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure of November 1989.

在新加坡，付費電視產業的競爭與策略很少被討論。有鑑於此，本研究藉由檢視新加坡媒體媒體發展管理局（Media Development Authority）於2010年所修訂的媒體市場行為準則（Media Market Conduct Code）之「跨台聯播」政策（Cross-Carriage Measure），利用五力分析、PEST分析及SWOT分析，來探討新加坡付費電視產業的發展、競爭、策略及「跨台聯播」政策所造成的影響。 在新加坡的付費電視產業競爭趨勢中，以新電信公司（SingTel）於2007年所推出的Mio TV IPTV付費電視服務成長最多，2011年時市占率已成長了30%；同年，其競爭者星和有限公司（StarHub）的星和視界（StarHub TV）付費電視服務卻成長不到1%。本研究發現，Mio TV市占率成長之迅速是因新電信公司積極與內容提供者及電視頻道業者簽訂獨家播映權，甚至以高價購買運動電視品牌ESPN的眾多頻道及其旗下英格蘭超級聯賽2010年至2013年的獨家播映權。此舉讓兩家電視業者競爭越趨激烈，採取多面策略以增加訂戶率並吸引不同族群與多元喜好者，包括產品差異化策略、成本領先策略及集中化策略等。 研究結果顯示，兩家業者為爭取更多訂戶，主要採取的策略是與內容提供者及電視頻道業者簽訂獨播合約（Exclusive Carriage Agreements），但此策略也引起媒體發展管理局的關切。兩家業者所採取的獨播合約策略不僅增加了訂戶們訂閱內容的開銷，也讓訂閱星和視界服務的訂戶們面臨必須同時安裝新電信Mio TV服務或不得不更換服務之不便。為解決以上的問題，媒體發展局決定施行「跨台聯播」政策，規定付費電視業者必須與其他業者分享所購得的內容或頻道獨播權，並支付對方播映費，受方不准修改轉播內容，包括內容中穿插的廣告及原先業者的商標等。本研究發現，此政策將會促使付費電視業者購買更多多元化的節目內容及推出更低價格的節目組合等，有利於消費者成為付費電視服務的訂戶，同時也有利於降低既有訂戶的內容訂閱開銷。另一方面，星和公司及新電信公司兩家業者也不再需要以高價購買內容的獨家播映權，於是更專注於為各自的訂戶提供更創新及完善的服務。不過此策略亦有利於新進業者進入市場，預料將導致市場競爭更加激烈，業者們也必須更投入差異化策略。同時，此政策也意謂獨播合約的現象將會減少，間接使內容提供者的議價能力受到影響。 / Competition and strategies in Singapore’s television industries were rarely examined despite the growing phenomena of such research in other countries. The implementation of the Cross-Carriage Measure presents a timely opportunity to examine developments, competition, strategies and the impacts of the Measure on the industry. Using the Five Force model, PEST and SWOT models as the basis for the research framework, this thesis adopted the case study approach and used documents from various sources to examine the industry and discuss the changes brought upon by the Measure. Competition in the industry showed that SingTel Mio TV achieved more than 30 percent market share in 2011 since its entry in 2007 while StarHub TV grew less than one percent from 46.9 percent in 2007 to 47.5 percent in 2011. Such increase was due to the aggressive acquisition of premium programming. Competition between FTA television and the industry saw a 78 percent market penetration for the industry in 2011 and 80-odd percent for FTA television. Both providers used a combination of differentiation and cost leadership strategies to attract audience groups of different ethnicities and specific interests. The outcome of the Measure required dominant player StarHub TV to offer its exclusive content to SingTel Mio TV’s subscribers at similar prices and quality. With the Measure, consumers could enjoy a greater variety of content at more affordable prices without incurring the inconvenience of having multiple set-top boxes. However, StarHub TV might not wish to bid aggressively for exclusive content, considering the high acquisition costs for both its cable and SingTel Mio TV’s IPTV platforms. Content suppliers might have lesser bargaining power for their content and more signing of non-exclusive agreements with providers. However, more competition might be expected as other operators can now acquire the previously exclusive content. The Measure might also lead to further increases in market share and ARPU for both providers as current subscribers could subscribe to other genres of content at lower subscription prices while others may see more advantages in subscribing to subscription television services. Both providers will have to devote more efforts into differentiating themselves and adopt different strategies if differentiation through exclusive content offerings were no longer used.

This thesis investigates the historically composed political and economic contexts that contributed to the late 1990s commercial renaissance of Korean national cinema and that have sustained the popularity of Korean films among local and regional audiences ever since. Unlike existing approaches to the topic, which emphasise the textual characteristics of national film production, this thesis considers relations between film production, distribution, exhibition, and ancillary markets, as well as Korean cinema’s engagement with international cinemas such as Hollywood, Hong Kong, China and Japan. I argue that following the relaxation of restrictive film policy towards the importation and distribution of foreign films between 1986 and 1988, the subsequent failure of the domestic film industry to compete against international competition precipitated a remarkable shift in consensus regarding the industry’s structure and functions. Due to the loss of distribution rights to foreign films and the rapid decline in ticket sales for Korean films, the continued economic viability of local film companies was under enormous threat by the early 1990s. The government reacted by permitting conglomerates to seize control of the industry and pursue vertical and horizontal integration. During the rest of the decade, Korean cinema was transformed from an art cinema to a commercial entertainment cinema. The 1997/98 economic crisis led to the exit of conglomerate finance, but streamlined film companies were able to withstand the monetary meltdown, continue the domestic revitalisation, and, since the late 1990s, build media empires based on the expansion of Korean cinema throughout the Asian region.