本文以國家行動為研究目標，意欲探究的是中共政治行動對農民抗議產生的影響以及遭遇農民抗議時中共政治行動的回應。其中，主要探討的是中共中央與地方行動上的差異性。兩者行動上的差異在本文中一方面認定為導致農民抗議產生的外部環境因素（即政治機會），一方面據以探究面對農民抗議時中共中央與地方在回應時所採取的政治行動分別為何。 本文以政治機會結構理論及國家與社會互動理論作為研究理論，並在「中央—地方—農民」三分的分析框架下，提出中央與地方的差異作為研究面向。整理農民抗議的定義、特點、方式、類型及成因時，並討論與之相關的農民權益。在探究行動上的差異對農民抗議的影響以及面對農民抗議時中央與地方的各自行動時，本文從稅費問題及土地徵用來看行動差異對農民抗議的影響，而中央政府的回應行動包括國家重建、事件定調、策略防範以及守住底線。基層政權的回應行動則分別就「官方論調」、「力量對比」、「對上訪時幹部行動的參酌」、「秩序共識下的行動劇碼」，以及「角色扮演」等予以解讀。 / State action is regarded as the research target, intending for the influence on peasant protest by PRC’s action and the response to peasant protest by PRC. Focusing on these two topics, action discrepancy in central-local relations is what I’d like to discuss in this research. For one thing, action discrepancy is seen as the outer environmental factor that brings about the begin of peasant protest. For another, based on action discrepancy,while responding to peasant protest, what the central do and what the local do can be explored. Based on the political opportunity structure theory and the state-society interaction theory, and analyzed on the framework of “central-local–peasant” tripartition, this research presents the discrepancy in central-local relations as main dimension. While definitions, characters, measures, types, and reasons concerning peasant protest are organized, peasant rights and interests are also discussed. The influence on peasant protest by action discrepancy and the actions separately by the central and the local when encountering peasant protest are then explored. This research examines the influence through tax-fee problem and land expropriation, and then concludes that the central actions include state-rebuilding, affair-identifying, strategy-guarding, and deadline-defending, and moreover, interprets the local regime’s actions in such ways like “official-like statement”, “power contrast”, “reference to local cadres’action toward peasant appealings to higher levels(shangfang)”, “act performance on the consensus of order”, and “role play”.