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This thesis develops an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s existential-phenomenological conception of perceptual normativity, that is, how there are norms, internal to perception itself, governing our everyday perceptual involvements with the world. I argue that Merleau-Ponty conceives perceptual norms as being gestalt-structural forms of ‘original sense’, which we experience pre-reflectively in a direct, bodily way. I motivate my interpretation by examining a passage in Phenomenology of Perception where Merleau-Ponty remarks on how perception tends toward an optimal or better view of things, indicating a normative dimension in perception. I make sense of this passage in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s wider gestalt-ontological thought about embodied subjectivity. I unpack how, via the basic intentional structure of perspective by which subject is geared into the perceptual world, body-subject adopts an ‘original sense’ or ‘look’, which undergoes an open process of definition that is experienced as normative. This account can further clarify some questions Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly address about our lived experience of perceptual norms: namely, how perceptual norms are temporal and contingent in their hold on body, and how these norms integrate the subject’s perceptual interests. I further investigate how perceptual norms, in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, are perceived in a two-fold or ambiguous way: the subject lives norms immediately from the ‘inside’, but can also adopt a perspective on norms. In so doing, the subject can perceive the norm itself from the ‘outside,’ which is to partially ‘free’ body from the world’s normative grip. This interpretation is presented as a response to a debate in the literature involving Sean Kelly, Corinne Lajoie, and Samantha Matherne on how Merleau-Ponty conceives perceptual normativity. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Studies in face perception often use androgynous faces as a tool. The common assumption about androgynous faces is that they lie at the halfway point of a continuum that features "male" and "female" at the extremes. However, this definition has not been verified by research. This thesis uses a variety of methods, with an emphasis on data-driven methods, to test common assumptions about androgynous faces. Chapter 2 compared morphed faces, which were created using the common definition of facial androgyny, to naturally androgynous faces. Although the two groups were rated as equally androgynous, the naturally androgynous faces were rated as significantly more feminine. Chapter 3 focused on understanding androgynous face perception while minimizing prior assumptions. In a series of experiments, participants handled androgyny-related tasks and stimuli in a way that was qualitatively and quantitatively different than their gendered counterparts. Overall, these results suggest androgyny as a category cannot be accurately summarized as halfway between male and female and that a more nuanced approach to studying face gender is needed. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc)

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published_or_final_version / abstract / Psychology / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy