published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

No description available.

M.A. (Historical Studies) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

No description available.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1985 S94 / Master of Landscape Architecture

No description available.

The aim of this research is (1) to test the hypothesis that participating in collective action varies by social class position, (2) to examine the mechanisms behind class effects in collective action in a general model of individual participation in collective action, and (3) to discuss the societal implications of these effects. Class position modifies the social process which determines who will participate in protest demonstrations or community problem solving. Class influences political socialization, an individual's network of interpersonal ties to others, and opportunity constraints which guide individual choices to participate in collective action. A model of these relations is tested empirically using secondary analysis of a nationwide, longitudinal survey of young adults and their parents (Jennings and Niemi's Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study, 1965-1973). The findings show that working class young adults participate in collective action at a lower rate than the young adults in other class positions. The direct relationship between class and collective action participation is virtually nonexistant. It is the indirect effect of class through the development of a sense of efficacy (socialization) and membership in organizations (networks) that is significant in the prediction of who participates. The primary contribution of this work involves the formulation of a general model explaining individual participation in collective action. Further, by linking socialization and networks, this research attempts to bridge the micro-macro distinctions found in other explanations of collective action. Other contributions of this research lie in its implementation of a neo-Marxist definition of class and the utilization of alternative measures of collective action (protest participation and activity in community problem solving). In conclusion, finding that some individuals are hindered in their ability to participate in collective action has implications for the direction of social change efforts. It appears that inequality exists in the promotion of social issues even in the area of non-institutionalized politics. The findings suggest that the relationship between stratification and collective action should be explored further in future research.

by Yvette Shadikhan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 156-168). / PREFACE --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi / LIST OF ABBREVATIONS --- p.vii / CHAPTER / Chapter 1. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter PART I. --- RESHUFFLINGS OF REGIONAL MILITARY LEADERS IN THE MAO ERA / Chapter 2. --- THE 1967 RESHUFFLING --- p.9 / Conflict between Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai / A Small-Scale Reshuffling in1959 / Steps After Reshuffling for the Consolidation of Power / The Cultural Revolution and the Field Army System / The 1967 Reshuffling / Other Causes of the 1967 Reshuffling / Chapter 3. --- THE 1971 AND 1973 RESHUFFLINGS --- p.31 / The Domination of the PLA in Non-Military Organizations / Conflict between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao / The 1971 Reshuffling / The End of PLA's Domination and the 1973 Reshuffling / Chapter PART II. --- RESHUFFLING OF REGIONAL MILITARY LEADERS IN THE DENG ERA / Chapter 4. --- THE 1980，1982 AND 1985 RESHUFFLINGS --- p.54 / Deng Xiaoping and his PLA men / The 1980 Reshuffling / Steps After the 1980 Reshuffling / The 1982 Reshuffling / The Continued Streamlining of the PLA after the 1982 Reshuffling / The 1985 Reshuffling / The Continued Streamlining of the PLA after the 1985 Reshuffling / Chapter 5. --- THE 1990 RESHUFFLING --- p.86 / Student Movements and Intra-Party Struggles / The Behaviour of PLA in the June 4 Incident / The 1990 Reshuffling / Steps After the 1990 Reshuffling / Chapter 6. --- CONCLUSION --- p.100 / NOTES --- p.107 / APPENDIX --- p.126 / CHRONOLOGY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS --- p.132 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.156

Mass demographic changes in the ethnic and racial composition of the United States since the 1960s are commonly considered a force driving major transformations in contemporary American politics. In political science, there are longstanding research traditions that examine the political implications of demographic change: how demographic change leads to growing intergroup political contestation over political power and public policies; how demographic changes lead to shifts in the group bases of partisan support; how demographic changes are associated with changes in the demographic composition of politicians and elected officials; and how the changing face of America affects the political responsiveness of elected officials to historically underrepresented but increasingly prominent segments of the population. Despite the proliferation of empirical studies on these topics, numerous causal claims central to broader arguments about the political implications of demographic change deserve greater theoretical and empirical scrutiny. In this dissertation, I make use of novel datasets and methods for descriptive and causal inference to contribute more credible evidence that test these claims and develop new avenues of research.

Why do some businesspeople run for political office, while others do not? Sending directors into elected office is one of the most powerful but also resource-intensive ways firms can influence policymaking. Although legislative bodies are populated with businesspeople in countries worldwide, we know little about which firms decide to invest in this unique type of nonmarket strategy. In response, I argue that businesspeople run for elected office when (1) they cannot trust that the politicians they lobby will represent their interests and (2) their firms have the resources available to contest elections. My theory predicts the probability of politician shirking (reneging on their promises) depends on whether rival firms have representatives in parliament and political parties are capable of enforcing informal quid pro quo agreements. Evidence to test my arguments comes from an original dataset of 8,829 firms connected to candidates to regional legislatures in Russia from 2004-2011. I find that both greater oligopolistic competition and weaker political parties incentivize businessperson candidacy, while the ability to cover campaign costs depends on the level of voter income and firm size. Do firms with directors holding elected political office then benefit from political connections? Using the same dataset but restricting the analysis to elections in single-member districts, I next employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of gaining political ties, comparing outcomes of firms that are directed by candidates who either won or lost close elections to regional legislatures. I first find that a connection to a winning politician can increase revenue by roughly 60% and profit margins by 15% over their time in office. I then test between different mechanisms potentially explaining the results, finding that connected firms improve their performance by gaining access to bureaucrats and reducing information costs, and not by signaling legitimacy to financiers. Finally, winning a parliamentary seat is more valuable for firms where democratization is greater, but less valuable when firms face acute sector-level competition. This finding suggests that the intensity of economic rivalry, rather than the quality of political institutions, best explains the decision to send a director into public office.