Thesis advisor: Kenji Hayao / Thesis advisor: Hiroshi Nakazato / The most stunning example of two historical figures working both together and against one another to fashion a shared goal is the demonstration of power and compromise displayed by Count Camillo Benso di Cavour and Giuseppe Garibaldi during the Sicilian Revolution of 1860 and additional events during the greater Italian Risorgimento. This thesis is an attempt to uncover the bargaining strategies utilized by Cavour and Garibaldi throughout their political interactions as well as reach important conclusions concerning the use of interpersonal relationships to aid, not hinder, the outcome of a common political aim. This case study focuses on the years from 1852 to 1870, but specifically looks at 1859 to 1861, largely considering the theoretical framework of political game theory as outlined by Thomas Schelling. After forming two distinct hypotheses regarding both the competitive and cooperative nature of the two men's relationship, this thesis finds a greater cooperative characteristic to their historic interactions, although both hypotheses contribute to a relationship that formed the state of Italy. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2008. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: International Studies. / Discipline: International Studies Honors Program.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of domestic political actors in Ukraine’s transition process (2000-2005), under which it went from a competitive authoritarian regime to a democracy in the year 2005. Ukraine was chosen as a single case study since previous theories, such as Levitsky & Ways’ structural theory of linkage, leverage and organizational power and Bunce & Wolchiks’ regional diffusion-theory, have difficulties in explaining Ukraine’s democratization. These theories have focused excessively on either the regime’s or the opposition’s role in the transition but not on how they interact. The result of this study suggests that the actors in the political game, between regime (hardliners and softliners) and opposition (moderates and radicals), had a more prominent role in Ukraine’s democratic transition. It also suggests that the actor-oriented approach may be tested as a plausibility probe in other deviant cases of competitive authoritarian regimes in the theory of linkage, leverage and organizational power, such as Benin and Mali, whose regime trajectories unexpectedly led to democratization.