Role of public service commission

Non-Alignment as a factor

Eisenhower Doctrine

Growth of political leadership

Urban development administration

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Due to the numerous municipal jurisdictions statewide and in our region, government fragmentation has become a significant impediment to providing efficient and effective municipal services. The revenue and administrative limitations on local governments make it difficult to maintain adequate emergency response services, park and recreation services, schools, and infrastructure. Historically this issue has been addressed as a structural problem, suggesting municipal mergers as an appropriate solution, however, political obstacles to actually eliminating inefficient municipalities have deterred this approach. Thus, the contemporary political vogue in our region has shifted to functional consolidation efforts through municipal cooperation. There are several avenues to realizing functional consolidation efforts for municipal jurisdictions. Act 177 of 1996 (Intergovernmental Cooperation Law) includes broad language regarding municipal cooperation. There are myriad applications of this legislation evident between municipalities, the most compelling and widely applicable seem to be Councils of Governments (COGs). Councils of Governments are a unique application of the Act 177 language; multifunctional organizations established by a group of municipalities in the interest of facilitating service programs better suited to cooperative provision than by individual local governments. However, in the more than forty years since their inception Councils of Governments remain chronically underutilized resources for many municipal regions. In fact, statewide COGs are widely considered to be an ineffective model for governance. In many cases this is due to a lack of funding, resources, and public awareness about the value of COG participation . It is this reports contention that by providing examples of best management practices for Pennsylvania Councils of Governments and increasing state funding and incentives for municipalities to participate in COG programs through the Pennsylvania State Department for Community and Economic Development (DCED), much of the factionalization of the local government structure in the state can be overcome. Because COGs are voluntary organizations, they can be strengthened without cumbersome legislative change and draw the support of many leaders in local government. Moreover, with minor legislative change to the COGs legal status Pennsylvania COGs could be an effective solution to the inefficiency of Allegheny County local government system.

This paper analyzes the United Nations implementation of Resolution 1325 in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Seven criteria were derived from the Secretary Generals Reports on Women, Peace, and Security: Peacekeeping Operations; Post-conflict Reconstruction; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence; Gender Balance; Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence by UN Personnel; and Monitoring and Reporting. These criteria were applied to four case studies: the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Each case study provides a description of the activities conducted and an evaluation for each criterion. The paper makes conclusions about the effects of specific characteristics of some of the cases and about areas in which the UN needs broader solutions. Specifically, suggestions are made for improved UN efforts in Gender Balance, Responding to Gender-Based Violence by UN Personnel, and Monitoring and Reporting.

It has become a commonplace observation in recent years that Russian democracy is in remission. Indeed there is a significant difference between the struggling democratic performance of Russia and that of a consolidated democracy such as France. The modern French and Russian states are both semi-presidential states, meaning that in each country executive power is shared between an elected president and an appointed prime minister who can (at least in theory) be voted out of office by the legislature. Despite this broad similarity, semi-presidential institutions are organized in significantly different ways in each country. This paper examines those differences in order to understand how they can help account for poor democratic performance in Russia and strong democratic performance in France. Four political institutions will be examined in each country: presidents, prime ministers, parliaments, and political parties. By comparing these institutions across two semi-presidential states, important differences can be unearthed and their implications for democratic performance analyzed. This paper concludes that, if anything, the Russian legislature is more independent than the French National Assembly, and more capable of influencing independent policies and laws. However, a weak vote of no-confidence means that the Russian legislature has little control over the selection of the prime minister and cabinet. This severely hobbles Russian political parties and creates a leadership class that is not dependent on party support for its position. These non-partisan leaders are therefore free to create the clientelistic 'parties of power' that have become characteristic of the Russian system. By contrast, the strong vote of no-confidence in the National Assembly obliges French national leaders to cultivate and reward political parties in order to build a supportive majority in the legislature. As a result, French parties are able to act as links between the state and society, while Russian society remains alienated from its leaders.

Since the Zapatistas emerged on the national scene on January 1, 1994, they have been dependent on civil societys support to implement an agenda based on democracy and indigenous rights and to protect them from the Mexican military. Without massive mobilization from civil society, the Zapatista Movement has no influence in Mexican politics. Over the course of the movement, there have been periods in which this mobilization has been very high and effective and others in which it has been minimal to nonexistent. This paper seeks to find a variable that has consistently driven these changes in mobilization throughout the movement. The paper argues that Mexican civil societys changing perceptions of democracy between 1994 and 2006 is the independent variable driving mobilization. This is shown by tracing the fluctuations in both satisfaction with democracy in Mexico and fluctuations in mobilization.