This research assesses China's likely future behaviour in relation to the South China Sea disputes, critically evaluating two prominent, related topics of discussion among the International Relations scholars since the late 1980s. One of these topics is theoretical: to what extent is the flourishing `liberal peace' argument in International Relations theory valid when applied to China's international behaviour, and towards the South China Sea disputes in particular'? The advocates of the 'liberal peace' argument have spent much energy attempting to prove the positive correlation between peace and such factors as democracy and economic interdependence using statistical models. In addition, one faction of the liberal school emphasises the effectiveness of institutions which supposedly impose constraints on a state through international rules and agreements. However, liberals' arguments fail to engage with some critical points. First of all, whether a state goes to war is not a matter of probability but a political decision. Secondly, the costs of sacrificing economic ties and violating internationally-agreed obligations surely affect a decision to go to war. However, if a state perceives that its vital national interests are at risk, such costs will have little influence on decision-making. In addition, liberals' argument ignores the importance of the political framework in which economic interdependence functions. Furthermore, liberals do not pay attention to the facts that institutions are usually established by the initiative of a hegemon and its supporters, and that the rules and norms of institutions generally reflect the distribution of power among their members. This dissertation illustrates the way in which realist thinking (involving consideration of survival, balance of power and relative gain) still forms the foundation for states' behaviour. The other topic relevant in this dissertation is empirical and concerns which of the conflicting opinions about China's future geopolitical orientation is more accurate: that China will become an assertive regional hegemon as her economy develops and her military is modernised, or that she will not obtain even regional hegemonic status for some decades to come due to her lack of economic and military power. The first view generally draws the conclusion that China should somehow be contained, while the second view concludes that other states need to engage China so that the latter can be tied into the international community. A major problem with arguments of this type is that China's likely behaviour tends to be predicted on the basis of research on specific issues. In particular, military factors, such as China's increasing defence budget, its vigorous purchase of advanced weapons particularly from Russia, and the PLA's weight in the government's decision-making, have been overemphasised. Although stronger military capabilities may provide a government with wider foreign policy options, states - including China - usually do not use force just because their military capabilities become stronger. Understanding the nature of states and the factors that drive states' behaviour is necessary in order to avoid extreme conclusions. This dissertation tries to integrate the existing empirical studies and theoretical assumptions in International Relations theory. The reason for focusing on the South China Sea is that this case is important in the sense that the disputes there are not just territorial conflicts involving China and other claimants. The South China Sea disputes involve many factors such as fisheries, energy, and extra-regional powers' strategic and economic interests, besides the overlapping territorial sovereign claims. In addition, economic interdependence between China and regional states has deepened since the 1990s, and the region has international institutions such as APEC and the ARF where economic and security issues, respectively, are I Introduction discussed. The last two factors make this case particularly suitable for the application of IR theory. This dissertation will demonstrate that geopolitical considerations are dominant not only in China's decision-making but also in the ASEAN states' attitudes towards China and the disputes themselves.

No description available.

The Caribbean has long been an area of intense US interest and activity. Yet at the same time, the United States has failed to articulate a distinctive Caribbean policy, separate from its policy towards Latin America. In part, this failure has resulted from the practical difficulty of determining a definition of "the Caribbean" - US policies towards the different countries within the Caribbean region have varied according to time and perspective. This thesis attempts to determine the exact nature of United States foreign policy towards the Caribbean during the period 1960 to 1976. It starts from the assumption that the Caribbean has been included within US-Latin American policy in the articulation of policy statements and objectives, but that US policy has differed in terms of both its implementation and impact on Caribbean countries. US foreign policy is, therefore, examined from a liberal-democratic perspective in terms of the distinction between national interest and development objectives and policy actions, looking at their impact on the Caribbean national development process - in particular, on economic and political development. In attempting to assess the coherence of US policy, the differences within US policy are examined with respect to two sub-groups in the Caribbean - the English speaking and the Spanish speaking countries. Three specific areas of US policy are examined: first, security policy - looking at both hemispheric defence and internal security policy, military and police assistance programmes; second, economic policy - looking at development assistance, regional integration, private investment, trade and migration; and third, diplomatic policy - looking at US policy towards dependent countries, trades unions, political parties, human rights and different forms of government. The continuity of US policy is assessed by comparing the Democratic presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson with the Republican administrations of Nixon and Ford, and the key feature of US-Caribbean policy - the primacy of security interests - is finally distinguished.

International Relations theory tends to assume that the use of violence is both necessary and effective. Supporters of non-violence however propose that violence is not effective to achieve ones aims. This study will question these contrasting perspectives by asking to what degree violence is effective in obtaining security in international politics. The study focuses on International Relations theory, testing its assumption that violence is effective against the case of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a conflict that is often seen as a clear case for the success of violence. If the security benefits of this war cannot be proven clearly, then it brings the effectiveness of violence to build security into question. The study questions the effectiveness of violence in this case for three main areas: territory, military power and non-military power. It finds that Iraq's use of violence was mostly counter-productive, leading to further losses rather than gains. The use of violence on the Coalition side brought the Coalition some benefits, but these benefits were not as high as one might expect, and they were not long-lasting. This leads to the conclusion that the benefits of the use of violence are not easy to achieve, even for the victor. It is easier for the victor to destroy the power and ability to act of another actor than it is to build the benefits from that destruction afterwards. The final conclusion of the study is that the use violence needs to be treated more critically in International Relations theory, as it cannot be assumed that the successful use of violence will bring security.

This thesis analyses the pohtical and economic transformation in the two Yemeni states - the YAR and the PDRY - over the period of 1968 to 1998. The unification process between the YAR and the PDRY is critically assessed in preparation and implementation phases over the period 1972 to 1990 under minority rule in both states. The thesis is critically focused on the minority impact of northern Shafais in the ex-PDRY leadership which led to serious struggles within and between the two Yemens out of which a hasty unification was resulted. The methodology employed in the research utilises many materials and opportunities made available to myself as a high-ranking member of the administration of the ex-PDRY and, subsequently, the Presidential Office of the ROY. Due to my position, I was able to witness the political system and procedures of Yemen first-hand. The data collected includes information from formal sources in Aden, San'a and the UK. This material was substantially added to with extensive interviews and meetings with public figures in Yemen and abroad who were, and are, important actors in the political history and contemporary political system of Yemen. The integration process was not successful because of several necessary conditions which were not present in either state in the preunification era or, indeed, after it. The two states had different experiences in terms of administration, policies and above all power structures. The two states had political and military confrontations in 1972 and 1979 along their border mainly because of the northern Shafais who wanted power legitimacy in either state or independently. Under such minority impact, the south sponsored revolutionary insurgencies in northern areas to force the admission of northern Shafais into the power centre of the north. The unification process throughout the 1970's and the 1980's was controversial but suddenly achieved its objective in May 1990 though in a hasty manner. A series of agreements took place on both sides with regional monitoring. The platforms on which these agreements were carried out, technically, politically and economically, were weak and rushed as varying factors were not taken seriously into account and the unification process was undertaken in an emotionally charged atmosphere. During the period of 1990 to 1994, the cooperative unification did not achieve success. The unified system had relatively good northern/southern representation but it was not effective. The northern tribal and the southern factional attitudes and approaches were too strong in the power centre to enhance the level of integration. The tribally-dominated power centre did not encourage a change in the administrative setup and the two sides wanted to impose their former systems on the national administration. As the capital, Sanaa, was in the ex-YAR territory, the central administration was predominantly characterised by the latter's system which was cumbersome and corrupt. The acceleration of political tensions between the two sides increased after the 1993 elections as a third northern party shared government, diminishing the southern share to a third. In view of the supremacy of southern natural resources, the southerners had a motive to seek deunification, and they duly did so. This was put down by the northern side which used force in the 1994 civil war. The thesis is concluded with three scenarios discussing the possible directions of the future political development of the Republic of Yemen, with a focus on how the ROY can escape from the predicament of sectarian dominated politics. The first of these scenarios envisages fundamental reforms taking place immediately so as to preserver the present unification system. The second proposes that amalgamated unification could be replaced by federalism. The third forwards a possibility that Yemen could fragment into many small states as a result of poor national administration and state management. These scenarios are founded in the analysis presented in the main body of the thesis by employing the arguments and dynamics identified as the failings of the current system in an analysis which would allow Yemen to enjoy a more prosperous and stable future.

No description available.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-115).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 219-225).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on March 10, 2009) Includes bibliographical references.