Thesis(PH.D.) - Carleton University. Also on Microfilm at National Library, Ottawa, No. 16524. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Honors project (B.A.) -- Carson-Newman College, 2010. / Project advisor: Dr. Charles Wade Bibb. Includes bibliographical references (p. [80]-85).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1983. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-115).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-68).

Disposing of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was viewed as the initial step of a comprehensive German post Cold War defence reform programme. The author of this study intends to challenge a generally accepted perspective originated by the political leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany and subsequently recited by many politico-military commentators that this effort of managing the NVA had significant positive impact on the overall German reunification process. The author assumed that such a political myth was caused by an insufficient basis of judgment, only focused on the initial stage of accommodating former NV A members into the Bundeswehr. Therefore, this study will re-examine the essence and significance of managing the NVA from two new angles, which received less attention from previous researchers. From a study of the negotiating process regarding the NVA in the last days of the GDR regime, the author proves that the future of the NVA never was the core issue to any party other than its military professionals. Hence, it could not be drastically elevated as a key factor in facilitating the post-reunification German national unity. Furthermore, re-visiting the process of disposing of NVA assets other than personnel proves that this had no effect on promoting national consolidation. On the contrary, many scandals that happened in transferring the NY A assets could have had the potential of undermining the national unity. At least, those problems caused numerous criticisms from the citizens of eastern Germany. By summarising the newly explored facts from these new angles, the author still genuinely believes that the Bundeswehr did positively contribute to the German national unity by appropriately managing the NVA thus defusing potential negative impacts on German post-reunification society. Nevertheless, the significance of their task should not be overrated in history.

The 1991 IGC has reformed the European Community and the nature of the host of relations between its Member States. It has created the European Union through the Maastricht Treaty. The central hypothesis is that reform seems not to have resolved fully the deficiencies in form and substance of the Community's politico-legal foundation. The analysis proceeds through the comparison of three aspects: the reform of the constitutional foundation of the Community carried out by the IGC; the changes in the nature of the relations between Member States in these areas of competence that are inalienable from their sovereignty, and the introduction of the concept of citizenship of the Union in order to consolidate certain elements of citizenship that were present in the Communitys framework. The conclusion reached is that the 1991 IGC has produced an entity of which the elements carry inherent contradictions; this tense nature appears to demand further reform.

[From the Introduction]: The People's Republic of China (PRC) has a communist and revolutionary government. The declaration of the PRC in October 1949, represented the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), established in 1921, in its struggle against the Chinese Nationalists, the Kuo Min Tang (KMT). This victory seemed to prove that the CCP's strategy, based on a United Front policy, worked. The United Front policy was a manoeuvre by which the CCP united with lesser antagonists against a greater mutual enemy. During the period 1921 to 1949 a relatively weak CCP applied the United Front idea to form, when required, a temporary union even with its fundamental enemy, the KMT. This occurred during the early and mid 1920s and the Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945, and was even attempted in the talks with the KMT after World War 11. The experience with the KMT gave the PRC more confidence in dealing with the outside world. The Korean War made the PRC realise the importance of the safety of its own border. After the Korean War, not surprisingly, the PRC began to use its experience of the United Front strategy in its dealings with international affairs. The selective application of United Front tactics led to PRC foreign policy successes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The PRC avoided the formidable hostility of the Soviet Union (SU) and played a significant role in the US-SU-PRC triangular relationship. Both domestically and internationally, the United Front strategy has been at the root of much of CCP-PRC policy. It is the contention of this dissertation that the PRC has consistently employed a United Front strategy in its relations with the United States. It takes as its focus the period 1954 to 1973, with particular reference to the conflict in Vietnam. During this period, the comparatively weak PRC sought to accommodate itself to shifts in US Vietnam policy within the limits of its United Front strategy. The period of the US-North Vietnamese peace talks serves as a particularly useful "miniature," as it were, of this process and will be given special attention.

The SRV occupy an ambiguous position in relation to the Soviet Union, conforming neither wholly to the status of an eastern bloc state nor to that of a developing country. Furthermore, the dynamics of the relationship ensure that the client patron relationship has often been reversed. This study is structured around a loose methodological framework, in order to accommodate both Marxist-Leninist and international relations aspects of the problem. A study of Soviet academic writing on Vietnam opens up several areas of inquiry. The course of the Paris Peace Talks, which coincided with detente and improved Soviet/United States relations, illustrates a conflict of interests for the Soviet Union. The war in Vietnam emerged as a lesser priority, in spite of the Vietnamese desire to move to a military conclusion. For the same reasons, Soviet support for Vietnam appeared muted in the period immediately following the cease fire of 1973 and amounted to an acceptance of the status quo for the foreseeable future, priority going towards economic reconstruction in the North rather than military action in the South. A Vietnamese initiative, therefore, led to the unexpected final victory of 1975. The Soviet Union were thus unprepared, immediately, to deal with the problems attendant upon reunification and continued Vietnamese hostilities with Cambodia. The Soviet/Vietnam Treaty of 1978 represents a harmonizing of Soviet and Vietnamese policy goals in which Soviet support for Vietnam in respect of full economic reunification and Cambodia as a sphere of Vietnamese influence was the political consequence. The substantial power of leverage the Vietnamese have been able to exert at any given time, leads to a re-evaluation of the nature of the relationship and suggests an interpretation in terms of mutual advantage.

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