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Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Painting, Gestalt, and ReversibilityPerez Carrasco, Andres January 2012 (has links)
Thesis advisor: John Sallis / Maurice Merleau-Ponty's last essay about art, Eye and Mind, refers to many painters, to painting, and even to sculpture. Yet there is hardly any use of the traditional categories used in art criticism to categorize artistic movements or to evaluate painters' contributions to their period. Instead, he uses terms such as `body' and `flesh' that are alien to that tradition, thereby indicating that he clearly intends to go beyond commenting on and assessing the artistic value of the works he mentions. Instead, the essay is a reevaluation of meaning of painting as a whole. Merleau-Ponty says that all painting from Lascaux to our day has been a celebration of `the visible.' However, to understand what he means by `the visible' involves considerable complexity. The standard by which Merleau-Ponty evaluates painting emerges from his phenomenological and ontological research into perception. I argue that in fact Eye and Mind answers a question that arose in his first major book concerning the relationship between consciousness and nature. Because the evolution of the ideas underlying the Eye and Mind's answer is so vast, the goal of this dissertation is to trace the thread leading from his earlier work in order to provide a unifying viewpoint that will ground an adequate understanding of the essay's various arguments. The dissertation argues that Merleau-Ponty's notion of the Gestalt or structure is the framework for understanding the origin and depth of the aperçus developed in Eye and Mind. Ironically perhaps, this notion is not mentioned in Eye and Mind. As if it had lost its original meaning, it is only referred to indirectly and vaguely in terms of transcendence. Nevertheless, the main issue settled in The Structure of Behavior dominated his understanding of the body in The Phenomenology of Perception, and underwent a transformation when Merleau-Ponty discovered language as a diacritical structure. This made possible the radical use he made of it in Eye and Mind without expressly mentioning it. Once the interpretation of Gestalt in relation to Paul Klee and Rudolf Arnheim had been worked out, this dissertation could use this notion--usually undervalued in Merleau-Ponty scholarship--to make sense of Eye and Mind's main contention in light of the interpretive reconstruction of the notions of expression, reversibility, body, and flesh Merleau-Ponty elaborated on the way to that essay. Part I of the dissertation deals with the phenomenology of the Gestalt structure prior to Merleau-Ponty's ontological turn, which in turn frames and underpins many of the insights achieved in this pre-ontological period, especially those about the body. The first two chapters introduce the notion of structure as it emerges in its application to behavior, and explain Merleau-Ponty's own contribution to the notion through the overcoming of earlier psychologists' static reduction of the notion to the physical level. The third and last chapter of Part I discusses the structural dimension of the body. There are two extraordinary things in Eye and Mind: the first is Paul Valery's statement that the painter "takes his body with him"; and the second is the analogy between the problems of the body and the problems of painting, by which Merleau-Ponty proposes that understanding one is indispensable for understanding the other. To clarify his proposal we have to return to The Phenomenology of Perception's analysis of the body according to embodied intentionality or motor intentionality, in which the body operates according to an "I can" that must replace the mechanical reaction to a stimulus. Here Merleau-Ponty was helped by Kurt Goldstein's insight into the body as a Gestalt. The dissertation illustrates what this could mean for the structure of a painting by using examples. What was formerly Part II profiles Merleau-Ponty's embodied notion of the Gestalt form against Arnheim's aprioristic account, which explains the relationship between consciousness and nature through an isomorphism that is even more ambitiously totalizing than the ones envisioned by the original Gestalt psychologists. Because of the detailed nature of our account this part is in two appendices. What is now Part II focuses on the problem of painting more directly. Using both the Notes de Cours (where Merleau-Ponty's most extensive comments on Paul Klee occur) and Paul Klee's own celebrated Notes, Chapter Four on Paul Klee reconsiders the relationship between consciousness and nature as the one between the painter and the world. Klee interpreted abstraction in terms of Gestalt as a form of transcendence involving the visible and the invisible, in contrast to Sartre's idea of transcendence, which also employs the figure/ground formation of the Gestalt. In Eye and Mind the expression of painting is interpreted as "a `visible' to the second power, a carnal essence or icon of the first." So Chapters Five and Six discuss the notion of structure from the viewpoint of expression. The doubling of expression in painting is seen first as analogous to philosophy as a hyper-reflection, and then in the linguistic distinction between le langage parlé et le langage parlant, which allowed Merleau-Ponty to interpret and generalize the model of expressive language via the diacritical structure of language and not restrict expressive language to bodily gestures. Rather than a return to the original (as The Phenomenology may have suggested), the point of this doubling aspect of expression is the recognition of the qualities of reversibility and difference that constitute `depth.' With the clarification of terms such as `perceptual faith' and `style,' Chapter Seven introduces the notion of reversibility before exploring its meaning, specifically in the second chapter of Eye and Mind. In Chapter Eight the earlier focus on the beginning of the definition of a painting as "a `visible' to the second power, a carnal essence or icon of the first," shifts to the meaning of the term "icon." This rounds off the meaning of `depth' and completes the exploration of the theme of the Gestalt structure. Now it becomes clear that the meaning of `depth' is articulated as the depth between the visible and the invisible, because the model used to understand depth is the by now very familiar basic articulation of the perceptual Gestalt: the articulation of a figure over a ground. Like a stain on a rug--in painting, in history, in philosophy, in language, or in perceptual faith--the crystallization of what appears always disguises an invisible dimension, whose invisibility is what makes the visibility of the visible possible. Chapter Nine then concludes the dissertation. It first considers Jean-Luc Marion's use of the icon in painting, in which, as in our interpretation of Merleau-Ponty on depth, uses his own idea of the depth between the visible and the invisible; and second, it responds to observations on Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of art by Veronique Fotí and criticisms of it by Michel Haar. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.
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Learning to Be Human by Pretending to Be Elves, Dwarves, and Mages: A Phenomenological Aesthetic of Video GamesMartis, Nicholas Samuel January 2014 (has links)
Thesis advisor: Eileen Sweeney / This paper combines principles from aesthetic cognitivism with phenomenological embodiment as explained by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to construct both an argument for video games as a form of art as well as a method for appreciating them. I argue that the unique status of video games as interactive fictions warrants an adjusted set of aesthetic criteria. My proposed method of examination involves the concept of "fictional embodiment" in which an appreciator imaginatively undergoes the experiences of the video game character. After establishing this framework the paper applies it to narrative and emotion in video games before moving on to extended examples. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.
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一種以感知為首要的身體理論. / Yi zhong yi gan zhi wei shou yao de shen ti li lun.January 1994 (has links)
詮釋馬勞龐蒂的身體理論 / 論文(碩士)--香港中文大學,1994. / 參考文獻: leaves 119-121 / 趙子明. / 符號說明 --- p.ii / 全文摘要 --- p.iii / 前言 --- p.iv / 目錄 --- p.viii / 導論: --- p.2 / Chapter §1 --- 感知經驗及以感知為首要的身體理論 --- p.3 / 身體結構的分析: --- p.13 / Chapter §2 --- 感知中的身體──充滿歧義的在世存有 --- p.14 / Chapter §3 --- 身體活動與活動意向 --- p.38 / Chapter §4 --- 說話和會說話的思想者 --- p.68 / 結論: --- p.94 / Chapter §5 --- 身體結構及以感知為首要的哲學理論 --- p.95 / 註釋 --- p.106 / 參考書目 --- p.119
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馬勞龐蒂的形上藝術觀: 晚期論藝術起源的哲學基礎及理論發展. / Malaopangdi de xing shang yi shu guan: wan qi lun yi shu qi yuan de zhe xue ji chu ji li lun fa zhan.January 1987 (has links)
文潔華. / 稿本複印本. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部. / Gao ben fu yin ben. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 203-204. / Wen Jiehua. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue xue bu.
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Sensation Rebuilt: Carnal Ontology in Levinas and Merleau-PontySparrow, Tom 12 April 2012 (has links)
The phenomenological approaches to embodiment presented by Levinas and Merleau-Ponty cannot provide an adequate account of bodily identity because their methodological commitments forbid them from admitting the central role that sensation plays in the constitution of experience. This neglect is symptomatic of their tradition's suspicion toward sensation as an explanatory concept, a suspicion stemming from Kant's critique of empiricist metaphysics and Husserl's critique of psychologism and objectivism. By contrast, I suggest that only with a robust theory of sensation can the integrity of the body and its relations be fully captured. I therefore develop--contra Kant and Husserl's idealism--a realist conception of sensation that is at once materialist and phenomenological. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;
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Merleau-Ponty and the Preconceptions of Objective ThinkingAl-Khalaf, Hanan January 2006 (has links)
Maurice Merleau-Ponty thinks that many classical theories of perception, especially reductionism, are influenced by the objective and the scientific form of thinking. Such influence is expressed in two preconceptions. The first preconception is that perception is reduced to units such as “impressions”. The meaning of these units is considered to be a representation of the world. The second preconception is that such perceptual meaning is caused by the world and the living being is passive in its relation to such constitution of meaning. In my view, the results of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these two preconceptions constitute his two main concepts: the phenomenal body and the perceptual meaning determined by the structural relation with the world. Despite the fact that some traces of these preconceptions can be found in the introduction of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, there is no straight argument that shows how he approached these two results from the rejection of these two preconceptions. My thesis is to present Merleau-Ponty’s view on the phenomenal body based on his criticism of the two preconceptions described above. In my view, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these preconceptions can be traced through his argument against Gestalt psychology, associationism, and behavioral associationism.
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Merleau-Ponty and the Preconceptions of Objective ThinkingAl-Khalaf, Hanan January 2006 (has links)
Maurice Merleau-Ponty thinks that many classical theories of perception, especially reductionism, are influenced by the objective and the scientific form of thinking. Such influence is expressed in two preconceptions. The first preconception is that perception is reduced to units such as “impressions”. The meaning of these units is considered to be a representation of the world. The second preconception is that such perceptual meaning is caused by the world and the living being is passive in its relation to such constitution of meaning. In my view, the results of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these two preconceptions constitute his two main concepts: the phenomenal body and the perceptual meaning determined by the structural relation with the world. Despite the fact that some traces of these preconceptions can be found in the introduction of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, there is no straight argument that shows how he approached these two results from the rejection of these two preconceptions. My thesis is to present Merleau-Ponty’s view on the phenomenal body based on his criticism of the two preconceptions described above. In my view, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these preconceptions can be traced through his argument against Gestalt psychology, associationism, and behavioral associationism.
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On Consciousness, Body, and World : Merleau-Ponty's Viewpoint in Phénoménologie de la perceptionKu, Chih-yu 10 September 2009 (has links)
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Phénoménologie et ontologie : Merleau-Ponty lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger /Robert, Franck, January 1900 (has links)
Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Philosophie--Nice, 2002.
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A Phenomenology of Taste: Brewmasters and the production of lived taste experienceSteiner, Robin Thomas January 2009 (has links)
Using a phenomenological account of perception drawn largely from the work of Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Gibson (1966; 1974), this thesis explores how perceptual experience is created and modified through practices and discourses. The project examines how a specific perceptual experience--the taste of beer--is formed through the practices and discourses of production. It investigates how both the nuanced taste experiences of brewmasters and the less precise taste experiences of their customers are cultivated in relation to a set of production concerns surrounding the manufacture of a consistent brand. Ultimately, it is argued that the production of brands--the urge to produce products which are identical to themselves--is a characteristic of consumer-oriented late capitalism which illustrates how mechanical reproduction influences the formation of contemporary sensory experiences and lifeworlds.
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