Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 239-254).

published_or_final_version / Business / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

A discussion of reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, and referent power bases was the initial focus of this research. A review of the power sources literature suggested that vertical integration within a channel of distribution was a crucial precursor to develop a structure to facilitate the use of power without creating a significant conflict among channel participants. Elements of transaction cost analysis (TCA) were offered as being suitable for determining the existing level of vertical integration among respondent firms. Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to develop a tentative model to determine proper use of power within varying levels of vertical integration.

This dissertation examines the role and influence of state, federal, and institutional policies in the experiences of developmental students and instructors enrolled in, or teaching at, community colleges. Through the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu’s relational sociology and Field Theory, I organized and examined narratives and interviews from students and instructors at one community college. These narratives and interviews worked to articulate participants’ positions in related fields of power as they navigated the complexities of academic bureaucracies like financial aid, admissions, and enrollment. Particular attention was paid to the ways in which financial aid and college remediation interact. The data from both groups revealed that policy implementation has marked influence on classroom experience, even when—and perhaps because—instructors and students are unaware of the specific and particular policies themselves. The data revealed that both students and instructors make decisions based on faulty or flawed understandings of academic policies. Based on these understandings, I recommend policy literacy programs for both students and instructors and call for greater policy transparency so that students may navigate complex bureaucracies at community colleges and be better prepared to self-advocate for best practices.

Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Thesis. 1979. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Includes bibliographical references. / Ph.D.

周濂. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2005. / 參考文獻(p. 217-224). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in English. / Lun wen (Zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2005. / Can kao wen xian (p. 217-224). / Zhou Lian.

Conventional wisdom suggests that weak international actors should avoid concluding ambiguous agreements with much stronger partners because this increases their vulnerability to subsequent exploitation. Why then do we observe so many instances of just such agreements signed under conditions of extreme power asymmetry? I answer this question by emphasising an underappreciated factor shaping the agreement design strategies of actors: Power trajectory. Focusing on international trade, I develop a three-part framework which demonstrates first, that powerful but rising states gain from securing narrow agreements because as the scope of these agreements is broadened, they are provided with more opportunities to use their growing power to secure increasingly favourable deals. Conversely, powerful but declining states are incentivised to conclude broad agreements as a way to lock-in an advantage that will decline over time. Second, I demonstrate that because of the particular vulnerabilities faced by weak states as a result of these narrow agreements, strong but rising powers are often required to make up-front concessions in order to secure their preferred contract and overcome the fears of their weaker counterparts. Third, I show that powerful but rising states can reap the benefits of subsequent rounds of bargaining because the initial agreement has induced the weaker party to make transaction specific investments which serve to drastically reduce its exit options. In developing this framework, I make three contributions; first, from a theoretical standpoint I specify more precisely the conditions under which powerful states choose to tie their hands and so qualify both the liberal claim that powerful states must always do so, and the realist suggestion that they strive to maintain freedom of action. Second, I make an empirical contribution by placing the trade policies of four major economic powers in detailed comparative perspective. Finally, I make a substantive contribution by demonstrating yet another mechanism by which the strong secure their preferences at the expense of the weak in international affairs.

The present study was conducted to examine power use patterns and general power use strategies in organizations multidimensionally (i.e., downward, upward, and lateral directions of power use), to extend and explain previous findings by Kipnis et al. (1980), with reference to situational effects on multidimensional power use. The samples in this study consist of 230 full-time managers who were from eight local businesses, and a second sample of 140 college students who worked over 15 hours a week at the time of the study. Two exploratory factor analyses resulted in five commonly used power patterns and two general power use strategies based on the eight factors found from Kipnis et al. (1980) factor analysis. Significant differences between the manager's level and manager's power tactics use were not found in downward, upward, or lateral power tactics use when three corresponding MANOVA analyses were conducted. Two different measures of work unit size were used, and the relationship between the work unit size and manager's power tactics use was significant when tested by a stepwise multiple regression analysis. A final multivariate analysis with repeated measures found no significant difference between the two response formats used on the questionnaires given to the college student sample. The important implications and contributions of the present study are discussed as well as future research directions.

The main purpose of this study is to analyze a measurement instrument developed by Frost & Stahelski (1988) to measure French & Raven's (1959) bases of social power. The measurement instrument of a competing typology of social influence tactics (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980) was also administered to the same managerial population (N=108). Confirmatory factor analyses using LISREL (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986) were performed on each scale. Possible relationships between the two typologies were explored. Results include confirming a modified Frost & Stahelski scale and no confirmation of the Kipnis et al. scale. Canonical correlation yielded two dimensions where Coercive Power and Expert Power relate to Assertiveness and Rationality respectively. Exploratory factor analysis of the composite scores from both typologies yielded two factors called Positive Power and Negative Power. Implications and future research are briefly discussed.