本研究旨在了解國中校長遴選政策中組織的政治歷程，以微觀政治的角度來了解遴選組織中的政治現象，並用質性的研究方式訪談八位遴選政策參與者探求遴選過程的全貌，以分析國中校長遴選政策中個人及團體如何以權力為背景進行協商，運用那些處理衝突與利益的策略，以及探討遴選勝出的關鍵要素。最後探求國中校長遴選制度中，權力變化與協商對象改變的演化過程，並研究遴選政策帶來的省思與回應，作為未來改進的建議與參考之用。 本研究的結論如下： 一、以不變應萬變的「萬年校長」時代確實已成為歷史遺跡。 二、遴選委員會與政治勢力及政治策略的運作產生相當大的關聯。 三、遴選委員組成的「優勢聯盟」可以有效的決定校長的聘任。 四、在校長遴選過程中，參與的各方都有必要與其他人進行協商。 五、參與的各方之間因校長遴選而形成了上下交織的權力網絡。 六、協商產生了價值、權力解決了紛爭。 七、智慧的應用政治的策略，考驗行政者的管理藝術。 八、正視政治策略在校長遴選制度運作中的必要性與正當性，才能解決核心問題。 九、協商必須有權力做背景，協商中就有各種權力在其中運作。 十、決定國中校長任用的權力流動方向從省→縣市→學校及社區。 十一、遴選政策發展下去，最大的權力者竟然是被遴選的對象。 十二、「校長難為」應將是一種贊美與肯定。 十三、校長遴選就是一個政治制度，是眾人之事，也是協商妥協下的產物。 十四、適當與配合才是遴選政策的真知。 根據研究結論，提出下列建議： 一、對遴選政策主管單位的建議： (一)明定主事者及參與者的權力與責任。 (二)正視政治策略在校長遴選制度運作中的必要性與正當性。 二、對候聘校長的建議： (一)努力增加實力，學習互助合作。 (二)熟悉協商與權力運作技巧。 三、對後續研究的建議： (一)擴大研究範圍。 (二)改變研究方法。 / The Research in the Selections of Junior High School Principals --The Viewpoints of Organizational Negotiation and Power Manipulation Chang, Ching-Ying Abstract This research primarily hopes to understand the political process and framework in the selections of junior high school principals. It will achieve this aim by examining the aforementioned selections from a micro-political standpoint, and will seek to grasp an overview picture of the electoral process through qualitative research. The research will also analyze the role of individual and group power struggles in the principal selection campaign tactics by examining their political management and tactics for handling conflicts and interests. Additionally, it will discuss the crucial key factors that led to some principal political victories and successful selections. Last, the research will study feedbacks and afterthoughts brought on by these electoral tactics and policies, so they can be used as suggestions and references from future improvements.

一般而言，股東會議程所有議案資訊必須事前揭露給全體股東，提供股東充分資訊，其方能在充分瞭解下作成投票決定。惟我國公司法長久以來承認股東有臨時動議與議案修正之權利，允許出席股東就第一七二條第五項規定除外事項之其他一切事項，在股東會現場提出臨時動議或原議案之修正，此舉不但將形成股東會議程資訊之漏洞，復以實務一般認為只要未違反第一七二條第五項之規定，股東可以在現場以臨時動議提議召開股東臨時會針對法定除外事項進行決議，或在同一議題下，可以提出任何修正案，而架空第一七二條之一股東提案權制度所寓有之資訊揭露功能。在無法獲得充分資訊之下，股東應當如何行使表決權，尤其未出席股東以書面或電子方式事前行使表決權時，更是需要充分資訊，否則一旦面對臨時動議或議案修正時，其表決權將依法視為棄權，更進一步衍生出表決權操縱和應否親自出席之問題，橫生枝節，臨時動議與議案修正之突襲性問題，亟待解決。 因此，參考美國、日本、德國、英國、香港、韓國和中國大陸公司法制，公司法應明文要求將股東會議程之主要內容或要領記載於召集通知中，股東會不得就召集通知所未記載之議案進行決議，股東如欲發表任何意見，應循事前提案權提出，而非在現場提出臨時動議或議案修正突襲其他股東。因此，本文建議禁止在現場提出任何臨時動議或議案修正。 / Generally speaking, the agenda of general meeting, including all motions, should be disclosed to all shareholders of the company in advance of a general meeting to provide them with sufficient information to vote (informed voting). However, according to Taiwan Company Act, shareholders have right to move extemporary motions or amendments all but any items as set forth in §172(5) hereof at the meeting. This will not only come to be a loophole resulting from blank statements in a notice of a general meeting, but also sideline the information disclosure function by implication of shareholder proposal in §172-1, because the court hold that the shareholder are entitled to move an extemporary motion to call a meeting to make a resolution on exclusion items in §172(5), or any amendment under the same subject. Thus shareholders are unable to vote without sufficient information, especially who cast their vote through writing or electronic transmission without participating in person in advance of the meeting. In case of extemporary motions or amendments, shareholders who cast vote through writing or electronic transmission shall be deemed to withhold their voting power. This result would bring some issues of manipulation of voting power and whether shareholders who have cast their vote through writing or electronic transmission should participate in person afterwards or not. However, extemporary motions and amendments with surprising nature shall be or shall not be, that is the question. In order to deal with this problem, the main component or general nature of items in the agenda of a general meeting shall be stated in the notice, and only the items stated in the notice could be validly passed at the general meeting by referring to the Company Act of the U.S., Japan, Germany, U.K., Hong Kong, South Korea, and Mainland China. If shareholders are willing to express their opinions, they should propose to ask to put in the agenda in advance of the meeting, instead of moving extemporary motions and amendments to surprise the others. This study suggests that no extemporary motion or amendment shall be allowed to move at the general meeting.