This thesis investigates the effect of union members’ position in the wage distribution on income inequality in Germany between 1998 and 2019. Specifically, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel are analyzed on two levels. Regression analyses on the sector-year and individual level show that if a large share of union members is relatively well positioned in the wage spectrum, the inequality-reducing union effect weakens.The purpose of this thesis is to provide evidence on within-union dynamics that might contribute to the continued union decline in many industrialized economies. This thesis fills a gap in the literature as most researchers focus either on how union strength affects income inequality or look at how union members’ wages affect their preferences on redistribution. By directly studying the effect of union members’ wages on inequality levels, this thesis additionally engages with the theoretical tradition of Power Resource Theory (PRT). Specifically, this analysis confirms that union strength and income inequality are negatively associated. However, it also provides evidence for a central critique of PRT, suggesting that working-class interest is heterogeneous and not homogeneous as PRT presumes.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the causes of welfare state expansion, specifically the causes of welfare state expenditure of active labor market policy (ALMP). ALMP aims at reducing unemployment and increasing participation in the labor market. The field of political economy has long asked the question of why certain welfare states are characterized by generous social policy, while others are not. Several theories have been presented over the years, each providing new perspectives. The two theories that could be considered to be the most prominent are the Power Resource Theory, which centers on the importance of power resources of major classes, and the Varieties of Capitalism, which is more focused on the different needs of capitalists.The specific interest of this paper is the varying orientations of ALMP. It is argued that ALMP should not be understood as a homogenous concept, but instead as a category of policy which consists of a range of tools from which a government can choose. Analyzing the expenditure of these tools separately is thus of great importance for the development of a deeper understanding of the welfare state.Using regression analysis, I analyze which of the theories mentioned above is most strongly correlated to increased expenditure of ALMP. I use a total expenditure of ALMP, as is customary within the field, but I also include two other measures for specific tools of ALMP; incentive reinforcement programs and training programs.The results indicate that when looking at the total expenditure of ALMP the VoC approach appears to better explain the cause of welfare state expenditure. However, when including the measures for the specific tools of ALMP, the classic notion of VoC is confirmed only regarding incentive reinforcement programs, and contradicted regarding training programs. Moreover, the classic notion of PRT is confirmed regarding the expenditure of training programs, albeit with quite limited evidence. Also, the classic notion within PRT finds little support in the analysis of total expenditure of ALMP and the expenditure of incentive reinforcement programs. Only making a distinction between large and small welfare states is thus argued to be a simplification. Welfare states with similar levels of social expenditure might in fact differ significantly regarding actual policy preference.It is concluded that the continued disaggregation of ALMP is necessary in order to further the research field. Acknowledging the highly heterogeneous nature of ALMP is essential when understanding its expenditure.

Ce mémoire cherche à comprendre un paradoxe : les États-providence les plus généreux, façonnés par des partis sociaux-démocrates, sont financés par des taxes beaucoup plus régressives que les États-providence les moins généreux où les partis de droite, plus souvent au pouvoir, mettent en place une taxation plus progressive. Pour comprendre ce paradoxe, ce mémoire débute en analysant les pressions induites par la mondialisation des capitaux sur la taxation. Ensuite, le mémoire explore les causes institutionnelles des régimes fiscaux en effectuant une revue de la littérature analytique. Ces contraintes institutionnelles et fonctionnelles sur le comportement et les préférences des acteurs politiques permettent de définir trois idéaux-types de régimes fiscaux. Ces idéaux-types cadrent avec la typologie des régimes d’État-providence d’Esping-Andersen. En regroupant des typologies sur les régimes fiscaux et les régimes d’État-providence, ce mémoire souligne que le financement des politiques publiques représente une composante cruciale de l’économie politique de l’État-providence. / This thesis is about a paradox: the most generous welfare states, built by social-democratic parties, are financed by more regressive taxes than residual welfare states, which are funded by progressive taxes, despite the fact that they are governed by right parties more often. To understand this paradox, this thesis starts by analysing the pressures that globalisation puts on taxation. Then, the thesis reviews the literature of political science research on taxation to understand the institutional origins of distinct tax regimes. Three ideal types of tax regimes are defined by the study of institutional and functional constraints on political actors’ preferences and behaviour. These ideal types fit with Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states regimes. By regrouping typologies on tax and welfare regimes, this thesis explores the link between revenues and expenses while showing that the funding of public policies is a crucial feature of the political economy of welfare states.