Constitutions and bills of rights have previously been argued to be non-democratic. To justify the entrenched nature of constitutions, some theorists have argued that constitutions represent a type of rational precommitment. However, this precommitment understanding of constitutions is not without its own problems. In this work, I will argue the prominent understanding of constitutional precommitment used by its proponents seems to rely upon a definition of commitment to which their arguments do not stay true. However, when I try to amend their arguments and apply a proper example of commitment, it leads to some problems with other tenets of the constitutional debate, especially the fact of constitutional entrenchment. In an attempt to determine just what it would take to save the rational precommitment understanding of constitutions, while maintaining a proper definition of commitment, I turn to metaphysical puzzles about change, persistence, and the possibility of a mereological understanding of our constitution. I conclude that 1) current debates do not have a proper conception of commitment and are thus failing to accomplish their ends, and 2) if proponents of the rational precommitment view do not buy into my analysis, then it is going to prove quite difficult to keep their account afloat once we properly define commitment. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

<p>This essay presents an alternative approach to the predominant democratic analysis of the European Monetary Union. As the Treaties stipulate the political conduct within Monetary Union and put certain restrictions on the European politicians they are to some extent constitutional in their character. </p><p>Essential for constitutional theory is the concept of precommitment; according to which a decision is made in t1 purposing to obstruct certain actions in t2. In light of this the aim of this essay is to investigate whether or not delegating monetary responsibility to the ECB can be seen as an example of constitutional precommitment and if so, if this constitutional perspective can add something to the predominant democratic analysis of the EMU. </p><p>According to the author the EMU is by and large a form of precommitment as the leading politicians in Europe figuratively have tied their hands from intervening in the common monetary policy. The author is also of the opinion that a constitutional approach can add something to the incomplete democratic analysis of the EMU. If a treaty has a constitutional character one cannot expect it to be changed using ordinary political means. Since it is instituted to safeguard certain values the amendment process has to be complex. This complexity does not however entail that it is impossible to change the mandate of the ECB. The European Union furthermore has a confederal character and the member states can thus, as a last resort, withdraw their membership, still making them the"Masters of the Treaties".</p>

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Juliana Mongon Petroni.pdf: 891182 bytes, checksum: d7decc8c64ba4ec85cdddc1bfafeb137 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-18 / The proposal of this study is to present and discuss issues related to the apparent paradox of constitutional democracy demonstrated by Frank Michelman. Based on Post's ( procedural democracy ) and Dworkin's ( democracy as a right ) ideas, Michelman seeks to demonstrate the "paradox of constitutional democracy", i.e., on the one hand, for the procedural view, it is stated that there won't be a democracy if the contents of the basic law can not be decided by the people and, second, it seeks to withdraw from the political decisionmaking process the content of a democratic regime. Those Michelman's studies brought a huge impact on constitutional doctrine and made Jünger Habermas pronounce himself about this issue. Habermas, analyzed the main ideas presented by Michelman and demonstrated that, in fact, these are complementary notions, not a paradox. This interesting debate between Habermas and Michelman brought a big impact for democracies that, created by a Constitution, established limits on popular sovereignty, which, according to Michelman, would be undemocratic, a paradox. / O presente estudo tem como proposta apresentar e discutir questões relacionadas à aparente relação paradoxal entre democracia e constitucionalismo demonstrada por Frank Michelman. Com base no pensamento de Post ( democracia procedimental ) e de Dworkin ( democracia como direito ), Michelman busca demonstrar o que denomina de paradoxo da democracia constitucional , i.e., por um lado, na visão procedimental, afirma-se que não haverá democracia se o conteúdo da lei básica não puder ser decidido pelo povo e, por outro, busca-se retirar do processo político decisório parte do conteúdo de um regime democrático. Tais estudos de Michelman trouxeram um grande efeito na doutrina constitucional e implicaram o pronunciamento de Jünger Habermas, o qual, ao analisar as principais ideias apresentadas por Michelman, demonstrou que, na verdade, tratam-se de noções complementares, e não de um paradoxo. Este interessante debate entre Habermas e Michelman traz um enorme impacto para as democracias que, instituídas por meio de uma Constituição, estabelecem limites à soberania popular, os quais, segundo Michelman, seriam antidemocráticos, um paradoxo.

This essay presents an alternative approach to the predominant democratic analysis of the European Monetary Union. As the Treaties stipulate the political conduct within Monetary Union and put certain restrictions on the European politicians they are to some extent constitutional in their character. Essential for constitutional theory is the concept of precommitment; according to which a decision is made in t1 purposing to obstruct certain actions in t2. In light of this the aim of this essay is to investigate whether or not delegating monetary responsibility to the ECB can be seen as an example of constitutional precommitment and if so, if this constitutional perspective can add something to the predominant democratic analysis of the EMU. According to the author the EMU is by and large a form of precommitment as the leading politicians in Europe figuratively have tied their hands from intervening in the common monetary policy. The author is also of the opinion that a constitutional approach can add something to the incomplete democratic analysis of the EMU. If a treaty has a constitutional character one cannot expect it to be changed using ordinary political means. Since it is instituted to safeguard certain values the amendment process has to be complex. This complexity does not however entail that it is impossible to change the mandate of the ECB. The European Union furthermore has a confederal character and the member states can thus, as a last resort, withdraw their membership, still making them the"Masters of the Treaties".

This dissertation reports a series of studies on social influences in decision making with wide ranging marketing implications in areas such as gamification initiatives, participative pricing mechanisms, and charity fundraising strategies. The body of this work comprises of three indepth, stand-alone studies. The first study, "Contagion of the Competitive Spirit: The Influence of a Competition on Non-Competitors", investigates the influence of a competition on noncompetitors who do not participate in it but are aware of it. In a series of experimental studies, the study shows that the mere awareness of a competition can affect a non-competitor's performance in similar tasks. These experiments provide confirmatory and process evidence for this contagion effect, showing that it is driven by heightened social comparison motivation due to mere awareness of the competition. In addition, the study finds evidence that the reward level for the competitors could moderate the contagion effect on the non-competitors. The second study, "The Negative Effects of Precommitment on Reciprocal Behaviour: Evidence from a Series of Voluntary Payment Experiments", examines the effects of precommitment on reciprocal behaviour towards a forthcoming benefit. Through a series of experiments in several countries, the study shows that precommitment often weakens reciprocal behaviour. In two field experiments, a laboratory and an online experiment, the study finds consistent evidence that voluntary payment amounts decrease for individuals who are asked to precommit their payment. The results from a final online trust-game experiment support the posited mental-accounting mechanism for the effect. The third study, "Hold-Up Induced by Demand for Fairness: Theory and Experimental Evidence", explores the domain of hold-up and fairness concerns. While recent research suggests that fairness concerns could mitigate hold-up problems, this study proposes a starkly opposite possibility: that fairness concerns can also induce hold-up problems and thus significant inefficiencies. The study reports theoretical analysis and experimental evidence of hold-up in scenarios in which it will not occur if agents are purely self-interested, but could occur if they care about fairness at ex post negotiation.