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We estimate the impact of natural and human-influenced catastrophes on individual risk preferences. Using the meta-analysis process with random-effects models, we examine the significance of the effect of different catastrophes on individual risk preferences. As natural and human-influenced catastrophes have become more frequent a number of studies have evaluated their effects on risk attitudes. In this thesis a meta-analysis is performed from the results in these recent studies, allowing for comparisons across catastrophes and against results from laboratory experiments. In evaluating the change in risk-taking behavior amongst affected populations it may better inform relief efforts and policy decisions. Overall, subjects from developed nations exhibit increased risk loving behavior on average in contrast to the shift to risk aversion in subjects from developing nations.

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The boon of public goods to a society is its inclusive nature where no individual can be restricted from enjoying its fruits. However, this very feature generates proclivity among individuals in the society to escape paying their share towards creation of the public good, which is known as free-riding. Interestingly, contribution levels in reality surpass predictions suggested by theoretical findings. To understand and assuage the free-riding problem, we study a public good game where individuals in a society form small groups or coalitions to carry out collective decisions about contribution levels. Such cooperative action is further augmented when we account for social and other-regarding preferences in individuals, which make them care about well-being of others. While social preferences are well documented in other economic environments, their effect on the formation, likelihood and size of coalitions to provide public goods is not well understood. This dissertation uses both theoretical and experimental methods to incorporate social preferences into the study of coalition formation and how such coalitions affect the provision of the public good. In any public good provision problem, marginal per capita return (MPCR) is an important determinant. For every dollar a person spends on privately providing the public good, the MPCR measures how much the individual gets back. Conventional theory suggests an inverse relationship between coalition size and MPCR, which stands contrary to recent experimental evidences. My dissertation uses heterogenous social preferences to arrive at sufficient conditions which establishes a positive relationship between coalition size and MPCR. Chapter 2 theoretically investigates the conditions required to achieve a positive relationship between coalition size and MPCR when an individual's social preference is private information. The model is a two-stage public good game, where in the first stage individuals decide whether or not to join the coalition and then in the next stage, the coalition votes to contribute to public good. The results suggest that individuals with pro social preferences are more likely to join the coalition and upon joining always contribute to the public good. Higher MPCR further increase an individual's likelihood to join coalition and contribute to public good. The results hold true under different model specifications as well. Chapter 3 test the theoretical predictions of Chapter 2 by using an experiment. In the experiment, subject's payoff is determined by exogenously inducing social preferences into an individual's payoff function. The experiment validates the predictions of theoretical model and we find that individuals who have lower weight on their own payoff are likely to join the coalition and also vote to contribute to public good. Higher return from public good also results in larger coalition size and increases the likelihood to contribute to public good. Chapter 4 also tests the theoretical prediction, however, here the preferences are estimated by using an incentivized task based on how much money they are willing to give to someone else. The outcomes from the incentivized task suggest that individuals who give more money to others are more likely to join the coalition and also contribute to public good. High MPCR ensures larger coalition size and more individuals contributing to public good. We also find that coalition size have a positive impact on individual's decision to join the coalition and contribute. / Doctor of Philosophy / Public goods like healthcare services, free-vaccinations, cleaner environment is an important parameter to the development of a society. The primary features of these goods are non-excludability – no one can be excluded from enjoying the benefit of the good and non-rivalry such that multiple individuals can enjoy its benefits. These features allow many to free-ride and escape contribution towards the provision of the public good. In this dissertation, we study how coalitions amongst people in a society can potentially assuage the free-riding problem. International Environment Agreements (IEA) such as Kyoto Protocol, Paris agreement are some of the examples of existing coalitions. While in practice coalitions, i.e., subgroups of individuals who agree to act collectively to produce a public good exist, the conditions under which these coalitions are most likely to form are not well understood. In this dissertation we incorporate facets of Behavioral Economics to understand functioning of coalitions which will allow to incorporate various behavioral and other-regarding preferences to study economic outcomes. Other-regarding preferences assume that individuals also care about the well-being of others. The dissertation uses both theory and experiments to understand and test the conditions required for successful coalition formation through behavioral economics-based explanations. A society is comprised of heterogeneous individuals who value public good differently and so have different willingness to pay. For example, not everyone is equally willing to pay for the construction of a public park. We exploit such heterogeneity to understand how efficient coalitions can be formed such that it increases chances of public good provision. We construct a two-stage game where individuals choose whether or not to join the coalition in the first stage. Once individuals learn the size of the coalition they can determine whether it is desirable for them to contribute to the public good in the second stage. As a result, despite individual social preferences being private information, our mechanism increases the size of the public good and thus outcome efficiency. The design of our model also helps to test these predictions by using human subjects' experiments. We find that individuals who care more the well-being of others join the coalition and also contribute to the public good. An increase in benefit from public good also increases the likelihood of higher coalition size and higher contribution levels. In its scientific mission, the study aims to understand importance of heterogenous society in successful provisioning of public goods.

With the transition of the economy in China, migrants start holding a more and more important position in the labor market. Therefore, from this dissertation, we try to explore different topics related to the migrants in China. This dissertation consists of three essays on who chooses to migrate, how networks affect migrants' outcomes, and what is the intergenerational impact of parental migration on children's risk preferences. In the first chapter, we briefly introduce the motivation and contribution, and then we provide the methods and detailed findings in the following chapters. Chapter 2 examines the impact of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate on the wage differentials between migrants and non-migrants in China. We find that migrants are self-selected from the upper tail of the income distribution in their home location. Consistent with a theoretical model of migration choice, we show that the size of the selection effect on wage depends on the wage differences between the prefectures of origin and destination as well as migration cost. The selection effect also differs among workers with different education and in different cities. Chapter 3 studies how networks affect migrants' migration decisions, employment, and wage levels by using 2005 China's mini-census. Different from existing studies, this paper takes into account the existence of self-selection in the labor market. With the help of a theoretical model, we have a better understanding of the mechanism of networks as well as the different network effects on rural and urban migrants. We find out that networks affect both rural and urban migrants' migration decisions positively. In terms of employment, networks exert positive impacts on rural migrants but not on urban ones, which is due to the different quality drops between rural and urban migrants when the networks increase. Such employment effects also lead rural migrants to face a more severe negative wage impact than urban migrants. Chapter 4 investigates how parental migration affects left-behind underage children's risk preferences. By focusing on migrant parent groups, we are able to estimate whether the influence of nurture could also affect children's risk preference levels or not. The findings suggest that besides the intergenerational transmission of risk preferences between parents and children, parental migrations do have an influence on girls' risk preference levels. In addition, in terms of adult children's risk-related outcomes, we are able to find a positive parental migration impact on daughters' self-employment decisions. Findings help us have a better understanding of the relevant factors of risk preferences, and also confront the impact of the separation of parents and children. / Doctor of Philosophy / Nowadays, migration becomes increasingly common and migrants take a large proportion of the labor market. With the economic development and the closer connections among regions, people are more likely to study or work outside their home locations than before. Even though there is still a strict household registration system in China, we can find the migration supporting systems are becoming established, and facilitate easier migration for more and more people. Having a better understanding of migrants helps us make better policies as well as have the labor market and society develop better. This dissertation explores who choose to migrate (Chapter 2), how the social connections or networks affect migrants' employment and wages (Chapter 3), and whether there is any intergenerational impact on migrants' children in terms of risk preferences (Chapter 4) using methods from labor economics and economic theory. We conclude that the best works tend to migrate first in the labor market, and social connections have different impacts on rural and urban migrants in terms of employment and wages. Moreover, we notice that migrant parents affect the left-behind children's risk preferences by both influences of nature and nurture. In sum, we study different topics on migrants and have a deeper understanding of how migrants are affected in the labor market as well as how migrants affect their next generations.