The objective of my dissertation work was to provide a better understanding of consumer choices related to these two important tradeoffs that consumers are often confronted with in the marketplace. Drawing upon regulatory focus theory, I investigated how consumers choose between price and quality or price and quantity, in each of two essays, thereby shedding light on the role of consumer goals in purchase decisions. In the first essay, I propose that quality is predominantly a promotion feature whereas price is predominantly a prevention feature. Therefore, promotion oriented consumers should be more attentive to differences in product quality whereas prevention oriented consumers should be more attentive to differences in product price. Three studies demonstrate that quality (price) is more strongly associated with a promotion (prevention) orientation, that promotion (prevention) oriented consumers prefer products with higher quality (cheaper prices), and that these preferences are mitigated when consumers do not need to prioritize between price and quality and are mediated by relative attention to quality versus price. In the second essay, I investigate the manner in which consumers' goal orientations affect their preferences for monetary versus nonmonetary promotional offers, such as bonus packs and price discounts. I propose that consumers with a promotion (vs. prevention) orientation are more likely to prefer a bonus pack offer over an economically equivalent price discount offer. Two pretests and one study provide empirical support for this key prediction. I also identify theoretically defensible and managerially actionable boundary conditions for this effect that are related to price levels and product types.

本研究以民國91年至民國96年期間辦理私募案之上(市)櫃公司為研究對象，探究私募折溢價與私募後經營績效及市場反應之關聯性。 本研究將私募樣本區分為溢價組與折價組，溢價組於私募前後之營運績效均如預期般表現比折價組好，且溢價組與折價組於私募後之營運績效表現有更顯著的差異。同時，溢價組於私募後展現正向的市場反應，折價組於私募後則呈現負向的市場反應。 企業價值與成長機會高度相關，而溢價發行企業之成長機會對企業價值之影響程度較折價發行企業高。折(溢)價幅度與私募後營運績效、累計異常報酬間呈負(正)相關，顯示折溢價幅度可能反映出私募企業未來成長與風險之訊息。 / This study examines the effects of price discount (premium) on performance and market reaction in private placement. Three main findings are as follows. After classifying the sample into two categories, premium and discount, this study finds that the operating performance of the premium group is better than that of the discount group both before and after the private placement. The difference is especially significant after the private placement. Furthermore, the premium group shows positive market reaction after private placement while the discount group negative. Firm value is highly related to growth opportunity, and the influence of growth opportunity on firm value of premium group is significantly higher than that of discount group. The results also show that the magnitude of price discount (premium) is negatively (positively) related to operating performance and cumulative abnormal return after private placement. This may indicate that the price discount (premium) reflects the signal of future growth and risk of the firm in private placement.

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本研究以適用於民國九十九年九月一日修正前之「公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券應注意事項」辦理私募增資之上市櫃公司為研究對象，研究期間為民國九十四年十月十一日至九十九年八月三十一日，以探討內部人行為對私募折價幅度之影響。 　　研究結果發現，公司內部人若有參與私募者，則折價幅度會較純粹為外部人應募之私募案為大，顯示內部人可能藉由其職權，壓低私募價格以自肥，符合利益掠奪假說。此外，若內部人於應募前後，尚還有出售老股套利或隱瞞應募人與公司關係之情事者，其折價幅度越大。顯示內部人若意圖假私募手法圖利自身時，其確會運用其對公司之影響力，蓄意壓低私募價格以賺取折價之價差，或刻意隱瞞資訊以規避小股東之監督。因此，私募折價幅度與內部人是否參與應募以及續後之作為，確有密切關聯。 / This study examines the effect of insiders’ activities on the price discount of private placement. The sample period starts from October 11th, 2005 and ends August 31th, 2010, one day before the last revision on the regulation, Directions for Public Companies Conducting Private Placements of Securities. The empirical result shows that the price discount under private placement with insiders involved is more than that with outsiders only. The insiders, in accordance with entrenchment hypothesis, may benefit by discounting the price in the private placement. In addition, more price discount may also be taken by the insiders who intend to benefit from selling stocks while purchasing stocks from the private placement or intentionally concealing information about their relationship with the company. It’s evident that the price discount under private placement has something to do with whether the insiders are involved and how they behave in response.

Gli aumenti di capitale iperdiluitivi causano rilevanti anomalie di mercato, soprattutto con riferimento ai diritti d’opzione, che sono spesso scambiati a un prezzo notevolmente inferiore rispetto al loro valore teorico. Come evidenziato nel Capitolo I, tali anomalie possono comportare un significativo annacquamento del valore dell’investimento, inducendo così gli azionisti a sottoscrivere le azioni offerte loro nonostante le prospettive reddituali dell’impresa avrebbero consigliato altrimenti (c.d. coazione a sottoscrivere). Al fine di trovare un adeguato equilibrio tra le esigenze di finanziamento dell’impresa e la necessità di tutelare adeguatamente gli investitori, l’ordinamento giuridico offre una pluralità di soluzioni. In quest’angolo visuale, il Capitolo II esamina il divieto di emettere nuove azioni al di sotto della parità contabile (art. 47, Direttiva (EU) 2017/1132) quale limite ex ante alla diluizione massima del valore della partecipazione azionaria, così di ridurre il rischio di comportamenti opportunistici. Similmente, nel Capitolo III si discute della funzione assolta in tali operazioni dalla responsabilità degli amministratori ex art. 2395 c.c. e ci si interroga se - nelle società quotate - l’illiquidità del mercato dei diritti di opzione costituisca un’ipotesi rilevante ai sensi dell'art. 2441, comma 5, c.c., così che tutte le nuove azioni debbano essere emesse al loro valore “reale” (co. 6). / In publicly traded companies, highly dilutive rights issues create market anomalies throughout the whole offer period, especially with respect to rights prices, which quote considerably below their fair value. As pointed out in Chapter I, these anomalies could cause severe losses to non-subscribing shareholders, inducing them to take part in the operation even if financial perspectives of the company would have suggested otherwise (= enforced subscription mechanism). In order to strike a proper balance of enabling companies to raise new capital while simultaneously protecting investors, company law provides an array of regulatory strategies. In this respect, Chapter II analyzes the prohibition on issuing new shares below par value (art. 47, Directive (EU) 2017/1132) as a means to limit the dilution that can be imposed on non-subscribing shareholders, thus hindering opportunistic behaviors. Similarly, Chapter III examines the function and the contents of managers’ liability to investors (art. 2395 Italian c.c.) and discusses whether, in these operations, the illiquidity of rights’ market can be regarded as a restriction of their pre-emption right, imposing that new shares are always issued at their “real” value (art. 2441, par. 5 - 6, Italian c.c.).