Human accelerated climate change presents a worldwide threat. It is a problem that requires international as well as local solutions. Human accelerated climate change is induced by the release of so called greenhouse gasses (GHG's) as a result of human activity, most notably by converting fossil fuels into energy. GHG's include Carbon dioxide (CO₂), Methane (CH₄), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆). The most notable of these gasses is Carbon Dioxide (CO₂), this gas is released into the atmosphere in vast amounts and is primarily responsible for the human contribution to climate change. In recent years, Governments all over the world have begun implementing strategies in order to decrease the amount of GHG's released into the atmosphere. The South African Government set out a range of options in the National Climate Change Response White Paper that could be used to reduce GHG emissions. The specific option which forms the subject matter of this dissertation is referred to as the Carbon Tax. Stripped down to its bare essentials a Carbon Tax entails that producers of GHG emitting products would pay a tax that corresponds to the amount of CO₂ emitted in the production of that product, or the CO₂ equivalent of the product if it emits one of the other GHG's. This amount of money is then incorporated into the price of the product making those emission intensive products more expensive. Theoretically, this should result in a decline in the consumption of the product and/or cleaner methods to produce the product. The underlying idea is to change consumers' behaviour to promote environmental goals by reducing GHG emissions. Carbon Taxing falls under a category of regulation which is referred to as the 'incentive based approach to environmental regulation' with the incentive being financial or market based. Incentive based measures are used in environmental regulation where traditional command and control measures would be insufficient or where they could be supplemented. This paper will examine the proposed Carbon Taxing regime for South Africa. It will assess the proposed regime in terms of its effectiveness as an instrument to reduce GHG emissions. It will also assess the equitability of the regime by assessing how the tax will affect citizens in different income classes.

There is literature available on the characteristics of good teachers and there is also literature that shows teaching differences by gender and by level of experience. Additionally, there are models of instruction that relate to distance education, as well as a model of good practice in undergraduate education. There is, however, a lack of research on whether those who teach distance education classes use these principles of good practice. There is also a lack of research on whether there are differences in the degree to which they use these practices by gender or by level of teaching experience. This study attempted to address the gap in the existing literature by examining whether distance educators use the principles of good teaching practice. Additionally, this study attempted to examine whether there are differences of use by teaching experience and by gender of instructor. For purposes of this study, one instructional design model was used (Chickering & Gamson, 1987). A 52-item survey, the Online Teaching Practices (OTP) Inventory, was developed specifically for this study. The OTP consisted of seven sections that measured the extent to which instructors implemented the seven principles in the design of their course curricula. The response options asked participants to numerically rate how well each item described their online class. Mean scores were used to assess the degree to which the principles were being used in general. Then ANOVAs were run to determine if differences existed between/among groups. Finally, in cases where there were three or more groups, independent t-tests were used to determine where those differences lay. Results revealed that instructors are implementing the seven principles into course curricula design. Additionally, a significant difference was found between males and females on one scale. Three significant differences were found based on level of teaching experience and three more differences by discipline were identified. / Master of Arts

As its objective this study develops a modus operandi for the interior designer who must understand and work with both additively and subtractively mixed colors in constructing interior color schemes.

The aim of this field study is to examine the following problem: To what extent has education operated on a limited and narrow perception of design principles and if so how could the implementation of the missing principles be achieved. The field study is composed of an analysis and an educational model incorporating three levels of education. In the analysis the aesthetic principles of design are investigated in relation to natural design to find out what constitutes good design. Then these design principles are used to reflect on modern social values and socio-economic behaviour. The insights gained from the socio-economic sphere are then used for analysis of education curriculum planning to see whether the principles presently used can be improved upon. Finally the Educational model using aesthetics as its central value is expressed as a possible answer to the problem.

This study focuses on testing the five hermeneutic principles set out by Jakob Klein and two ofmy own. The test consists ofwriting a commentary on Plato's Jon read in accordance with those principles. In summary these principles require paying close attention to the dramatic aspect ofthe dialogue and reading in a very detailed fashion. The success or failure ofthe principles is to be decided on the basis ofthe quality ofthe reading they produce. If following the principles produces a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of the dialogue then they should be deemed successful. The principles require that attention be given to the framing details of the dialogue and that an attempt be made to integrate them into the overall understanding. This interpretation thus reaches a somewhat different understanding of Sokrates' purpose in talking to Ion and Plato's purpose in writing the dialogue. Instead ofan abstract battle between philosophy and poetry, we have a battle between two particular characters over a real city. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

General Introduction The process of the institutionalisation of law that started at the end of the 18th century was followed by a general wave of codification throughout Europe. The French codification of 1804 was exemplary for all the others. The “law in books” was complete, certain, clear, and undisputable. From then on, the law in books had priority over the “law in action”. Law in books was a critique of law in action that preceded the French Revolution. Judicial activism was proscribed, and judges were called to apply the rules issued by the legislator. This ideal of the French Revolution is still framing our pattern of legal thinking. It is dominant throughout the 19th century with the école de l’exégèse in France, Begriffjurisprudenz in Germany, and analytical jurisprudence in Anglo-American legal systems. Legal formalism or the deductive application of rules is the only form of judicial reasoning that is allowed. The science of law, as a consequence, was confined to a theoretical support and elaboration of this judge-centred approach to law. This view on law and legal science persisted throughout the last century. It started being criticized in the late 1960s, a critique that paved the path for a more active role of the judge. New theories of interpretation were proposed so as to supplement the law in books with theoretically justified methodologies to determine its meaning. The findings of legal theory are still, to a large extent, premised on the central role of the judge in the legal system. Although this evolution may be applauded for having contributed to a more dynamic attitude towards the law, the role of the legislator remains largely underexposed. Legal theory takes the law as “just there”, and limits its theoretical undertakings to law as it is. Law, so it is said, is the result of political decision-making. Once it comes into being however, it is separated from politics. Politics, that is, is thought of as impure, at least when compared to the methods of legal reasoning and decision-making. This brings us to the theme of this book. Some of the questions I propose to explore are: Where does the law come from? What are the premises of a theory that considers law separated from politics? What does it mean for a legislator to be bound to the rules of a constitution throughout the process of legislation? Does the constitution consist of rules to be followed by the legislator or is its role merely confined to be a political programme? These and other questions frame the main problem this book proposes to deal with. They are triggered by the fact of the exponential growth of today’s legal systems. Complaints about both the increasing volume of legislation and its decreasing quality in most European countries have raised the question as to whether collaboration between legislators and legal theory can help to articulate and to solve that problem. As a matter of fact, although the complaints are made with an ever-stronger voice, solutions are by no means obvious. Legislation as a matter of politics is not rational. Politics is a power game, resulting in compromises that are framed into a legislative or statutory structure. This power game seems to have its own logic, the results of which most of the time outweigh any other form of logic. Legal theory for its part is considered, from the perspective of politics at least, to be a “theoretical” approach to legal problems. It contributes to the description and systematisation of existing valid law. It shows up, like Minerva’s owl, after the sunset of legislative activity. From that perspective, there is not much hope that legal theory can usefully intervene in the process of legislation or regulation, i.e. before or during the creation of rules. Legal theory then is confined to “legal science” or “legal dogmatics”. I propose to consider the problem of legislation from another angle. The premises of the problem are that, although legislation and regulation is the result of a political process, they can be the object of a theoretical study. Using an approach analogous to e.g. Hans Kelsen in legal theory , the main idea is not to primarily focus on the content of rules and concepts, but rather on the structure and function of legal systems. In the approach of this book, the focal point is on problems that are common to most legal systems and not on the characteristics, viz. the content of concepts that are specific for one or more legal systems. The creation of law, so is my claim, has become a problem. Kelsen’s approach leaves legislation and regulation – apart from their formal validity aspects – outside the scope of study. The creation of rules relies on value judgments that are according to him not fit for theoretical study. In short, the creation of legal rules is a matter of politics and politics is not fit for scientific study. This position is an understandable one, though it is only partially acceptable. Rule creation is a matter of choice. The legitimation of this choice is found in the democratic character of the regulating process and not in some science of values. In other words, would one try to mould legislation into the frame of a science, we would face something like “scientific politics”, as Marxism propagated, and which is, for several reasons, unacceptable. A different standpoint is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal theory. This approach I propose to call legisprudence. The object of study of legisprudence is the rational creation of legislation and regulation. As to its method, it makes use of the theoretical insights and tools of current legal theory. Whereas the latter has been dealing most of the time dealing with problems of the application of law by the judge, legisprudence explores the possibilities of the enlargement of the field of study as to include the creation of law by the legislator. Within this new approach, a variety of new question and problems – e.g. the validity of norms, their meaning, the structure of the legal system, etc. - are raised. They are traditionally dealt with from the perspective of the judge or are taken for granted by classical legal theory. However, when shifting our attention from the judge to the legislator, the same questions arise: In what sense does the legislator have to take the systematicity of the legal order into account? What counts as a valid norm? What meanings can be created and how? to mention but a few. Traditional legal science or legal dogmatics covers many of these questions with the cloak of sovereignty. Legislators are sovereign, they decide what will count as a valid norm, and its meaning. Whether and how a rule and its meaning fit with the legal system, is then a matter of interpretation – and this is the task of the judge and the legal scientist. On this view, the process of legislation seems to be inappropriate for theoretical inquiry. After long decades of legalism in legal reasoning, it can be said that the dominant views in legal theory resulting from that, have precisely barred the way for inquiring into the position of the legislator. Everything happens behind the veil of sovereignty as far as legislation properly so called is concerned, and behind the veil of legality when it comes to the execution of legislative acts. These veils conceal a great part of ignorance related to the possibilities of an alternative theoretical reflection on rule making. Sovereignty itself, so one can say, creates silence about this alternative, so that it becomes “sovereignty in silence” . Sovereignty of the ruler prevents his rules from being questioned in any other than binary terms. Validity is a good example of that. The only question that is worthwhile putting is: Is this propositional content a valid rule yes or no? As a consequence, questions on its efficacy, effectivity, efficiency, or acceptability are not in order. The claim of legisprudence is that these questions, like others, are important ones, and that they can be analysed with the help of legal theory. The book is divided into three parts. In the first part, I propose to explore the three basic tenets of the Modern philosophical project as Descartes inaugurated it. These three tenets are: rationality, the individuality of the subject, and freedom. A brief sketch of what is meant by them is offered in the first chapter. Rationality as it is dealt with in the Modern philosophical project means that what is rational is self-evident. Self-evidence is certainty and certainty is the mark of truth. The question for whom something is certain is however left out of view. The subject, that is, has himself immediate access to reason and truth upon the use of his rational capacities. The latter are presumed to be identical in and for all. The subject’s reflection on himself leads to the true insight that he is a res cogitans. The subject thinks of himself as an ”I”, that is, as an individual. Others are not thought of as others, but rather as representations or ideas. The subject as an individual is a product of thought, that is, upon the Modern approach of rationality, a theoretical idea. As a result of rationality as self-evidence and the subject as an individual, practical reason is confined to free will. Freedom as the third basic tenet of the Modern philosophical project is limited to following the commands of God and the rules of the country. These commands and rules are found “out there”, without questioning either their origin or their purpose. The main critique of the Modern philosophical project as it is briefly set out in the first chapter is that it is based on the so-called "scholastic fallacy”. This fallacy involves that rationality is presupposed identical in everyone’s head. On the supposition that all subjects are ontologically rational as Descartes suggests, their use of their rational capacities would result in an identical outcome that is truth. The universality of reason is, however, a hidden premise of the Modern philosophical project. It unfolds from a “view from nowhere”. This view of rationality is challenged as an unreflected one, and the methodological device of this book is to avoid this type of fallacies. Chapter 2 focuses on the idea of science as it comes up with the Modern philosophical project. The infinite universe is substituted for the Aristotelian closed world. Mathematics becomes the appropriate method of the scientia nova that Descartes and Galileï initiate. As Descartes’ method aims at being a mathesis universalis it is believed to include the aptitude to deal with any problem, theoretical as well as practical. The subsequent epistemologization of philosophy tacitly presupposes that mathematics belongs to the very nature of reality. From there, it follows that philosophy is thought of as a theory of reality. On an alternative view, mainly advocated by, e.g., Heidegger, it is claimed that mathematics as a method of science is a matter of choice. If the method is a matter of choice, the scientia nova can be articulated as a liberation from the shackles of ecclesiastical authority, and hence as a matter of freedom. Another consequence is that the scientia nova can articulate true propositions about reality, without having direct access to it. The distinction between a theory of reality and a theory about reality is illustrated with the help of the conflict between Galileï and the Church. Chapter 3 concentrates on the subject and rationality. Both the subject and rationality are put in context, that is, a context of participation. With this approach, I propose to challenge the self-evidentiary character of rationality as well as the idea of the isolated and ontologically anchored Cartesian subject. Relying on George Herbert Mead’s theory of the subject, I argue that the subject is first and foremost an “intersubject”. The subject, it is argued, is a social subject whose self emerges through interaction with others. The substitution of a subject of meaning for a subject of truth concretises the critique of the Cartesian subject in the first chapter. Both the subject and meaning, so it is argued, emerge from interaction in a context of participation. The subject’s self includes a social as well as an individual pole. These two poles and the interaction between them have been neglected throughout the Modern philosophical project. By articulating them, an attempt is made to take the subject qua subject seriously. A similar contextualisation is operated with rationality. Rationality, even in its rationalistic appearance, is not self-revealing. The idealisation of rationality in the Modern philosophical project, that is, its decontextualisation, obscures the fact that it is historically situated. This situatedness refers to its emergence and operation in a specific context. This recontextualisation shows it as one conception of rationality among others. The Modern philosophical project held its conception of rationality to be a reflection of reality, upon its belief in the direct access to the latter. The distinction between conceptions on the one hand and a concept on the other is the methodological device that serves to further articulate the concept of freedom. This is the theme of chapter 4. Freedom is related to the emergence of science in the 17th century. While the subject and rationality were connected to a context of participation in the foregoing chapters, attention will be drawn to the characteristics of the concept of freedom in this chapter. The basic premise of the theory of freedom proposed in this chapter comes to saying that in the absence of any external limitation, subjects are free to act as they please. If they want to act, however, freedom unlimited as it is called must be determined. This means that from the infinite range of possibilities, a choice has to be made. Without a choice, everything remains possible though no action can occur. To make a choice implies that the concept of freedom is concretised. This concretisation is called a conception. Action is possible, so it is argued further, on two types of conceptions. One is a conception of freedom, the other a conception about freedom. A conception of freedom is a conception of the subject himself; a conception about freedom on the contrary is a conception of someone else. On the basic premise of the theory of freedom advocated throughout the book, freedom is unlimited. This includes a priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom. Therefore, his acting on conceptions about freedom must be justified. This requirement of justification is connected to the idea of freedom as principium. A principium has a twofold meaning. The first is a starting point; the second is that a principle is also a leitmotiv. Freedom unlimited is the starting point of political philosophy as it is found in Hobbes and Rousseau. They will be our main discussion partners throughout the book. Their theory of the social contract as the basis of the construction of political space is premised by the idea of freedom unlimited. They do neglect though the second aspect of freedom as principium, that is, freedom as the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. This aspect is briefly elaborated in chapter 4 where Hobbes’ theory is diagnosed as a theory about freedom, while it purports to be a theory of freedom. Freedom as principium and the priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom that it involves is identified as the basic principle of legisprudence. It holds, summarizing, that law can only be legitimate if it is legitimated to operate as an alternative for failing social interaction. The idea of freedom as principium will be elaborated in chapter 8 where I proceed to the identification of the principles of legisprudence. The second part of the book is dedicated to the problem of legalism and legitimation. Chapter 5 explores the reason for the absence of a theory of legislation until now. The main reason is that law, from the very beginning of the Modern philosophical project, is unfolded as a reflection of reality. The obscuration of the embedment of law in the realm of politics is explained as a strategy of practical reason. This strategy is at the basis of what is identified as strong legalism. Strong legalism is the dominant pattern of thought in legal thinking. It holds that normativity is a matter of rule following, irrespective of where the rules come from. It easily fits the idea of the provisional morality Descartes has sketched, but that never came to a real end. The main characteristics of strong legalism are pointed from a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau. The characteristics identified are: representationalism, universality or the neglect of the time dimension, concealed instrumentalism, and etatism. These characteristics of the legalistic thought pattern are supported and corroborated by a type of legal science that finds its roots in the Modern philosophical project. Over against this form of legalism that is labelled “strong legalism” chapter 6 explores the contours of a different brand of legalism that I propose to mark as “weak legalism”. Weak legalism or “legalism with a human face” comprises a critique of strong legalism in that the latter neglects the position of the subject qua subject. As it will be discussed in the first part of the book, the Modern philosophical project makes the subject the preponderant actor in reality. He is, however, an actor in a play written in advance by others and not an auctor or an agent. To take the subject qua subject seriously, as weak legalism purports, entails placing him in a context with others. This part of chapter 6 joins the insights articulated in the first part of the book, more specifically in chapter 2. Others, and not just “otherness” as a representation of the subject, belong to the subject’s context. If it is in this context that the self and meaning emerge, this process is not necessarily conflict-free. Hobbes and Rousseau conclude from this fact that social interaction leads to war. It provides them with an argument to substitute interaction based on legal rules from social interaction based on conceptions of freedom. The former are issued by the sovereign and can be qualified as conceptions about freedom. Hobbes and Rousseau hold that this substitution is ipso facto legitimate. On the theory of freedom that was sketched out in chapter 4, this substitution however needs to be legitimated. Chapter 7 deals with the issue of legitimation. I distinguish to begin with between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories of legitimation. On the former, law is legitimated if it corresponds to at least one transcendent true norm. On the latter, no transcendent content is available. This is proper to a democratic theory of legitimation upon which the demos determines the ends of action as well as the means to realise them. Apart from this difference between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation process they embrace is the same. This dynamic refers to the direction of the legitimation chain. In jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation chain runs from a transcendent norm to a rule of the sovereign. In non-jusnaturalistic theories exemplified by Hobbes and Rousseau the dynamics of the chain runs from an initial consent to the social contract to the set of rules issued by the sovereign. The dynamic of the chain in both type of theories, so it is argued, is irreversible. The operationalisation of political space ensuing from the social contract is what legislation is about according to the Modern philosophical project. Taken as it stands, the initial consent of the subjects to the social contract or their proxy to the sovereign is an action on a conception of freedom. They do give, though, a proxy to the sovereign to issue subsequent limitations of their freedom that are yet unknown when subscribing the contract . From the “moment” of the contract, the sovereign is legitimated in substituting conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom. The initial proxy contained in the contract covers any of his limitations of freedom. As both Hobbes and Rousseau argue, the rules of the sovereign are always morally correct. As a consequence, they cannot be criticized for whatever reason. Would this be possible then the chain of legitimation initiated by the social contract would be reversed. On strong legalism, however the chain is unidirectional. The sovereign transforms any propositional content into a true norm, which allows for the qualification of sovereignty as a black box. Chapter 7 ends with the articulation of some possibilities of reversing the chain of legitimation in what is called the proxy model. On this idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain, a more general approach is initiated. This approach leads to the claim that a legislator’s limitations of freedom are to be justified. They are deemed legitimate and legitimated on a general proxy. The latter however affects he reflexive character of freedom of the subject. On the idea of a general proxy, any of his conceptions of freedom can a priori be replaced by conceptions about freedom. The general approach to the idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain comes to say that this substitution must be justified. Sovereigns, that is, should give reasons for their rules. This is basically what legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation comes to. Its more concrete articulation is the topic of the third part of the book. Chapter 8 starts with the exploration of an alternative for the proxy model of legitimation that was investigated in the previous chapters. The alternative is labelled the trade-off model. On this model, the subjects trade off conceptions of freedom for conceptions about freedom. This comes to saying that the substitution of conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom must be justified. No rule can be held legitimate if this justification or legitimation is lacking. The trade off model is based on freedom as principium in its twofold meaning. Freedom unlimited as was argued in chapter 4 is both the starting point and the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. It follows from there that subjects are primarily to act on conceptions of freedom. A substitution of a conception about freedom for conceptions of freedom can only be legitimate if it is legitimated or justified as an alternative for failing social interaction. This is the first principle of legisprudence that is called the “principle of alternativity”. The second principle is the principle of necessity of the normative density. Rules should not automatically contain sanctions. If sanctions are included, this requires a specific justification. Rules with a sanction embrace a double reduction of freedom. First, the pattern of behaviour is imposed and second its realisation is enforced. Before realising a rule with the help of force alternative means of achievement of its goals are to be outweighed. The third principle of legisprudence is the principle of temporality. The limitation of freedom on a conception about freedom must be justified as “on time”. Any justification is embedded in a context. This means that if it is successful it will only be temporarily so. The principle of temporality then requires a justification over time, and not only on the moment that a rule is issued. The principle of coherence is the fourth principle of legisprudence. It requires that rules, both judicial and legislative make sense as a whole. The principle of coherence thus identified is elaborated in a theory that I propose to call the “level theory of coherence”, and that makes part of legisprudence. At the end of the chapter, the principles of legisprudence are focused on from the position of the legislator before they are further explored in chapter 9. This chapter concretises the operationalisation of the principles of legisprudence. The principles of legisprudence, so it is argued, are to be read within the context of one another. Upon weighing and balancing their relative weight in the process of legislation, the ruling of the sovereign can be said to be legisprudentially optimal. Legisprudential optimality on its turn is further concretised in chapter 10. The sovereign has to discharge of his duties throughout the legislative process while taking the circumstances of legislation into account. These circumstances are the fact that subjects interact with each other on the basis of conceptions of freedom. These circumstances result from the theory of freedom that was set out in chapter 4 and further elaborated in the subsequent chapters. The duties of the sovereign throughout the process of legislation amount to a duty of fact finding, problem formulation, weighing and balancing of alternatives, prognosis, retrospection, taking future circumstances into account and finally a duty to correction. Finally, a brief sketch is offered of the concept of validity according to legisprudence. Apart from the necessity of formal validity, both efficacy and axiological validity are briefly commented upon. From the diagnosis of some theories of validity that mainly focus on only one of the aspects of validity, the concept of validity according to legisprudence is called “network validity”. Projects like this book would never begin, let alone come to an end, without the help of a large number of people. I will not enter into a detailed description of their contribution. Suffice to mention their names with the hope that they will recognize some of their thoughts, reflections, critiques and encouragements somewhere in the book. The persons that come to my mind are Aulis Aarnio, Maurice Adams, Manuel Atienza, John Bell, Samantha Besson, Guido Calabresi, Tom Campbell, Carine Caunes, Emilios Christodoulidis, Wochiech and Aga Cyrul, Martine de Clerq, Pieter Dehon, Erwin Depue, Johan Desmet, David Dhooge, Guillaume Drago, Hugues Dumont, Philip Eijlander, Michiel Elst, René Foqué, Benoit Frydman, Tito Gallas, Philippe Gérard, René Gonzalez, Guy Haarscher, Mark Hunyadi, Sheldon Leader, , Maria-Isabelle Köpke-Tinturé, Neil MacCormick, Francesco Laporte, Luzius Mader, Frank Michelman, Charles-Albert Morand, Dwight Newman, François Ost, Juliane Ottmann, Richard Parker, Trinie Parker, Aleksander Peczenik, Chaïm Perelman, Vlad Perju, Kauko Pietillä, Juha Pöhöynen, Daniel Priel, Pekka Riekinen, Thomas Roberts, Eric Rossiaux, Geoffrey Samuel, Jerzy Stelmach, Andreas Takis, Benoît Timmermans, Philippe Thion, Hannu Tolonen, Michel Troper, François Tulkens, Stamatios Tzitzis, François Vallançon, Koen Van Aeken, Wibren Van der Burg, Mark Van Hoecke, Michiel Vandekerckhove, Frederik Vandendriesche, Rob van Gestel, Scott Veatch, Roger Vergauwen, Amaryllis Verhoeven, Michel Villey, Jeremy Waldron, Kenneth Winston, Willem Witteveen, Wochiech Zadurski and Marek Zyrk-Zadurski. Thomas Roberts helped me with the linguistic corrections of the text. I have a special debt to Mark Van Bellingen and Lilly De Vooght for their views on the context of participation, the idea of a hermeneutical point of view and their critique on the “view from nowhere”. 1 Table of Contents 2 3 General Introduction – v 4 5 Table of Contents - xv 6 PART I THE MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECT AND ITS CRITIQUES Chapter 1 The Modern Philosophical Project I. Introduction - 5 1. Doubts and Certainty - 5 2. Questions, Open and Closed - 8 II. Three Basic Tenets of the Modern Philosophical Project: Rationality, Individualism, and Freedom - 10 1. The Rationality of Rationality - 11 2. Individualism or the Subject as an Individual - 16 a. Realism and Nominalism - 17 b. The Subject as an Individual - 21 3. Freedom - 27 a. Freedom and the Ontology of Separation - 28 b. Freedom in the Modern Philosophical Project - 32 III. Methodology : Avoiding the Scholastic Fallacy - 40 7 Chapter 2 Science as Freedom I. Introduction - 45 II. The Mechanism and Worldview - 45 III. From Thinking to Knowing - 53 IV. Addendum : Faith and Science - 59 8 V. Philosophy as Epistemology ? – 63 Chapter 3 The Self and Rationality I. Introduction - 71 II. Subjectivity as Intersubjectivity: A Critique of the Cogito - 76 III. The Elusive Subject - 81 IV. Rationality in Context: Reasonableness – 85 V. Conclusion - 100 Chapter 4 Freedom I. Introduction - 103 II. The Perspective of Freedom - 105 III. Methodological Preliminary: Concepts and Conceptions - 109 IV. Freedom : Concept and Conceptions - 114 V. The Politics of Freedom : Thomas Hobbes - 119 VI. Freedom as Principium and the First Principle of Legisprudence - 128 VII. Short Plan of the Exposé of Part II - 139 PART II LEGALISM AND LEGITIMATION Chapter 5 Strong Legalism or the Absent Theory of Legislation I. Introduction - 145 9 1. An Initial Exploration: Legalism as a Strategy - 147 2. The Main Characteristic of Strong Legalism: the Separation of Law and Politics - 150 II. Strong Legalism as a Thought Pattern - 156 10 1. Representation: the Path to Strong Legalism - 156 a. Representation-Reproduction and Representation-Construction - 156 b. Representation in the Napoleonic Codification : the Naturalisation of Law - 160 2. No Time for Time: Timelessness and the Validity of Law – 166 a. Time and Social Contract – 168 b. Time and Legislation – 175 3. Concealed Instrumentalism – 178 4. Etatism and Sovereignty - 187 5. Strong Legalism and the Contribution of Legal Science - 198 a. The Semantics of Strong Legalism: the Plain Meaning Doctrine – 199 b. Rationality of the Legislator – 201 III. Strong Legalism’s Ideology - 203 IV. Summary : a General View of Strong Legalism - 207 11 Chapter 6 Towards Weak Legalism or Legalism with a Human Face I. Introduction - 211 12 II. Law v. Politics - 213 13 III. Representation and Instrumentalism - 215 1. Is There Some Place Left for the Subject ? – 215 2. From Representation to Symbolisation - 225 3. Self and “Otherness” v. Self and Others - 232 4. Meaning, Interaction, and Legal Rules - 236 5. Interaction and Conflict - 243 6. Interaction as Conflict : Law’s Alternative - 249 Chapter 7 Legitimation and Democracy I. Introduction – 261 II. Justnaturalistic and Non-Jusnaturalistic Models of Legitimation – 263 III. The Construction of Political Space: the Proxy Model of Legitimation – 269 IV. The Operationalisation of Political Space: Legislation – 276 V. The Concept of Freedom and the Epistemologization of Philosophy – 280 VI. Rights – 286 VII. Sovereignty or the Black Box in the Legitimation Chain – 292 VIII. Reversals in the Legitimation Chain - 298 IX. Strong Legalism and Legisprudence: Two Ways of Reading a Constitution - 302 PART III LEGISPRUDENCE 14 Chapter 8 From Proxy to Trading Off: the Principles of Legisprudence I. Terminological Clarification - 309 II. Introduction - 312 III. The Trade-off Model - 313 IV. The Principle of Alternativity (PA) as the First Principle of Legisprudence – 325 1. The PA and Freedom as Principium – 326 2. The Ethical Bearing of the PA - 332 V. The Principle of Necessity of the Normative Density (PN) as the Second Principle of Legisprudence - 338 VI. The Principle of Temporality (PT) as the Third Principle of Legisprudence - 348 VII. The Principle of Coherence (PC) as the Fourth Principle of Legisprudence - 353 1. Introduction - 353 2. The PC and the Level Theory of Coherence - 359 a. Coherence0 as Coherence Unaffected by Time - 360 b.The First Level of Coherence: Coherence1 as Coherence as Affected by Time – 364 i. Coherence1 Arguments and the Judge - 364 ii. Coherence1 Arguments and the Legislator - 369 c. The Second Level of Coherence : Coherence2 as Systematicity in Decision Making - 374 i. Coherence2 Arguments and the Jud

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The federal administrative structure has undergone many changes as a result of governmental reorganizations. In analyzing one of these various reorganizations, the author was convinced that though there were many reasons for change, the plans were based on some set ideas, congenial to the efficient working of governmental machinery. This study will demonstrate how the principles of public administration are employed and emphasized in the reorganization plans.

This thesis explored the impact of the teacher incentive policies which were designed and implemented in Rwanda between 2008 and 2013, with the aim to understand their impact on teacher motivation. Research evidence shows that, competence and commitment of teachers are among the main determinants of student learning outcomes (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). As such, governments have the responsibility to ensure that teachers are appropriately trained and motivated to teach. Yet, motivational and incentives issues among teachers have been inadequately researched in the African context to understand how teacher motivational issues might be addressed by governments and international donors to improve educational quality. Rather, as reported by the Voluntary Services Oversees (VSO) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), educational policies have focused much more on teacher supply and demand issues in response to increased access to education (VSO, 2002; UNESCO, 2005). In countries where teacher motivation issues have been on the education agenda, these have been piecemeal interventions lacking long-term sustainability. As such, UNESCO's 2013/14 Education For All-Global Monitoring Report (EFA-GMR) recommends the need for policy-makers to identify ways how teachers' motivation can be improved so as to enable teachers to work in the service of improving learning for all (UNESCO, 2014). This study employed a mixed methods sequential explanatory research design, where quantitative data (from 276 teachers from 46 schools located in 10 districts) was collected first, followed by qualitative data (obtained from interviews with eighteen participants, selected from institutions involved in teacher incentives' policy making, implementation, facilitation and the beneficiary level). This data was then integrated at the intermediate and final stages of the study and presented concurrently in this thesis. The study was framed around the content (or basic needs) theory of motivation (see Chapter 3). Findings indicate that, individual teacher characteristics are key in understanding how the incentives impact on teachers' levels of motivation. As such, the Government of Rwanda (GoR), should take into consideration these characteristics, when designing the teacher incentive policies for the teaching profession. The study confirms earlier findings that, teachers' pay is very low, both in absolute terms and in comparison to other professions, which is a major motivational challenge. The study further shows that, while most teacher incentives may achieve the purpose for which they are meant, others are likely to result into unintended implications, which should be factored and monitored while designing and implementing the teacher incentives (see Chapter 6, section 6.2.2). Furthermore, the study shows the “8-step monthly protocol on processing the teachers' salaries”, as an example of incentives that are cost-effective and are likely to create an immediate positive motivation impact, and which can be ideal for resource-constrained contexts, such as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, including Rwanda. The study notes the key potential role of parental contributions to teachers' pay (top-up), and that governments need to harmonise and regulate it, so as to eliminate the imbalance it causes, between primary and secondary teachers; and rural and urban schools. Most teachers responded that teacher training and professional development was the main intrinsic motivational factor. The study noted that, while the teacher's union was viewed as potentially key in enhancing teachers' status, solidarity and power, the teachers' union was very weak and influenced by government, which is characteristic of most unions in the SSA. This is coupled with limited teachers' participation in decision-making on issues that concern them (see DeJaeghere et al, 2006), which is likely to lead to their de-motivation. This study, therefore, has attempted to make a contribution to the development of the theoretical and substantive knowledge in terms of policy changes designed to improve teacher motivation in Rwanda (and possibly in the SSA region). It also contributes to a clarification of the methodology, which can be employed for future research on teacher motivation.

Sustainability has become a goal for many recreational tourism businesses. For ski resorts, the goal of sustainability has been driven by a growing understanding of the impacts ski resorts have on the biophysical environment and the host communities in which they reside. In addition, ski resort owners and operators have an inherent self-interest and ethical responsibility as corporate citizens to pursue sustainability. Has a sustainable ski resort, however, been adequately defined at a conceptual level? The current understanding of sustainable ski resorts is limiting because it encourages ski resort owners and operators to address sustainability challenges in a compartmentalized fashion and in isolation of one another. This thesis examines how ski resorts would benefit from taking an integrated systems approach to sustainability—an approach that when applied, can be used to assess the state of sustainability at an organization and can broaden the scope of decision-making at an organization. This approach is missing in an industry where sustainability has historically meant focusing on achieving outcomes in efficiency thus failing to acknowledge the broader socio-ecological footprint of a ski resort. Gibson et al. (2005) argue the journey toward sustainability ought to be guided by a set of requirements based on principles of sustainability. Such principles operate on an integrated systems approach. This thesis uses the Gibson principles as the criteria by which to assess literature that discusses desirable characteristics of businesses and recreation/tourism destinations in sustainability terms. The intention here is to incorporate context specific insights into the Gibson principles such that the Gibson principles are adapted for ski resorts. The sustainable ski resort principles emerge out of this adaptation process and are applied using an exploratory case study. Specifically, the principles are compared against the current conditions of sustainability at Blue Mountain Resort (BMR), located in the Town of Blue Mountains (Ontario), with the goal of assessing the state of sustainability at BMR. The analysis resulted in the identification of five areas where the sustainable ski resort principles advanced the understanding of what constitutes a sustainable ski resort. First, the sustainable ski resort principles clearly require that there be limits on quantitative growth and, as such, ski resorts must strive towards decoupling improvements in quality and service from further growth and consumption. Second, a sustainable ski resort contributes to narrowing the socio-economic gaps within the workplace and the host community while operating within a multigenerational timescale to ensure future generations are fairly represented. Third, a sustainable ski resort reduces its net consumption of materials and resources and invests these savings in areas that are deficient in natural and social capital. Fourth, the sustainable ski resort principles require decision making power to be shared amongst internal and external stakeholders. Fifth, stakeholders must pursue opportunities to arrive at decisions that strengthen the well-being of both human and ecological systems through the integrated application of the sustainable ski resort principles. The analysis of the case study findings reveals that five of the eight sustainable ski resort principles are partially realized as represented by BMR’s demonstrated leadership amongst ski resorts in Ontario in the areas of solid waste reduction, energy efficiency and staff/public education. As evidenced in the case study, the ski resort industry’s responses to its sustainability challenges have largely been handled in isolation using conventional approaches to decision-making that tend to address sustainability challenges as separate entities. This perpetuates the notion that sustainability challenges are detached and therefore detached solutions are proposed or pursued. These approaches fail to recognize the linkages and interdependencies between entities thereby failing to pursue integration—the essence of sustainability as articulated by the sustainable ski resort principles.