This research examines the role of Private Capital Flows (PCF) and Financial Deepening in the economic growth of South Africa. Using secondary data obtained from the South African Reserve Bank and the World Bank online databases for the period 1990 to 2015, we examine the relationship between these three variables using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure. The causal relationship between the variables is further investigated using the Granger Causality test. Where previous studies mainly focus on investigating the relationship between capital flows and economic growth; and that of financial deepening and economic growth in South Africa independently; this study looks at the interrelationship between these three variables. Contrary to our expectations, the findings from the research suggest that there is no significant long run relationship between these variables in South Africa; however we found significant unidirectional short run causal relationships between the variables. The study established that in the short run, economic growth granger causes private capital flows; financial deepening granger causes private capital flows and that economic growth granger causes financial deepening. These findings imply that putting in place policies that encourage economic growth will lead to improvements in both PCF and financial deepening in the short run. In turn, improvements in financial deepening will also foster improvements in PCF in the short run. The results, policy implications, and future research are discussed.

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Em março de 2004, o governo brasileiro aprovou as leis 10.847 e 10.848, que alteram as bases da regulação do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro. As leis instituíram novas regras para a outorga de concessões para aproveitamentos hidrelétricos e para comercialização de energia entre agentes de geração, distribuidores e comercializadores de energia elétrica. Diante da contínua demanda por investimentos na expansão da capacidade de geração, este trabalho foi desenvolvido com o objetivo de inferir sobre a capacidade do modelo institucional vigente de atrair capital privado para investimentos em geração de energia hidrelétrica. A inferência é realizada a partir da análise dos resultados dos leilões de energia nova realizados em 2005 e 2006 e da simulação do investimento em um protótipo de empreendimento de geração de energia hidrelétrica. De forma geral, as mudanças regulatórias favorecem o fluxo de investimentos para empreendimentos de geração hidrelétrica. Contudo, mais do que a um modelo institucional sólido, a derivação de investimentos para este segmento estará condicionada à ação do Estado sobre o equilíbrio entre consumo, oferta e preços de energia, enquanto principal artífice da política energética nacional. / In March 2004, the Brazilian Government passed the laws 10.847 and 10.848, which changed the regulatory guidelines of electric market. The laws established new rules for granting hydroelectric exploitation rights and for energy purchasing, among distributors, new generators and free consumers. In front of the new regulatory basis and the Brazilian demand for installed capacity increase, this research aims to infer the capacity of regulatory basis to attract private recourses for investments on hydroelectric power projects. The inference will be developed based on the results of auctions of electricity from new power plants, occurred in 2005 and 2006, and on the simulation of the investment on a prototype of a hydroelectric project in Brazil. The final remarks show that the new electric model favor the investment flow to hydroelectric power plants. However, more than to a solid institutional model, the investments on this segment will be conditioned to the Government action on the equilibrium between energy consuming, offering and prices, as the main agent of the national energy politics.

Em março de 2004, o governo brasileiro aprovou as leis 10.847 e 10.848, que alteram as bases da regulação do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro. As leis instituíram novas regras para a outorga de concessões para aproveitamentos hidrelétricos e para comercialização de energia entre agentes de geração, distribuidores e comercializadores de energia elétrica. Diante da contínua demanda por investimentos na expansão da capacidade de geração, este trabalho foi desenvolvido com o objetivo de inferir sobre a capacidade do modelo institucional vigente de atrair capital privado para investimentos em geração de energia hidrelétrica. A inferência é realizada a partir da análise dos resultados dos leilões de energia nova realizados em 2005 e 2006 e da simulação do investimento em um protótipo de empreendimento de geração de energia hidrelétrica. De forma geral, as mudanças regulatórias favorecem o fluxo de investimentos para empreendimentos de geração hidrelétrica. Contudo, mais do que a um modelo institucional sólido, a derivação de investimentos para este segmento estará condicionada à ação do Estado sobre o equilíbrio entre consumo, oferta e preços de energia, enquanto principal artífice da política energética nacional. / In March 2004, the Brazilian Government passed the laws 10.847 and 10.848, which changed the regulatory guidelines of electric market. The laws established new rules for granting hydroelectric exploitation rights and for energy purchasing, among distributors, new generators and free consumers. In front of the new regulatory basis and the Brazilian demand for installed capacity increase, this research aims to infer the capacity of regulatory basis to attract private recourses for investments on hydroelectric power projects. The inference will be developed based on the results of auctions of electricity from new power plants, occurred in 2005 and 2006, and on the simulation of the investment on a prototype of a hydroelectric project in Brazil. The final remarks show that the new electric model favor the investment flow to hydroelectric power plants. However, more than to a solid institutional model, the investments on this segment will be conditioned to the Government action on the equilibrium between energy consuming, offering and prices, as the main agent of the national energy politics.

L’indivision prend fin par le partage. Le partage substitue des droits privatifs à une propriétécollective sur un bien ou une masse de biens qui est fractionnée.L’indivision est présentée traditionnellement comme un état éphémère, mauvais, auquel il fautmettre fin. Des règles juridiques spécifiques au partage ont alors été mises en place ; lafiscalité de l’enregistrement a assuré l’accompagnement de ces règles.Aujourd’hui le partage se conçoit en valeur. Les règles du partage ont donc évolué.Cette évolution n’est pas appréhendée par le droit fiscal. Le traitement des soultes, desindemnités de réduction ou de rapport est parfois contestable.En outre, l’administration fiscale maintient encore la distinction entre partage pur et simple etavec soulte, distinction qui n’emporte aucune conséquence en droit civil et qui ne se justifieplus aujourd’hui.Le partage a un effet déclaratif et rétroactif. Chacun des attributaires est réputé avoir été seulpropriétaire du bien mis dans son lot.Le régime des plus-values des particuliers s’est calqué sur cette analyse qui par voie deconséquences, fait fi du partage et des soultes ou indemnités qui sont versées par l’attributairedu bien. L’analyse juridique du partage ignore l’aspect économique du partage.Quant à la fiscalité professionnelle, les règles sont complexes et disparates, pasnécessairement fondées sur l’analyse juridique ; le traitement fiscal du partage est alorsd’autant plus compliqué. / Joint possession ends through sharing. Sharing substitutes private rights to a collectiveownership over an asset or set of assets which is split.Joint possession is shown traditionally as a transient state, a bad state which must be ended.Legal regulations specific to sharing have subsequently been implemented; recorded taxationhas ensured that these regulations are supported.Today, sharing is conceivable as a value. Sharing regulations have therefore developed.This development is not apprehended by tax legislation. The processing of balances, reducedcompensation or reported compensation is sometimes disputable.In addition, the tax office still maintains the distinction between pure and simple sharing andsharing with a balance, a distinction which bears no consequence in civil law, and which is nolonger justified today.Sharing has a declarative and retroactive effect. Each one of the allottees is considered to havebeen the sole owner of the asset put into their lot.The individuals’ capital gains system is modelled on this analysis, which consequently,throws caution to the wind, and balances or compensation which are paid by the allottee of theasset. The legal analysis of the sharing ignores the economic aspect of the sharing.As regards taxation on work, the regulations are complex and disparate, not necessarily basedon the legal analysis; the tax processing of the sharing is then all the more complicated.