The Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP) and Verbal Report Framework (VRF) have demonstrated that both explicit (Explicit Adaptation, EA) and implicit processes (Implicit Adaptation, IA) contribute to visuomotor adaptation. However, the definition of EA is inconsistent across the two paradigms, such that the PDP refers to EA as reflecting one’s knowledge regarding how they have to reach in the novel visuomotor environment, while the VRF refers to EA as reflecting pre-planned aiming strategies. The objective of the current experiment was to compare EA as assessed via the PDP and VRF and hence provide insight into if they are assessing similar explicit processes. Sixty-one participants were evenly divided into three groups (PDP, VRF and VRF-No Cursor) and trained to reach in a virtual environment with an aligned cursor (1 block of 45 trials) and then a cursor rotated 40° clockwise (CW) relative to hand motion (3 blocks of 45 trials). EA and IA were assessed immediately following each block of rotated reach training trials, and again 5-minutes later. In the assessment trials, the PDP group reached while using any learned strategy (EA+IA), or while not engaging in a strategy (IA) and the VRF group reported their planned aiming direction by picking a number from an array of numbers surrounding the target (EA), before reaching to the target (EA+IA) with visual feedback. The VRF-No Cursor group completed the same assessment trials as the VRF group, but no visual feedback was presented during assessment of EA and IA. Following this, participants completed a post-experiment questionnaire and a drawing task to assess their awareness of the visuomotor rotation and changes in their reaches respectively. We found that all groups adapted their reaches to the 40° CW cursor rotation. As well, averaged across participants, the magnitude and retention of EA and IA were similar between the PDP and VRF groups. However, the magnitude of EA established via the VRF was not related to participants’ post-experiment awareness of the visuomotor distortion and how they had changed their reaches, as observed in the PDP and VRF No-Cursor groups. Together, these results indicate that, while the PDP and VRF suggest similar contributions of EA and IA to visuomotor adaptation, the methods of assessment engage different explicit processes. EA assessed within the VRF does not reflect one’s awareness of the visuomotor distortion at the end of the experiment or how they changed their reaches.

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The chief aim of this dissertation was to establish the respective contributions of automatic and intentional memory processes to misinformation effects in 5-, 8-, and 9-year-old children. In the first two experiments children were presented with a picture story followed by misleading post-event details that were either read to participants, or were self-generated in response to semantic and perceptual hints. Children were then presented with original and suggested items and given a yes / no recognition test under inclusion or exclusion instructions. The application of Jacoby’s (1991) process dissociation procedure to children’s recognition performance revealed that the contribution of intentional processing to misinformation acceptance increased following the self-generation of suggestions. Automatic processing made a strong contribution to misinformation effects regardless of the way that misinformation was encoded. Experiment 3 extended this general pattern of results to a forced choice recognition paradigm. Experiment 4 examined the role of social demand factors in children’s suggestibility using Belli’s (1989) yes / no retrieval paradigm. Little evidence of an influence of social demand on children’s suggestible responses was found with automatic processes again the predominant factor determining suggestibility. In the final experiment, the temporal order of the original and post-event phases was reversed such that 5-year-olds were initially presented with a post-event summary containing misinformation, followed by a witnessed event. The results of this study confirmed that children’s suggestions were unlikely to be the result of trace alteration or social demand. The implications of the findings for theoretical accounts of the misinformation effect in children’s recognition and for children’s eyewitness testimony are discussed. / PhD Doctorate

There is an extensive debate in the adult literature on whether recognition memory can better be explained by a single- or a dual-process account. Single-process accounts assume that a single memory strength signal underlies recognition. Dual-process accounts propose two independent processes, namely recollection (slow and associated with contextual details) and familiarity (fast and automatic). The aim of this dissertation was to advance this debate using a cognitive developmental approach. By investigating age-related changes of recognition memory across childhood as a function of theoretically motivated experimental manipulations, predictions drawn from single- and dual-process models of recognition memory were tested. We adapted the Process Dissociation Paradigm (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) to disentangle processes underlying recognition memory in 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds and adults using a Dual-Process Signal Detection cognitive modelling approach (DPSD; Yonelinas, 1996). Experiments 1 – 6 demonstrated that 5-year-olds are able to recollect items based on perceptual details. Consistent with dual-process theory, across all age groups a response time limit decreased recollection while leaving familiarity unaffected (Chapter 2). Converging evidence consistent with dissociations during childhood was found after repeated item presentation (Chapter 3). Finally, after a thorough empirical validation of our approach, the new paradigm was used to investigate the developmental perceptual to semantic shift (Chapter 4). These findings, using a double dissociation logic, have advanced the theoretical debate on the nature of recognition memory by showing that one process is insufficient to account for the developmental and experimental findings reported here. Recollection and familiarity follow different developmental trajectories and are affected by encoding and retrieval manipulations (i.e., repetition and time limits). This provides a challenge for existing theories of recognition memory.

Pourquoi agissons-nous dans certaines circonstances de manière irrépressible ? Nos actes doivent-ils pour autant être considérés comme inconscients ? Peut-on apprendre inconsciemment ? La conscience et le contrôle peuvent-ils être dissociés? Ces questions ont été abordées dans le cadre de ma thèse de doctorat.

This study applied the Process Dissociation Procedure (Bornstein, 2002) to test independence between personality processes represented by different implicit measurement techniques. In contrast to the commonly adopted literal view of dual processes in personality theory, the study predicted that two implicit measures (CRT-A and IAT-A) and one explicit measure (NEO-AH) of aggressive disposition would dissociate with each other in their 1) intercorrelations, 2) predictions of behavioral criteria of aggressiveness, and 3) potential moderation by situational cues. These hypotheses were generally, though not completely, supported. Most importantly, the two implicit measures dissociated in their lack of correlation and differential prediction of behavioral criteria, unaffected by changes in situational cues. As predicted, the CRT-A and the NEO-AH dissociated in their intercorrelations, predictions, and moderation by incentives. The IAT-A and the NEO-AH dissociated in their lack of intercorrelation and their differential moderation by changes in incentive conditions. As predicted, only the explicit measure was moderated by changes in incentive conditions. Unexpectedly, IAT-A and the NEO-AH were statistically indistinguishable in their prediction of behavioral criteria of aggression. The findings provided strong support for the hypotheses predicting multiple independent implicit personality processes.

Pourquoi agissons-nous dans certaines circonstances de manière irrépressible ?Nos actes doivent-ils pour autant être considérés comme inconscients ?Peut-on apprendre inconsciemment ?La conscience et le contrôle peuvent-ils être dissociés? Ces questions ont été abordées dans le cadre de ma thèse de doctorat. / Doctorat en Sciences Psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished