The tradition of semantic externalism that follows Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) is built on the assumption that the folk have essentialist commitments about natural kinds. Externalists commonly take the body of empirical data concerning psychological essentialism as support for this claim. However, recent empirical findings (Malt, 1994; Kalish, 2002) call the psychological theory of essentialism into question. This thesis examines the relevance of these findings to both essentialism and semantic externalism. I argue that these findings suggest that these theories fail to reflect folk beliefs about natural kinds and folk natural kind term usage. This leads me to propose an alternative thesis-- the Ambiguity Thesis-- that is better able to accommodate the existing body of empirical data.

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Children’s understanding of race constancy and their subsequent use of race as a means of drawing inductive inferences were investigated. Race constancy was determined by children’s tendency to say that people could change category membership by changing their outside appearance. A second phase of the study measured how many race-based inferences children made relative to other social categories such as age or sex. The results indicated that children who had a better understanding of race constancy were also more likely to use race as a means of drawing inductive inferences. These findings support a developmental progression of race constancy and give insight to the development of potential bias and stereotypes.

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