Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich 9, Klassische Philologie und Kulturwissenschaften--Frankfurt am Main--Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, 1995. / Notes bibliogr.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Heidelberg, 1999. / Bibliogr. p. 323-328.

Th. doct.--Droit--Fribourg, 1997. / Bibliogr. p. XXIII-LIII. Index.

Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Droit--Genève, 2007. / Bibliogr. p. 393-424.

Reproduction de : Thèse doctorat : Droit. Droit public : Lyon 2 : 2007. / Titre provenant de l'écran-titre. Bibliogr.

Texte remanié de: Th. Univ.--Droit--Paris. / Bibliogr. p. 199-206. Notes bibliogr.

Le résumé en français n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur. / Le résumé en anglais n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur.

Le domaine public est une notion centrale en droit des biens publics. Par sa fonction de protection qui découle de son régime, elle focalise l’attention de la doctrine et du législateur depuis son émergence. Au côté du domaine privé, le domaine public constitue l’un des deux sous-ensembles du patrimoine des personnes publiques. Cette dualité domaniale est confirmée en 2006 par le code général de la propriété des personnes publiques. Loin de mettre fin aux débats, l’entrée en vigueur du code met en lumière la fragilité des critères d’identification du domaine public. La confrontation des normes qui lui sont applicables avec l’état de la doctrine démontre que la mise en œuvre des critères d’identification de la propriété et de l’affectation est mal aisée. Ces difficultés sont consubstantielles à la notion. Néanmoins, l’impératif de valorisation économique qui transcende l’ensemble de la matière accentue encore un peu plus leur dénaturation. Loin d’imposer une remise en cause des critères et des catégories qui en découlent, l’étude conduit à renouveler la lecture des rapports de propriété qui s’exercent sur ce domaine. Envisagé sous l’angle de la valeur, le domaine public doit être envisagé comme une somme d’utilités. L’abandon d’une conception exclusive du droit de propriété permet ainsi de redonner de la cohérence à l’identification de la notion. / Public domain is a central notion of public ownership. Because of the protective function that stems from its system, it has always focused the attention of both doctrine and the legislator. Along with “private domain”, public domain is one of the two subsets of state property. This duality was confirmed in 2006 by the general code on public property. Far from ending the debate, the coming into effect of the code highlights the fragility of the criteria identifying the public domain. Comparing applicable norms to the state of doctrine shows that implementing the criteria of identification of property and commissioning is not easy. These difficulties are consubstantial to the notion. Nevertheless, the necessity of creating economic value that transcends the whole matter, further accentuates their denaturation. Far from challenging the criteria and categories that result from it, the study leads to a renewed reading of the property relations exerted over this domain. Seen from a value perspective, the public domain should be viewed as a sum of utilities. Abandoning an exclusive conception of property law thus makes it possible to restore coherence to identifying the notion.

Le résumé en français n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur. / This thesis is composed by three chapters, each one addressing a policy question originated in the complex nature of public sector's objective function. In the first chapter, a policymaker intends to auction divisible goods among large and small bidders. On top of being concerned about maximizing surplus of auction participants, he also wants to avoid concentrated allocations. Motivated by actual practices on the field of spectrum auctions, this chapter examines standard auctioning policies, composed by auction formats (uniform price or Vickrey) and devices to favour groups of bidders (price discounts or quantity restrictions). The chapter relates the choice of the auction format and the favoring devices with the relative weight that the policymaker assigns to surplus maximization and outcome concentration. More generally, this work highlights the role of bidders’ market power in smoothing the effect of asymmetries. The second chapter compares the adoption of labor incentive policies in the public and the private sector. I build a general equilibrium model in which the private and the public sector need to attract workers to produce private and public goods respectively. In a moral hazard framework, standard profit maximizing leads firms to provide incentives to workers whose expected production is above a threshold. Even though information rents are not per-se costly for a welfare maximizing Government, providing incentives may attract too many workers to the public sector, creating a problem of talents allocation. This tradeoff justifies the choice of an output threshold different than the one in the private sector for giving incentives to workers. Finally, in the third chapter, a Government privately informed about its level of commitment intends to attract a foreign investor to undertake a costly oil project with price-driven risk. I show that a Government with high level of commitment does not have enough contracting elements to separate from a less committed type that is not credible enough to allow the investor recover his sunk cost. Still, a project can be feasible when Government types pool their offers at the cost of compensating the investor with an expropriation premium. I find that contingent taxation can be used to minimize the exposure to such cost. An optimal contract keeps investor's profits constant at the highest level that can be credibly sustained by a low commitment Government in most states of nature, and compensates the investor with higher profits when prices are high enough.

Thèse de doctorat--Droit--Université de Liège, 2006. / Bibliogr. p.571-586. Diffusé en France.