本論文對當代美國的法律解釋發展做初步的探討。美國聯邦最高法院近30年來有意識地使用二種法律解釋方法來確認具歧義的法律條文的文義。第一種方法是立法目的主義，它主張法院可以使用各種立法史資料來探究立法者的原意與立法目的，以確認法律的本義。第二種方法是強硬文本主義，它主張法院只能通過法律制定當時的公民對法律的通常理解來發現法律的一般與客觀意義。在過去三十年，當處理不明確法律意義的問題時，這二種方法支配了美國聯邦最高法院的法律解釋論證。 由這二種方法所引發的論爭不僅涉及法律解釋，還涉及立法學與權力分立，這是為什麼它們會成為過去30年間美國法學者間持續爭論不休的議題的原因。我在這篇論文將展示這段論爭，也就是關於聯邦最高法院的判決發展史中的法律解釋的種種爭論，以及它們與立法學和權力分立問題的關聯。本論文使用二種分析方法來釐清以上立法目的主義與文本主義的論爭，它們是聯邦最高法院的判決發展史分析以及法律解釋概念發展史分析。此外我在分析過程中還加入了當代最具爭議的Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC案，使我的論證能夠將立法目的主義與文本主義的不同特性放大，並因而能清楚揭示它們之間的關聯。 在本論文第一章，我將提出二個案例，以說明立法目的主義與文本主義對於法律解釋如此重要的理由。在第二章，我介紹1980年代的制定法解釋發展史。我在第三章說明Chevron案，以及圍繞著Chevron案進行的法律解釋論爭。在第四章，我根據先前的分析成果對法律當代法律解釋論爭提出批判。而在作為結論的第五章，我指出強硬文本主義和強硬立法目的主義無法自足地解釋不明確法律，而對於這二個基礎主義法學，我們都應該謹慎看待，不要懷著不切實際的信心。 / The thesis provides a preliminary inquiry for statutory interpretation in modern America. In recent decades in America, Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) intentionally used two types of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the ambiguous text of a law. The first is moderate purposivism, which contends that the court could use several materials of legislative history to confine the intent or purpose of the legislature so as to ascertain the appropriate meaning of a law. The second is textualism, which argues that the court could only find the ordinary and legitimate meaning of law from the perspectives of citizens when the law enacted. These two approaches have dominated the arguments of statutory interpretation at SCOTUS when she dealt with the cases which involved law with ambiguous text for more than thirty years. The debates caused by these two approaches are not only on statutory interpretation but also legislation and separation of powers. This is the reason why they became the most controversial issues among the legal scholars of American for recently 30 years. In this thesis, I will present the debates of statutory interpretation at SCOTUS, and their connections with problems of legislation and separation of powers. The thesis uses two analytic approaches to clarify the debates of purposivism and textualism. These two approaches are the history of related decisions at SCOTUS and history of concepts of statutory interpretation. In addition, I add the most controversial case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC around the 1990s into the last analysis. Through Chevron, the thesis could amplify the different characters of purposivism and textualism, and hence to disclosure the correlations among them. Chapter I proposes two examples in Taiwan to explain why purposivism and textualism are so important to statutory interpretation. Chapter II mentions the history of statutory interpretation at the 1980s. Chapter III resorts to Chevron and the debates about statutory interpretation encompass Chevron. Chapter IV offers some critical comments on above achievements of analysis. In the conclusion, I argue the hard textualism and purposivism are not self-sufficient to interpret the ambiguous text of a law, and we must carefully consider any version of foundationalism and its impacts.