Abstrakt:Barnkonventionen var länge den enda av FN:s kärnkonventioner som inte hade någon klagomålsmekanism, men år 2014 trädde en sådan mekanism i kraft. Denna C-uppsats ämnar belysa diskursen kring barnkonventionens tredje tilläggsprotokoll, om en individuell klagorätt för barn. Detta görs med hjälp av metoden argumentationsanalys, genom fallet Sverige. I uppsat¬sen analyseras pro-argumenten i diskursen, om huruvida barn har rätt till en klagomålmekanism. Då bedöms även dessa pro-arguments rimlighet och hållbarhet. Teorierna som kopplas till metoden är: viljeteorin, intresseteorin, maktteorin, men detta görs även genom teoretiker såsom Freeman, Archard, Dworkin, Guggenheim, Hobbes och Locke. Dessa teorier har valts ut, för att de är de mest framträdande inom diskussionen om barns rättigheter. Flera av argu¬menten som trätt fram under bearbetningen av dokumenten, liknar varandra till stor del och stöttas av flertalet teorier och teoretiker. Detta resulterar i att argumentens hållbarhet och rim¬lighet stärks. / Abstract:The Convention on the Rights of the Child was for a long time the only of the UN's core con-ventions that had no communications proceeding, but in 2014 such a mechanism went into force. This essay aims to shed light on the debate surrounding the CRC Third Additional Protocol, individual complaints procedure for children. This is done by applying the method of argument analysis on the case of Sweden. The paper analyses the pro-arguments in the dis-course about whether children should have the right to a communications procedure or not, and if these pro-arguments have fairness and sustainability. The theories that are used in rela-tion to the method are: will-theory, interest theory, power theory, but also by theorists such as Freeman, Archard, Dworkin, Guggenheim, Hobbes and Locke. These theories have been se-lected because they are the most prominent in the discussion of children's rights. Many of the arguments that emerged during the processing of documents are similar to a large extent and are supported by the majority of theories and theorists. This makes these arguments plausibility strengthened.

The primary goal of this work is to answer this question: if Artificial Intelligences (AI) are proper subjects of moral consideration, then should we develop such AI – that is, AI worthy of moral consideration of its own accord? To answer the above question, it is necessary to provide a systematic overview of whether AI are, or could be, subjects of moral consideration. By combining P. Wang’s definition of AI with AK.M. Andersson’s “The Relevant Similarity Theory”, I aim to identify conditions under which an AI could be demarcated as a proper subject of moral consideration. As a comparison, I also combine Wang’s definition with M.C. Nussbaum’s “Capability Theory”. The proposed theories have two strengths in common – namely that they each are good and contemporary examples of two influential families of views in ethics, and that they, together, represent a fairly wide spectrum of ethical theory. Using the insights gained I first develop an argument showing that beings classifiable as AI under Wang’s definition of intelligence would be correctly demarcated as proper subjects of moral consideration, regardless of preference of the two moral theories. I then develop an argument answering my primary question as such: if AI are proper subjects of moral consideration, then we should not develop AI further. / <p>HT 2021</p>