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This thesis attempts to contribute further to the investigation of the way in which the political relations between the PRC and Argentina are influenced by the complementariness of their economies. In order to do so, this paper will, firstly, examine the different reasons that provoked the deterioration of the political relation between the two countries, which has remained in a state of strain ever since reaching a peak of tension in 2004. Secondly, it will analyze the underlying causes that might explain the fact that -in spite of political tensions- commercial ties between the two countries have continued to be steady, with bilateral trade having consistently been on the rise and –until recently, at least– expected to become more intense in the next few years, an economic fact that could favor the normalization and reestablishment of the –currently– damaged political relations. Finally, it will briefly analyzed the negative effects that the existing stagnation could have on the PRC-Argentina political relation, negatively affecting it and potentially provoking a decrease on the commercial exchanges between the two countries.

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of the metaphysical status of mathematical entities in Aristotle. Aristotle endorses a form of realism about mathematical entities: for him as well as for Platonists, anti-realism, the view that mathematical objects do not exist, is not a viable option. The thesis consists of two main parts: a part dedicated to the objects of geometry, and a part dedicated to numbers. Furthermore, I have included an introductory chapter about a passage in the second chapter of Book B of the Physics (193b31- 194a7) where Aristotle endorses a form of naïve realism with regard to mathematical entities. Many of the passages that give us an insight into Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics are to be found in the third chapter of Book M of the Metaphysics. Aristotle's primary concern there, however, is not so much to present his own positive account as to provide answers to a series of (not so obvious) Platonic arguments. In the second chapter of my thesis, I discuss some of those arguments and highlight their role in Aristotle's own position about the metaphysical status of geometrical entities. In a passage that is of crucial importance to understand Aristotle's views regarding the mode of existence of the objects of mathematics (Meta. M.3, 1078a25-31), Aristotle allows for the potential existence of them. I argue that Aristotle's sketchy remarks in Meta. M.3 point towards a geometry based on the commonsensical notion of the solid. This account can be further developed if we take into consideration the purpose of the preceding chapter M.2: to refute Platonic arguments that attribute greater metaphysical status to 'limit entities' (entities bounding and within a physical body), that is, to points, lines, and surfaces. According to Aristotle, such 'limit entities' have only a potential existence-what does this claim amount to? To answer this question, I will explore a more traditional reading of this claim and I will also put forward a more radical one: from a contemporary perspective, this reading makes Aristotelian geometry a distant cousin of modern Whiteheadian or Tarskian geometries. Providing an account of the metaphysical status of number in Aristotle poses quite a few challenges. On the one hand, the scarcity of the evidence forces commentators to rely on a few scattered remarks (primarily from the Physics) and to extract Aristotle's own views from heavily polemical contexts (such as the convoluted arguments that occupy much of books M and N of the Metaphysics). On the other hand, the Fregean tradition casts a great shadow upon the majority of the interpretations; indeed, a great amount of the relevant scholarship is dominated by Fregean tendencies: it is, for example, widely held that numbers for Aristotle are not supposed to be properties of objects, much like colour, say, or shape, but second-order properties (properties-of-properties) of objects. The scope of the third chapter is to critically examine some of the Fregean-inspired arguments that have led to a thoroughly Fregean depiction of Aristotle, and to lay the foundations for an alternative reading of the crucial texts.

The goal of this thesis is to explore the debate between Bas van Fraassens constructive empiricism and scientific realism. For this purpose I discuss the existence of observable and unobservable entities, the observation/theoretical dichotomy, inference to the best explanation, the no miracles argument, pessimistic induction, and epistemic risk. I strive to show that, contrary to the view of constructive empiricism, there is no clear demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities, and that not only naked eye observation but also the instrument-based observation plays an important role in acquiring knowledge. I agree with scientific realists that there is no highest point to the human power of observation; it is open-ended for further development. Moreover, naked eye observations are not themselves beyond doubt, as sometimes even naked eye observations deceive us. In that context, theoretical explanations help us to understand the real situation. As such, there is no reason to give more credit to naked eye observations than to instrument-mediated, theory-informed observations. <p>Scientific realists are confident in their knowledge of unobservables, and reject the epistemic significance of the observable/unobservable distinction. To justify their knowledge of unobservables, they use inferences to the best explanation. Such inferences play an important role in choosing the best theory amongst a group of theories. For their part, constructive empiricists use what is called the bad lot argument to refute these inferences. I try to show that such bad lot arguments fail to succeed at undermining inferences to the best explanation. Following scientific realists, I assert that nothing is miraculous in the domain of science, and that we can be assured of the approximate truth of successful scientific theories. It is true that many contemporary scientific theories contradict previously successful scientific theories, but that does not compel us to be pessimistic about such contemporary theories. Instead of pessimism, we can have an optimistic attitude about the progress of science. Considering the different arguments of constructive empiricism and scientific realism, this thesis gives more credit to scientific realism than to constructive empiricism.

One major problem with moral discourse is that we tend treat moral utterances as if they represent propositions. But complex metaphysical problems arise when we try to describe the nature of the moral facts that correspond to these propositions. If moral facts do not exist, how can moralizers justify engagement in moral practice? One possibility is abolitionism; abandoning morality and growing out of our old habits. Another option that has been suggested is that morality be preserved as a useful fiction. Moral fictionalists propose that moralizers come to understand their moral beliefs as fictive precommitments that are instrumentally valuable. In this essay, I argue that this type of instrumentalist justification does not allow moralizers to have genuinely moral reasons for acting in accordance with their precommitments. The legislative function of morality and the concept of moral personhood cannot be supported by metaethical theories that only provide instrumental reasons for adopting moral discourse. Ironically, this implies that an instrumentalist moral society would not be able to preserve as many useful moral concepts as would a non-instrumentalist moral society. Since the fictionalists’ own criterion demands that they endorse the most instrumentally valuable metaethical theory, they cannot persuasively argue that their own metaethical alternative is viable. Fictionalists should, I argue, prefer a non-instrumentalist theory that preserves more of the functions of moral discourse, such as quasi-realism. The argumentative strategy employed by fictionalists is therefore self-undermining.

In his latest work, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Bas van Fraassen has argued for a position he describes as empiricist structuralism. This position embraces a structuralist view of science which contrasts with increasingly popular structural realist accounts of science. Unlike structural realists about science, who argue that we can be realist about theoretical structure preserved across successive scientific paradigms, van Fraassen claims that this preserved structure is little more than the structure of our ordinary empirical observations. Those structural aspects of scientific theory which extend beyond this empiricist core can be regarded as purely theoretical postulates about which we are not entitled to be realist. In this way, van Fraassen maintains a common-sense realism about those observable objects and processes of everyday experience, while concurrently holding anti-realist views about those objects and processes which are unobservable. I argue, however, that on a more considered analysis, many of the most mundane objects and processes which van Fraassen wants to be realist about do not seem to meet his own criteria for observability. Once taken to its logical conclusions, empiricist structuralism leaves us in a far more anti-realist position than van Fraassen imagines and undermines many of the motivations for holding such a position at all. I offer alternative suggestions for a more plausible realist account of scientific practice.

One major problem with moral discourse is that we tend treat moral utterances as if they represent propositions. But complex metaphysical problems arise when we try to describe the nature of the moral facts that correspond to these propositions. If moral facts do not exist, how can moralizers justify engagement in moral practice? One possibility is abolitionism; abandoning morality and growing out of our old habits. Another option that has been suggested is that morality be preserved as a useful fiction. Moral fictionalists propose that moralizers come to understand their moral beliefs as fictive precommitments that are instrumentally valuable. In this essay, I argue that this type of instrumentalist justification does not allow moralizers to have genuinely moral reasons for acting in accordance with their precommitments. The legislative function of morality and the concept of moral personhood cannot be supported by metaethical theories that only provide instrumental reasons for adopting moral discourse. Ironically, this implies that an instrumentalist moral society would not be able to preserve as many useful moral concepts as would a non-instrumentalist moral society. Since the fictionalists’ own criterion demands that they endorse the most instrumentally valuable metaethical theory, they cannot persuasively argue that their own metaethical alternative is viable. Fictionalists should, I argue, prefer a non-instrumentalist theory that preserves more of the functions of moral discourse, such as quasi-realism. The argumentative strategy employed by fictionalists is therefore self-undermining.

In his latest work, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Bas van Fraassen has argued for a position he describes as empiricist structuralism. This position embraces a structuralist view of science which contrasts with increasingly popular structural realist accounts of science. Unlike structural realists about science, who argue that we can be realist about theoretical structure preserved across successive scientific paradigms, van Fraassen claims that this preserved structure is little more than the structure of our ordinary empirical observations. Those structural aspects of scientific theory which extend beyond this empiricist core can be regarded as purely theoretical postulates about which we are not entitled to be realist. In this way, van Fraassen maintains a common-sense realism about those observable objects and processes of everyday experience, while concurrently holding anti-realist views about those objects and processes which are unobservable. I argue, however, that on a more considered analysis, many of the most mundane objects and processes which van Fraassen wants to be realist about do not seem to meet his own criteria for observability. Once taken to its logical conclusions, empiricist structuralism leaves us in a far more anti-realist position than van Fraassen imagines and undermines many of the motivations for holding such a position at all. I offer alternative suggestions for a more plausible realist account of scientific practice.

The goal of this thesis is to explore the debate between Bas van Fraassens constructive empiricism and scientific realism. For this purpose I discuss the existence of observable and unobservable entities, the observation/theoretical dichotomy, inference to the best explanation, the no miracles argument, pessimistic induction, and epistemic risk. I strive to show that, contrary to the view of constructive empiricism, there is no clear demarcation line between observable and unobservable entities, and that not only naked eye observation but also the instrument-based observation plays an important role in acquiring knowledge. I agree with scientific realists that there is no highest point to the human power of observation; it is open-ended for further development. Moreover, naked eye observations are not themselves beyond doubt, as sometimes even naked eye observations deceive us. In that context, theoretical explanations help us to understand the real situation. As such, there is no reason to give more credit to naked eye observations than to instrument-mediated, theory-informed observations. <p>Scientific realists are confident in their knowledge of unobservables, and reject the epistemic significance of the observable/unobservable distinction. To justify their knowledge of unobservables, they use inferences to the best explanation. Such inferences play an important role in choosing the best theory amongst a group of theories. For their part, constructive empiricists use what is called the bad lot argument to refute these inferences. I try to show that such bad lot arguments fail to succeed at undermining inferences to the best explanation. Following scientific realists, I assert that nothing is miraculous in the domain of science, and that we can be assured of the approximate truth of successful scientific theories. It is true that many contemporary scientific theories contradict previously successful scientific theories, but that does not compel us to be pessimistic about such contemporary theories. Instead of pessimism, we can have an optimistic attitude about the progress of science. Considering the different arguments of constructive empiricism and scientific realism, this thesis gives more credit to scientific realism than to constructive empiricism.

Magisk realism utgör ett sofistikerat berättagrepp i den japanske författaren Haruki Murakamis roman Kafka på stranden. I det realistiska ramverket av japansk vardag inträffar magiska inslag i form av fiskregn eller ikiryou en sorts 'gengångare'. Den magiska realismen utgör en artikulation mellan en medveten och en omedveten värld eller tar läsaren med på en gränsöverskridande resa för att utforska stil eller genre i texten samt identitet hos Jaget och den Andre.